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Abstract
In this treatise I introduce the time dependent Generalized Born’s Rule for
the probabilities of quantum events, including conditional and consecutive
probabilities, as the unique fundamental time evolution equation of quantum
theory. Then these probabilities, computed from states and events, are to be
compared with relative frequencies of observations. Schrödinger’s equation
still is valid in one model of the axioms of quantum theory, which I call the
Schrödinger model. However, the role of Schrödinger’s equation is auxiliary,
since it serves to help compute the continuous temporal evolution of the
probabilities given by the Generalized Born’s Rule. In other models, such
as the Heisenberg model, the auxiliary equations are quite different, but
the Generalized Born’s Rule is the same formula (covariance) and gives the
same results (invariance). Also some aspects of the Schrödinger model are
not found in the isomorphic Heisenberg model, and they therefore do not
have any physical significance. One example of this is the infamous collapse
of the quantum state. Other quantum phenomena, such as entanglement,
are easy to analyze in terms of the Generalized Born’s Rule without any
reference to the unnecessary concept of collapse. Finally, this leads to the
possibility of quantum theory with other sorts of auxiliary equations instead
of Schrödinger’s equation, and examples of this are given. Throughout this
treatise the leit motif is the central importance of quantum probability and
most especially of the simplifying role of the time dependent Generalized
Born’s Rule in quantum theory.
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Back Cover Blurb
This treatise presents a careful re-organization at an advanced level in terms
of the probability theory of basic quantum theory based on quantum states
and quantum events. This leads to the recognition that the fundamental
time evolution equation of quantum theory is the Generalized Born’s Rule,
not Schrödinger’s equation, which here plays a secondary role in one model
of quantum theory. References to classical physics are kept to a minimum,
since this is meant to be a stand-alone, axiomatic presentation of standard
quantum theory. This is not a generalization of quantum theory nor an
interpretation of it. The intended audience consists of those with a detailed
previous knowledge of quantum theory, classical probability and functional
analysis. Advanced undergraduate students may find something of interest,
but this is not a continuation of an introductory course in quantum theory.
Preface
What I can not create
I do not understand
Richard Feynman
After finishing my recently published introductory book [31] on quantum
theory, I began thinking of writing a sequel on the usual advanced topics used
in applications. I am thinking of Hartree-Fock, variational methods, atomic
and molecular physics, solid state physics, scattering theory, perturbation
theory and so on. But these topics are covered in many fine texts which get
the physics (mostly) right as well as getting the mathematics (mostly) right.
Some even get everything right! There seemed to be no point in writing yet
another big square book on all that well known material. And I am tired
of the retellings of the story of the historical path that led to the quantum
theory. Besides history hides the internal logical structure of quantum theory.
So references to history will be few and far between.
I decided to resolve clearly at an advanced level, but at the same time
in the simplest possible way, the unaddressed basic problem of quantum
theory: its logical structure without any reference to classical physics. And
it seemed to me that the central role of quantum probability in quantum
theory was not sufficiently appreciated in the scientific community, especially
the roles of conditional and consecutive probability. That seemed to be a
good starting point, and so I aimed at writing an expository article directed
at a specialized public to explain that. I soon realized that I had it wrong.
Quantum probability is not a central part of quantum theory. Rather the
basics of quantum theory are exactly the same as quantum probability. What
I mean is that the Generalized Born’s Rule, and not Schrödinger’s equation as
I previously thought, is the fundamental time evolution equation of quantum
theory. That is the essence of this treatise.
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Preface v
My approach is so different from the current trend to give ‘interpretations’
of quantum theory that I felt obliged to give an apology separately.
How I happened to arrive at this understanding may be of interest. I was
confused by the equivalence of the Schrödinger picture and the Heisenberg
picture. Most particularly, how could the Schrödinger picture have collapse
of the state as a basic aspect of the theory while the equivalent Heisenberg
picture has states which are time independent? I then realized that the
equivalence of these pictures is a well known statement about time dependent
probabilities. And therefore, probabilities and how to calculate them are the
central issue of quantum theory. That is exactly what the Generalized Born’s
Rule is about.
I am telling a new story, but all the characters in it are familiar. So, this
is a new organization of standard material with Born’s rule placed front and
center. This requires introducing a Generalized Born’s Rule that might be
new to you, though it is implicit in standard textbook quantum mechanics
and in many cases is related to Lüders rule. However most importantly,
the really new idea in this treatise is that the Generalized Born’s Rule is
the one and only fundamental time evolution equation in quantum theory.
Quantum probability is not simply an important part of quantum theory,
as I have previously thought. Rather it is the central part. Schrödinger’s
equation is still present in one model of quantum theory and still plays a
crucial role in understanding quantum systems, but it is not the fundamental
time evolution equation. It turns out that the model based on Schrödinger’s
equation. which I call Schrödinger’s model, has attributes that are not present
in other isomorphic models. The collapse of the wave function is an example
of this.
Another new aspect of this story is that there are many non-isomorphic
models of the basic axioms of quantum theory. This seems to fly in the face
of trying to find the unique and universal laws of nature. But the point
is that quantum theory is a work in progress and in this treatise only the
basics are being considered. In particular, this is not a complete exposition
of known quantum theory, since that would require many volumes. So, many
topics are deliberately not included. This is not a theory of everything, but a
theory of something. However, I am considering quantum theory consistent
with Galilean relativity and at the same time quantum theory consistent with
special relativity. If things work out that way, I am even considering quantum
theory consistent with general relativity. So I hope the reader realizes the
importance of non-uniqueness.
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This is a story about events (as well as states and probabilities) and could
be confused with the consistent histories interpretation of quantum theory.
(See [13].) I deal with this confusion in the chapter Interpretations. For
now let me note that I am not giving any ‘interpretation’ of quantum theory.
Nor do I care to, since ‘interpretations’ are neither falsifiable nor verifiable.
Rather this is a scientific treatise. However, I will touch on some issues that
are often considered in an ‘interpretation’ of quantum theory. This is not
an attempt to solve philosophical problems, but instead a way of throwing
some light on quantum situations by using just the basics: events, states and
probabilities.
This story is addressed to a reader with a rather substantial background
in quantum physics as well as in the mathematics used in describing that
physics. This is not an elementary treatise, nor even the immediate sequel
of such an introduction as for example found in my book [31]. Advanced
undergraduate students in physics or mathematics might find this material to
be quite challenging, though they should not be discouraged from trying. But
my intended audience consists of professional scientists and some graduate
students with lots of math and physics knowledge, much more than can be
found in [31]. The prerequisites that the reader should have include, but are
not limited to, an extensive prior knowledge of quantum physics and Hilbert
space theory. I assume knowledge of functional analysis up to at least the
spectral theory for self-adjoint operators. And this will be a stand-alone story.
References to classical physics will be incidental, not part of the main story.
It is not clear whether those with some knowledge of classical mechanics have
an advantage or an impediment. Some easy pedagogical examples, which are
some how illustrative of the general theory, will also be given. But mostly,
the presentation will be quite general. The experts will note, however, that
I limit myself to examples that are type I von Neumann algebras.
This treatise is organized as follows. The first chapter states and discusses
the Axioms. Chapter 2 is a long introduction to Quantum Probability. Here
the important topics of conditional and consecutive probability are discussed.
This is not new, neither in theory nor experiment, since one has to assign
theoretical probabilities to sequences of events and one measures relative
frequencies of such sequences. In one section this theory is compared and
contrasted with its well known intellectual competitor: Classical Probability
as a topic in measure theory. But I do not consider comparisons with classical
physics, Bell’s inequalities, hidden variables and such side issues, since my
focus is on quantum theory as a new type of probability theory and nothing
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else. Chapter 3 then applies this theory to Entanglement. In Chapters 4
to 7 I discuss various issues that have filled volumes for decades. These are
Schrödinger’s Cat, the Measurement Problem, the EPR paper, Determinism
and Probability. I do not resolve any of these issues, but try to shed some
light on what they are (or should be) about.
In the rest of the treatise I consider topics that strictly speaking have
little or nothing to do with quantum theory. I include them since it is an
appropriate moment for commenting on them. In Chapter 8 I attempt to
dismiss Interpretation, in the contemporary sense of that word, from scien-
tific consideration. Chapter 9 is devoted to the Wave Function about which I
expect the reader to know a lot already. I include it in order to rid quantum
theory of residual classical language that slips into discussions of it. Chap-
ter 10 concerns various extensions and alternatives to quantum theory. Some
of these are currently well accepted, while others are wild speculation at best.
In the final Chapter 11 it is my turn to tilt at windmills with an unlikely
proposal.
Strangely enough, I do not have to give any applications of the basic time
evolution equation of quantum theory. This is because that is done quite well
in the standard textbooks, usually in the Schrödinger model. Readers with a
lot of background can get the basic gist of this treatise by reading the sections
on Axiom 5 and Quantum Conditional Probability and then skipping forward
to the Chapter on Entanglement. I would like to point out that I originally
thought that Entanglement could not be explained without using the collapse
of the state associated with a measurement. So I examined this case carefully
in order to understand the fundamental role of the collapse condition. What
I found out surprised me; an analysis in terms of the conditional probability
of sequences of quantum events suffices.
There is a multitude of topics that I could have included, but I decided
to make my point in a slim book. I am reminded of the lawyer who was
summing up in court the defense of his client on and on. His partner seated
at his side took a legal notepad and wrote on it: “Sit down! You have made
your point!” So, I hope that I have said enough to make my point.
This treatise was much easier to write than [31], since here I can rely on
the previous knowledge of my intended reader. One day I hope to write a
book on basic quantum theory in a manner accessible to a general public,
since I feel that I owe it to my friends who are not scientists. That will be a
much more difficult task. In many ways this treatise is prologue.
Storytelling is a part of human culture and, by inference, a part of human
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nature. It is an art practiced in all societies throughout history. It pre-exists
written language. But it is a mistake to think that a universal part of the
human condition is necessarily a talent shared by all people. Quite simply,
there are many persons who can not narrate a story in a fashion comprehen-
sible to others. I am not merely speaking of those born with cerebral damage.
There are also those who do not understand that a story is for an audience
that does not yet know completely the topic at hand and, consequently, the
storyteller must go into the details, step by step, to communicate with that
audience. Young children seem to always be like that; when they tell a story
it is as if they expect the listener to already know it and they are merely
repeating something known by everyone. One has to learn that the ‘other’
is different from the ‘ego’ and so must be accommodated accordingly. But
some people never learn this, or learn it incompletely. Such people we can
deem as ‘pre-literate’ though this is meant to be purely descriptive and not
judgmental. At best they are like children who can repeat fragments without
realizing what are the processes, both mental and observational, by which
this all comes about. Such people are not able to organize nor communicate
scientific knowledge; They only listen to ‘authority’ and repeat it. A fancy
way of naming storytelling is simply ‘narrative’.
Curiosity is also a part of human culture and, by inference, a part of
human nature. And similarly, not everyone is curious or, better said, not
everyone is curious in the same way. Moreover, those who are curious may not
have much talent or experience for dealing with that curiosity in a systematic
way. Scientific activity is a combination of curiosity and narrative. While
some sort of scientific activity in this vague sense is found in all cultures, the
contemporary version of science is not a necessary aspect of human culture.
Many people are ‘pre-scientific’ very much in the same way as many people
are pre-literate.
The contemporary concept of science is not an invention of the modern
world, even though it is a human invention of an intellectual sort. One
can learn how science, basically as understood nowadays, was practiced in
Hellenistic society beginning around 300 B.C. from the fascinating book [28]
by L. Russo. As Russo points out, some ‘modern’ scientists do not grasp
completely what Archimedes and Co. were doing in Ancient Antiquity. One
necessary scientific activity, then as now, is the construction of mathematical
models which relate to observations. It is a two-way street, but logically the
flow starts on the observational side. In this approach the historical process is
not of any interest. However, I will directly jump over to the theoretical side
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by starting with an axiomatization of quantum theory. This methodology is
what Maxwell’s Equations are all about, though they are not typically called
Maxwell’s Axioms. Maybe they should be renamed.
I thank Micho Ðurđevich for graciously commenting on a preliminary
version of this treatise.
Many people have helped me in understanding the matters discussed here.
Sometimes that help was a detailed explanation, but often it was a casual
question or comment that focused my attention on an important matter.
A very partial list of those that I have known must include Luigi Accardi,
David Brydges, Micho Ðurđevich, Leonard Gross, George Hagedorn, Brian
Hall, Ira Herbst, Jim Howland, Jaime Cruz Sampedro, Larry Thomas and
Carlos Villegas. During my undergraduate days I was advised to read the
masters. So I am indebted also to those whom I have only known through
their published work. Most notable among those are Valentine Bargmann,
Paul Dirac, Richard Feynman, David Hilbert, John von Neumann, Erwin
Schrödinger, and Eugene Wigner. I thank all those mentioned as well as
many more, too numerous to recall and list their names. Of course, any
errors or shortcomings are due to my imperfect understanding of non-intuitive
matters.
Stephen Bruce Sontz
Centro de Investigación en Matemáticas, A.C. (CIMAT)
Guanajuato, Mexico
September 2020 (Preliminary version)
Apology
Avant tout il faut savoir poser des problèmes.
Et quoi qu’on dise, dans la vie scientifique,
les problèmes ne se posent pas d’eux-mêmes.
Gaston Bachelard
If this treatise receives any reception beyond total negligence, it most
likely will consist mainly of negative criticisms. In anticipation of the worst
of these, I present a defense. I only ask those imagined critics to try to take
what I now say into consideration.
I will be criticized for not treating some favorite topic. But this treatise is
meant to lay the groundwork for building a better understanding of quantum
theory. No claim is made to completeness. Nor would this be possible in
anything less than an encyclopedic set of volumes. If some think that it is
important that other topics be studied from this viewpoint, then it behooves
them to undertake that study. I intend to stand not only on the shoulders of
the giants who preceded me, but also on the shoulders of those who follow.
I will be criticized for not discussing classical physics, Bell’s inequalities,
quantization schemes, semi-classical limits or any of a number of topics that
are not part of quantum theory itself. But my subject matter is quantum
theory, nothing else.
I will be criticized for not seeking a deterministic, classical explanation for
quantum situations that have probability 1, despite the fact that probability
theory always includes the limiting case of probability 1 with no need for
explanations outside of that theory itself.
I will be criticized for being ‘over-mathematical’ when, in fact, I am just
trying to isolate the purely mathematical aspects of quantum theory in order
to avoid their intrusion into the difficult process of creating physical intuition
for a probability theory.
x
Contents xi
I will be criticized for relying on axioms. However, this is a time tested
methodology for organizing an explanatory system of thought in order to
provide objective criteria for valid advances and to enhance understanding.
It also serves the important pedagogical goal of giving a student a way to
learn and dominate the subject.
I will be criticized for giving yet another interpretation of quantum theory,
no better, and quite possibly, worse than others. But interpretation is not
my concern. Interpretation is felt to be required when obscurity, confusion
and contradiction dominate. But by isolating and logically organizing the
basics, I think that the need for interpretation recedes.
I will be criticized because this is mostly well known material that has
already appeared in the scientific literature long ago. Well, point partially
granted. However, I have firstly re-organized that well known material and
secondly put the Generalized Born’s Rule at its head as the fundamental
time evolution equation of quantum theory. I have not tried, as many have,
to derive Born’s Rule from more basic principles. Rather it is an axiom.
Moreover, I have emphasized that this is actually a time evolution equation,
even though it is not a differential equation.
I will be criticized because this is new material which rejects standard
quantum theory. But nothing is rejected, not even the collapse condition,
although it is language that I would prefer to avoid. I am only trying to put
things in their proper perspective given the new viewpoint provided by the
Generalized Born’s Rule.
I will be criticized for not solving some problem or other, whether it be
a problem of physics, mathematics or epistemology. I have posed my own
problem and outlined my resolution of it. Explicitly, the initial problem
was how to understand the collapse condition as a necessary part of the
Heisenberg picture of the quantum theory of entanglement. This is a part
of the scientific project, not all of it. I encourage others to work on their
problems.
I will be criticized because I do not have the requisite standing in the
scientific community to opine publicly on these matters. This is but a way to
avoid confronting the treatise on its intrinsic merits and should be recognized
as such. And rejected as such.
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Chapter 1
Axioms
I had been told that Euclid
proved things and was much
disappointed that he started
with axioms.
Bertrand Russell
In [31] I put the axioms in the penultimate chapter of the book. This was
a pedagogical choice. The intended audience for that book consists of people
with no prior background in physics, and so I wanted to present first the
particulars and get to the logic behind it all later. In fact, since many novices
are allergic to axioms and logic, I even made that chapter optional. But this
treatise addresses a much more advanced audience. I not only expect your
interest in these details, but also your understanding of their import. One
point is that there is a way to associate certain aspects of this mathematical
theory with physical phenomena. A theory, any theory, is interesting and
important if there are a sufficient number of physical phenomena that are
adequately described by it. There is no need to claim that this theory, or
any theory, is adequate for describing all possible physical phenomena. It is
in this sense that I use the expressions ‘physical characteristic’ or ‘observable
quantity’, for example. These are like ‘point’ and ‘line’ in geometry; they
are undefined expressions subject to possible correspondence with certain
physical phenomena.
These axioms are intended to provide a logical starting point for under-
standing standard ‘textbook’ quantum mechanics as is used on a daily basis
by scientists and engineers. If you prefer to start with other axioms that
1
2 Axioms
have these as logical consequences, then you are implicitly accepting the rest
of this treatise, provided that I have made no mistakes. If you prefer to
start with other axioms that contradict these, then the points of discrepancy
should be subjected to experimental tests. These axioms are not intended to
be complete, but are meant to give an explicit, logical basis for the rest of
the treatise. Nor are they intended to be the final, most efficient way to do
this.
I will use the spectral theorem for self-adjoint operators acting in a Hilbert
space. I try to use standard notations and conventions. Throughout this
treatise self-adjoint operators are understood to be densely defined. These
axioms are not the same as those given in [31]. Nor is this intended to be a
complete list of axioms. The statement of each axiom terminates with the
symbol .
We let C denote the field of complex numbers and i =
√−1 ∈ C. We
also define L(H) := {T : H → H| T is linear and bounded}, where H always
denotes a complex Hilbert space. We note that L(H) when equipped with
the operator norm, denoted by || · ||op, and the adjoint operation, denoted by
T 7→ T ∗, is both a C∗-algebra as well as a von Neumann algebra. The inner
product on H, denoted as 〈·, ·〉, is anti-linear in the first entry and linear in
the second. The norm on H is denoted as || · ||.
Here is some Dirac notation we will use. Every element in the dual
Hilbert space H′ := {l : H → C | l is linear and bounded}, according to the
Riesz representation theorem, can be written for a unique φ ∈ H as l = 〈φ|,
where the bra 〈φ| is defined by 〈φ|ψ := 〈φ, ψ〉 for all ψ ∈ H. Every vector
ψ ∈ H, a Hilbert space, can also be denoted as a ket |ψ〉. Then the definition
of bra becomes 〈φ| |ψ〉 := 〈φ, ψ〉. For a pair of vectors φ, ψ ∈ H we define
|ψ〉〈φ| := |ψ〉 ⊗ 〈φ| ∈ H ⊗H′.
This is then identified with the element in L(H) defined for all α ∈ H by
|ψ〉〈φ|α := 〈φ, α〉ψ.
Its operator norm satisfies || |ψ〉〈φ| ||op = ||ψ|| ||φ||, while its operator adjoint
satisfies (|ψ〉〈φ|)∗ = |φ〉〈ψ|. If both ψ and φ are also non-zero, then |ψ〉〈φ| is
a rank 1 operator. If φ is a unit vector, then |φ〉〈φ| is both a projection and
a self-adjoint, positive, trace 1 operator, that is, a density matrix.
We let ~ denote the (normalized) Planck’s constant. After the Table of
Contents a list of other standard notations and abbreviations from physics
and mathematics can be found.
Axiom 1 3
1.1 Axiom 1 - Kinematics
Axiom 1: (Kinematics) For every quantum system there is an associated
non-commutative von Neumann algebra V in L(H). The projection operators
in V are called (quantum) events and are associated with the physical events
of the system. There is a non-empty set of self-adjoint operators, each of
which is associated with a physically measurable observable of the system.
In particular, every event is such an observable. Also, each such self-adjoint
operator A (also called an observable) is associated to V, which means that
its projection valued measure (pvm) PA satisfies PA(B) ∈ V for all Borel
subsets B of R. 
The first condition in the axiom implies that dimCH ≥ 2. This axiom
does not assert that every observable quantity of a physical entity has a
corresponding self-adjoint operator in quantum theory. The most important
example of such an observable is the time of a physical event. Since the
events in V are assumed to be observables and the events (≡ projections)
generate V, it follows that the observables generate V. The criterion of
non-commutativity reflects Dirac’s often expressed opinion that the essential
characteristic of quantum theory is that the observables do not commute.
Since this is a presentation based on events and, in particular events of
the form PA(B) (using the notation of the axiom), it is more convenient,
almost obligatory, to use von Neumann algebras instead of the more general
structure of C∗-algebras. The point is that if one starts with a C∗-algebra C
and one has a self-adjoint A ∈ C, then the associated events PA(B) do not
necessarily lie in C, though they do lie in the smallest von Neumann algebra
containing C.
The mathematical definition of a quantum event as a projection operator
must be considered with care, since it does not correspond to the word ‘event’
in common English usage. A projection operator E /∈ {0, I} has spectrum
{0, 1}. Sometimes it is said that a quantum event is a YES-NO phenomenon.
In other words, a quantum event has exactly two possible eigenvalues. But
a physical event colloquially means that only one thing has occurred. For
example, suppose there is one beta unstable, radioactive nucleus in an atomic
trap. Suppose that it decays in a certain time period. Common usage has
it that beta decay occurred. But if it does not decay in that time period,
common usage has it that nothing happened, that there was no physical
event. But the second alternative is just the NO or 0 eigenvalue of the event
4 Axiom 2
of beta decay in that time interval. In either case we have the same quantum
event, but with two distinct values. For example, we say that PA(B) is the
quantum event that the observable A takes a value in B. But in general
this quantum event has two eigenvalues. As with any non-trivial self adjoint
operator a quantum event can assume more than one value. We can also
think of the eigenvalue 1 of the event PA(B) as meaning that a measurement
associated with A produced a value in B, while the eigenvalue 0 says that
the same measurement produced a value in R \ B, the set complement of
B in the real line. But measurements do not play a distinguished role in
this treatise; they are just a particular type of event. And events do play a
central role here.
It is traditional to speak in quantum theory in terms of the self-adjoint
operators acting in a given Hilbert space H. This is not logically necessary,
since in functional analysis one proves that these mathematical structures
are in bijective correspondence with two other structures. These structures
are on the one hand projection valued measures (pvm’s) with values in L(H)
defined on the Borel σ-algebra ofR and on the other hand strongly continuous
unitary groups acting on H. For example, one can define the commutativity
of two self-adjoint operators S and T by one of these equivalent definitions:
• Let PS and PT , denote the pvm’s of S and T , respectively. Then we
say that S and T commute if PS(B) commutes with PT (C) for all Borel
subsets B,C of R. (Notice that each of the families {PS(B) |B ∈ B(R)}
and {PT (C) |C ∈ B(R)} is commutative. This definition requires that
their union is also a commutative family.)
• Let eirS and eisT for r, s ∈ R denote the unitary groups of S and T ,
respectively. Then we say that S and T commute if eirS commutes
with eisT for all r, s ∈ R. (Notice that here as well each of the families
of unitary operators {eirS | r ∈ R} and {eisT | s ∈ R} is commutative.
This definition requires that their union is also a commutative family.)
The next axiom is really just a continuation of Axiom 1. It is included
as a separate axiom because of tradition.
1.2 Axiom 2 - States and Events
Axiom 2: (States and Events) Every quantum system is described by
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probabilities that are computed by using its set of events (see Axiom 1) and
the set of states of its von Neumann algebra V. 
Unfortunately, the terminology ‘state’ is so widely used that there is no hope
of ever replacing it with a neutral term. It is a term that drips with meanings
from classical physics as well as from everyday life. But in quantum theory
as presented here it is a mathematical term with a mathematical definition
In the following we will mainly discuss the case when the von Neumann
algebra V = L(H), since many quantum systems are covered by this case. In
introductory texts it is the only case considered, since that already puts a lot
of mathematical burden on beginners. I did this myself in [31]. While this
is the only case familiar to many physicists, there are other von Neumann
algebras used in quantum theory. When a physicist speaks of a Hilbert space
as being the setting for the discussion of a quantum system, the underlying,
usually implicit assumption is that the appropriate von Neumann algebra is
L(H). But that could be an error. The problem is to find the correct von
Neumann algebra, and not the correct Hilbert space as is often thought. This
is just a part of the problem of quantization. An important point here is that
the lattice of events is central to quantum theory, and its structure depends
on the von Neumann algebra being used. Note that the quantization problem
is not a problem within quantum theory itself, but rather a problem of how
to arrive at the quantum theory of a particular physical system or maybe of
a class of physical systems. This non-trivial and important problem will not
be addressed in this treatise.
Definition 1.2.1 A state is as a linear functional l : L(H)→ C satisfying
• (Positivity Preservation)
l(T ) ≥ 0 for all T ∈ L(H) that are positive (meaning that T = T ∗ ≥ 0).
• (Normalization)
l(I) = 1, where I ∈ L(H) denotes the identity operator.
It turns out that every state l is a bounded linear functional with norm
||l|| = 1. So l ∈ (L(H))′, the dual Banach space of the Banach space L(H).
We let S denote the set of all states. Then S is a convex subset of (L(H))′.
An immediate consequence of this axiom is that every unit vector ψ ∈ H,
that is ||ψ|| = 1, determines a state lψ defined by lψ(T ) := 〈ψ, Tψ〉 for all
T ∈ L(H). Moreover, the state lψ does not uniquely determine a unit vector
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that defines it, since lψ = lϕ for all unit vectors ϕ that satisfy ϕ = λψ for
some λ ∈ C. (Necessarily we have |λ| = 1.) The easy proof of these facts is
left to the reader. Such a state lψ is called a pure state.
There are more states. Every trace class operator D = D∗ ≥ 0 satisfying
Tr(D) = 1 is called a density matrix. Any such density matrix D defines a
state lD by lD(T ) := Tr(DT ) for all T ∈ L(H). We say that lD is a mixed
state. It is an exercise in functional analysis to show that lD is a state and
that this state uniquely determines the density matrix D. Also, any state
lψ, where ψ is a unit vector, defines a unique density matrix D = |ψ〉〈ψ| (in
Dirac notation) such that lD = lψ. However, if dimCH ≥ 2, it is easy to
construct mixed states which are not pure states.
I have carefully distinguished the terminology here. Often the expressions
‘density matrix’ and ‘mixed state’ are conflated as if they were synonyms.
But that is not quite so. Gleason’s Theorem (see [12]) speaks to this question.
In common parlance, especially among physicists, the expression mixed
state is often reserved for those states lD which are not pure states. This
is due in part to the emphasis given to pure states in many applications.
Indeed, often one only considers the pure states. It is important to note that
the set of pure states is in bijective correspondence with the set of all one-
dimensional subspaces of the Hilbert space H. The latter set is called the
(complex) projective space associated to H and is denoted as CP(H). This
projective space has many interesting mathematical properties.
The set of quantum events should be in bijection with the physical events
of a given quantum system. If not, then one has not correctly chosen the von
Neumann algebra for the system. The choice of the self-adjoint operators and
the states, which are physically relevant, is not so obvious. It is generally
accepted that the self-adjoint operators should be associated with the von
Neumann algebra, as specified in Axiom 1, though it may be the case that
not all such self-adjoint operators will have a physical significance. As for
the states, my preference is to include first only those states |ψ〉〈ψ| (with ψ
a unit vector in H) that are also events in the von Neumann algebra and
then the mixed states formed from these, that is, their closed convex hull.
To my way of thinking, this is not an ad hoc super-selection rule, but rather
a way of carefully choosing a self-consistent model for a quantum system.
Such a choice of model is called a quantization. A rule of thumb is that a
quantization should be based on a von Neumann algebra that is generated
by the smallest set of events needed to understand the quantum system.
However, quantization remains to this day as much an art as a science.
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1.3 Axiom 3 - Spin and Statistics
Axiom 3: (Spin and Statistics) The most basic quantum entities are
either bosons, all of which have integer spin, or fermions, all of which have
half-integer spin. All other quantum entities are composites of these. 
The Hilbert spaceH for a single boson or a single fermion carries a unitary
representation of the Lie group SU(2). That representation defines the value
of the spin. It seems that all ‘matter’ is composed of fermions, while all
‘interactions’ are mediated by bosons. But dark matter could be something
else; we simply do not know. Also, gravitation is thought by many physicists
to be mediated by gravitons, a spin 2 boson. However, we simply do not
know if that is correct. So, this axiom may be changed some day.
The Hilbert space of composite quantum entities is given in terms of
the Hilbert spaces of the constituent bosons and fermions by a non-intuitive
mathematical construction. This axiom is included because of its importance
in quantum theory. However, it is not presented in total detail since it is not
going to play a role in this treatise, which focuses on probability and leaves
spin and statistics to a side.
This axiom is a complicated condition that seems to have nothing to
do with the other axioms, and it introduces spin into quantum theory in a
seemingly ad hoc manner. If you like to think in terms of analogies, then
the Fifth Axiom of Euclid comes to mind. While generations have fretted
over deeper explanations of the origin of probability in quantum theory, nary
anybody is much concerned with an underlying explanation of spin. But spin
seems to be as much an essential, non-classical ingredient of quantum theory
as is probability. The reader can refer to the literature on this topic, most
notably in quantum field theory.
Another mathematical structure introduced in this axiom is that of a
representation. There is no denying that this is an important concept in
quantum physics. For example, see [32]. However, it will not play any role
in this treatise. Perhaps some comments on this omission are in order. For
example, the group symmetries of space and time, respectively, lead to the
conservation of linear momentum and energy, respectively. Even though they
are part of relativistic quantum theory, these symmetries are not a part of
basic quantum theory as presented in this treatise. This is common in most
introductory textbooks on quantum theory, which is a bit of an anomaly
given that quantum Hamiltonians are often based on classical Hamiltonians
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representing the total energy of a system. Actually, the basics presented
here are not explicitly invariant under representations of the Galilean group
nor the Poincaré group, but rather consistent with either of these groups.
Thinking that quantum theory automatically carries a representation of the
Poincaré group led to the mistaken conviction that parity is conserved in all
interactions in quantum theory. We also will not be considering quantum
interactions explicitly, except in so far as they are a type of quantum event.
It may seem strange that the non-intuitive concept of spin enters an
axiom, while the intuitive concept of position does not. Note that position,
together with linear momentum, enter quantum theory via a representation
of the Weyl-Heisenberg group. This could be taken as a shortcoming of the
approach taken in this thesis. However, none of these particular observables
will play a role here, though all of them could be present in a more complete
axiomatization of quantum theory.
1.4 Axiom 4 - Time Independent Born’s Rule
Axiom 4: (Time Independent Born’s Rule) Let T be a self-adjoint op-
erator (perhaps associated with an observable quantity of a physical entity), ρ
be a density matrix and B be a Borel subset of R. Then the quantum probabil-
ity that T lies in the set B given ρ is defined as P (T ∈ B | ρ) := Tr(PT (B)ρ).
Here Tr is the trace of a trace class operator, and PT is the pvm associated
to the self-adjoint operator T . 
This axiom, or a simple consequence of it about expected values, is part
of standard quantum theory as found in the textbooks and as practiced in the
scientific community. Only later on will we put time dependence into this
and, most importantly, elevate the resulting formula to be the basic time
evolution equation of quantum theory.
For fixed T and ρ the assignment B 7→ P (T ∈ B | ρ) ∈ [0, 1] for B a Borel
subset of R is a probability measure on R in the sense of measure theory.
The physical significance of quantum probability is that it corresponds to
the relative frequency of the empirically observed quantities associated to the
self-adjoint operator T .
To show the normalizations of this probability measure, we note that
P (T ∈ ∅ | ρ) = Tr(PT (∅) ρ) = Tr(0 ρ) = Tr(0) = 0
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and
P (T ∈ R | ρ) = Tr(PT (R) ρ) = Tr(I ρ) = Tr(ρ) = 1.
To show σ-additivity let {Bj | j ∈ N} be a countable family of disjoint Borel
subsets of R. We can calculate the trace of a trace class operator using
any orthonormal basis of H. We choose an orthonormal basis {φk} which
diagonalizes the trace class operator ρ. Specifically, ρ φk = λk φk where
λk ≥ 0 for each index k. (Also
∑
k λk = 1.)
Then we have
P (T ∈ ∪jBj | ρ) = Tr
(
PT (∪jBj ) ρ
)
=
∑
k
〈φk, PT (∪jBj) ρ φk〉
=
∑
k
〈φk,
∑
j
PT (Bj) ρ φk〉 using strong operator topology
=
∑
k
〈φk,
∑
j
PT (Bj )(λk φk)〉
=
∑
k
∑
j
λk〈φk, PT (Bj )φk〉
=
∑
j
∑
k
λk〈φk, PT (Bj )φk〉 using Fubini′s theorem
=
∑
j
∑
k
〈φk, PT (Bj )(λk φk)〉
=
∑
j
∑
k
〈φk, PT (Bj ) ρφk〉
=
∑
j
Tr
(
PT (Bj) ρ
)
=
∑
j
P (T ∈ Bj | ρ).
We can apply Fubini’s theorem since all of the terms in the double sum are
non-negative.
We discuss mainly the case of pure states φ ∈ H where ||φ|| = 1, in which
case ρ = |φ〉〈φ|. We then introduce the notation
P (T ∈ B | φ) := Tr(PT (B) |φ〉〈φ|) = 〈φ, PT (B)φ〉,
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which we read as: The probability that T has a value in B given φ. The
notation as well as the way of reading it suggests that this is related to the
concept of conditional probability in classical probability. We shall come
back to this point.
There are alternative formulas for Born’s rule for the case of pure states.
Here are two useful ones:
P (T ∈ B | φ) = ||PT (B)φ||2 = Tr(PT (B)Eφ).
Here Eφ := |φ〉〈φ| in Dirac notation is a rank 1 projection, and Tr denotes
the trace of a trace class operator. Note that Eφ is a both a quantum event
and a density matrix.
Axiom 4 is the simplest form of Born’s rule. It will be generalized and as
such its central importance in quantum theory will become apparent.
1.5 Axiom 5 - Dynamics
Axiom 5: (Dynamics) Every physical system has two associated actions
of one-parameter groups. These are denoted as St and Et, where t ∈ R is
considered as a parameter in the theory which corresponds to time. (By
one-parameter group we mean that SaSb = Sa+b for all a, b ∈ R and that
S0 = I, the appropriate identity map. Similar formulas hold for Et.)
The one-parameter group St maps the convex set S of all states (including
mixed states) to itself, while the one-parameter group Et maps the set E of
all quantum events to itself.
The dynamics (or time evolution) of the physical system itself for an
initial observable represented by a self-adjoint operator T = T ∗ and an initial
density matrix ρ is given by the time dependent Born’s rule
t 7→ Tr(Et(PT (B))Stρ) for t ∈ R, (1.5.1)
provided that conservation of probability holds, which by definition means
that for fixed ρ and T = T ∗ the mapping B 7→ Tr(Et(PT (B))Stρ) is a
probability measure for every t ∈ R. Here initial means at time t = 0. 
The reason for having two one-parameter groups in (1.5.1) will become
apparent in the next section.
Following tradition I have stated these as five separate axioms. Nonethe-
less, logically speaking Axioms 1 and 2 form one statement on kinematics,
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while Axioms 4 and 5 are one statement on dynamics. Axiom 3 as noted
above stands out as being quiet different, although in a technical sense it is
also a statement on kinematics. A long, convoluted statement.
A special case of Axiom 5 is when St maps the set of pure states to itself.
Then we have that
St|φ〉〈φ| = |φt〉〈φt| (1.5.2)
for some unit vector φt ∈ H which is not uniquely determined, but is unique
modulo a phase factor. In this case the dynamics is given by another version
of Born’s rule:
t 7→ Tr(Et(PT (B)) |φt〉〈φt|) = 〈φt, Et(PT (B))φt〉 = ||Et(PT (B))φt||2, (1.5.3)
provided again that conservation of probability holds.
1.6 Models of the Axioms
The time evolution of neither the events (given by Et) nor of the states (given
by St) is fundamental. What is fundamental in the sense that it corresponds
to observations is the combination of these two one-parameter groups in
the above expressions for the time dependent probability. Neither of these
two one-parameter groups is uniquely determined by the axioms. There are
various models of these axioms for which St and Et are quite different. Some
of these models are typically called pictures in the literature. Axiom 5 was
written to include the three most commonly used models, which we present
next. But other models are possible.
I am not the first to say that quantum theory is a way for calculating
probabilities, and nothing else. I am saying here that different models have
different ways for doing those calculations. Moreover, the fundamental, final
formula for arriving at those calculations is the same in all models (namely,
the Generalized Born’s Rule), which is covariance, and that the resulting
number is the same in all models, which is invariance.
The most commonly used model is called the Schrödinger picture, but I
prefer to call it the Schrödinger model. This model has the property that
Et = I for all t ∈ R, that is, the events have trivial time evolution. One
also says that the observables, which are events since they are pvm’s, are
time independent in this model. In this model the time evolution maps pure
states to pure states and is given by Schrödinger’s equation. The solution of
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this equation with an initial condition φ at time t = 0 is given by functional
analysis as φt = e−itH/~ φ, where H = H∗ is the Hamiltonian in Schrödinger’s
equation. (The minus sign in the exponent of e−itH/~ is a purely conventional.
It has no physical significance; it does not need to be ‘explained’.) Taking
the initial condition φ to be a unit vector, it follows by the unitarity of e−itH/~
that φt is a unit vector for all t ∈ R. Then St in the Schrödinger model is
defined on pure states by the formula (1.5.2), and the time dependent Born’s
rule gives the probability that the observable T = T ∗ is in the Borel set B
as a function of time t ∈ R as
t 7→ 〈φt, PT (B)φt〉.
Since φt is a unit vector, for each fixed time t this is a probability measure
as we have seen earlier. That is to say, conservation of probability holds in
the Schrödinger model.
Notice that Schrödinger’s equation is pushed into the background even
in the Schrödinger model. All that is important is the Hamiltonian H which
in and of itself specifies the flow t 7→ φt = e−itH/~ φ in the Hilbert space H.
However, there is a preference for thinking that differential equations are
basic and that their solutions, in this case the flow, are secondary. Of course,
to understand this flow in specific cases it often is a good idea to solve
Schrödinger’s equation. In introductory texts it is usually considered to be
pedagogically advantageous to give Schrödinger’s equation a central role.
And I do this in [31] for example. But this should be taken by those with
more knowledge with a ton, not a grain, of salt.
Next, we extend St to act on density matrices ρ as follows. First, by
the spectral theorem there exists an orthonormal basis {φk} of H and real
numbers λk ≥ 0 such that
∑
k λk = 1 and ρ =
∑
k λk|φk〉〈φk|. We also
define Ut := e−itH/~, the unitary time evolution operator, for all t ∈ R. The
time evolution of the ket is |φk〉 7→ Ut|φk〉, while that of its dual bra is
〈φk| 7→ 〈φk|U∗t . So, |φk〉〈φk| 7→ Ut|φk〉〈φk|U∗t . Putting this together, the time
evolution of ρ is defined by
ρ 7→
∑
k
λk
(
Ut|φk〉〈φk|U∗t
)
= Ut
(∑
k
|λkφk〉〈φk|
)
U∗t = Ut ρU
∗
t .
This model is so widely used that properties specific to it are often thought to
be general properties of quantum theory. I will discuss this misunderstanding
in more detail later on.
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Another model is called the Heisenberg picture, which I prefer to call the
Heisenberg model. In this model one has St = I for all t ∈ R. One says that
the states are time independent in this model. In particular, St maps pure
states to pure states. The time evolution of a quantum event P is given in
this model by the Heisenberg equation
P 7→ Et P := U∗t PUt, (1.6.1)
where Ut for t ∈ R is a strongly continuous unitary group acting on H. It is
important to note that this flow is basic; it is not arrived at as the solution
of a differential equation. Next it follows that Ut := e−itH/~ with H = H∗
by Stone’s theorem. (The minus sign in the exponent of e−itH/~ is again
purely conventional. It has no physical significance; it does not need to be
‘explained’.) If PA is the pvm of a self-adjoint operator A, then the same
time evolution applies to it:
PA 7→ Et PA := U∗t PAUt,
where U∗t PAUt(B) := U
∗
t PA(B)Ut for all Borel subsets B of R. It turns out
from functional analysis that this time evolution maps a pvm, which is a
family of projections, to another family of projections, which turns out itself
to be a pvm. It follows that the pvm PA of a self-adjoint operator maps to
the pvm of another self-adjoint operator. Explicitly, one can show that
Et PA = U
∗
t PAUt = PU∗t AUt .
Again, the Heisenberg model has certain specific properties which are
not general properties of quantum theory. Such a particular property of the
Heisenberg model is that Et extends naturally to a time evolution of L(H)
defined by Et T := U∗t T Ut for all T ∈ L(H). The group Et in any of these
manifestations is difficult to accommodate with ordinary intuition. This says
that observables are time dependent, which might seem sensible enough if
one is speaking of position or angular momentum. However, events are self-
adjoint operators; so they are observables too. So, in the Heisenberg model
events are time dependent! On the other hand states, which intuitively tell
us everything about a system at any moment, are time independent. This is
backwards from the common intuition of what ‘events’ are and what ‘states’
are. In part this is due to a poor choice in terminology. A quantum event
E /∈ {0, I} is an observable that has spectrum {0, 1}. This corresponds to two
14 Models of Axioms
possible observed values. Sometimes an event is called a Yes-No experiment.
We tend to think that the value 1 (Yes) means that the event occurred, while
the value 0 (No) means that the event did not occur. But this is misleading;
an event is an observable that can give either of these two values. In either
case the event has been observed. In any event (in another sense yet of that
word) quantum theory is non-intuitive.
Also notice that the time evolution of events in the Schrödinger model
extends naturally to L(H) by setting Et := IL(H) for all t ∈ R. This particular
extension property is not a necessary aspect of quantum theory.
To show that conservation of probability holds in the Heisenberg model
let ρ be a density matrix and T = T ∗ be a self-adjoint operator. Then
Tr(Et(PT (B)) ρ) = Tr(U
∗
t PT (B)Utρ) = Tr(PT (B)UtρU
∗
t )
= Tr(PT (B)ρt), (1.6.2)
where ρt := UtρU∗t , the time evolved density matrix for every t ∈ R, is
also a density matrix. But we have already proved in our discussion of the
Schrödinger model that the last expression gives a probability measure on R.
The same Born’s rule (1.5.3) is used in the Schrödinger model and the
Heisenberg model. What that means is that the same formula is used in both.
This is covariance. But more is true. The two models give the same numerical
probability using (1.5.3) provided that the same self-adjoint operator H is
used in both models. This is invariance. (In other words, compatible sign
conventions are being used in the two models. This does have a significance,
since it makes the following proof work.)
Here is the proof of this well-known, yet important result. We assume
that in both models at time t = 0 the state is φ and that the pvm is PT . Of
course, in the Schrödinger model only the state can be time dependent, while
in the Heisenberg model only the pvm can be time dependent. Be aware that
all of the following expressions are time dependent. Then for all t ∈ R we
have in an obvious notation that
P Sch(T ∈ B | φt) = ||PT (B)φt||2
= ||PT (B) e−itH/~ φ||2
= ||eitH/~PT (B) e−itH/~ φ||2
= ||U∗t PT (B)Ut φ||2
= ||Et(PT (B))φ||2 = PHeis(EtT ∈ B | φ).
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This is, of course, a special case of the following calculation. Let ρ be a
density matrix. Then we see that
P Sch(T ∈ B | ρt) = Tr(PT (B) ρt) = Tr(PT (B)UtρU∗t )
= Tr(U∗t PT (B)Utρ) = Tr(EtPT (B) ρ)
= PHeis(EtT ∈ B | ρ). (1.6.3)
This calculation should be compared with (1.6.2).
But still other models are used for which both St and Et are non-trivial.
The interaction pictures are such models. There are a multitude of such
models. One starts by taking any one-parameter family of unitary operators
Ut for t ∈ R acting on the Hilbert spaceH. Next one changes the Schrödinger
model to become the new interaction model by transforming the pure states
by ψ 7→ Utψ =: ψ′ and mapping the pvm’s by PS 7→ UtPSU∗t =: PS′, where
S is a self-adjoint operator and UtSU∗t =: S
′. One then sees that
P (S ∈ B |ψ) = 〈ψ, PS(B)ψ〉 = 〈Utψ, UtPS(B)U∗t Utψ〉 = P (S ′ ∈ B |ψ′).
This shows that the time dependent probability as calculated in each model is
exactly the same even though the time dependence of both the states and the
pvm’s has been changed. The transformation from the Schrödinger model to
the Heisenberg model is a special case of this. Another very special case is
to take Ut := U for all t ∈ R where U is a fixed unitary transformation.
Note that in the interaction model Ut need not be a unitary group nor
does t 7→ Ut need to have any sort of continuity. The lack of continuity,
for example, may seem to you to be a mathematical trick with no physical
intuition behind it. If so, you are right. The interaction model is just used
as a convenient mathematical technique to help one calculate probabilities,
and its intermediary steps have no physical significance.
All of these models are isomorphic (defined below) to the Schrödinger
model, but there are other models which are not. The point of the axioms is
to capture certain features, which are to be considered as basic to quantum
theory. They are not meant to be categorical, in the same sense as, for
example, the axioms of Euclidean plane geometry are meant to describe
completely their topic. Rather the axioms for quantum theory are meant
to be like the axioms in mathematics of a vector space, of which there are
many non-isomorphic objects. Similarly, as we shall discuss in detail later,
there are many non-isomorphic quantum theories. Here is that important
definition.
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Definition 1.6.1 A model of quantum theory is a triple (H, E, S) where H
is a Hilbert space, E : R → E is a one-parameter group of bijections of the
set E of events in L(H) to itself, and S : R→ S is a one-parameter group of
bijections of the set S of states in L(H)′ to itself such that for every t ∈ R
the time dependent Born’s rule
t 7→ Tr(Et(PT (B))Stρ)
is a probability measure on R for every density matrix ρ, for all self-adjoint
operators T and all Borel subsets B of R. As noted earlier this last condition
is called conservation of probability.
An isomorphism of the quantum theories (H, E, S) and (H′, E ′, S ′) is a
one-parameter family of unitary transformations Ut : H → H′ which are onto
and satisfy condition (1.6.4) below. Here the parameter is t ∈ R. In the model
(H, E, S) we let T = T ∗ be a self-adjoint operator and ρ be a density matrix.
These correspond in the usual way in the model (H′, E ′, S ′) to the self-adjoint
operators T ′ := UtTU
∗
t and to the density matrices ρ
′(A) := ρ(U∗t AUt) for
all A ∈ L(H′). Then for all times t ∈ R and for all Borel subsets B of R we
require that
Tr(Et(PT (B))Stρ) = Tr(E
′
t(PT ′(B))S
′
tρ
′) (1.6.4)
which is called preservation of probability. (This condition is based on the
equality of probabilities (1.6.3) for the Schrödinger and Heisenberg models.)
Finally, we say that two models of quantum theory are isomorphic if there
exists an isomorphism between them.
Please be careful to note the difference between conservation of probability
and preservation of probability.
There will surely be be those who wish to maintain that the time changing
state and the Schrödinger model are correct while the corresponding theory
in the Heisenberg model is not correct. This just amounts to rejecting the
importance of the previous definition. In that case the test is to design an
experiment whose results would be different in the two models. And then do
the experiment to see which model is wrong. (Maybe both will be wrong!)
But the Schrödinger model as presented here would have to be augmented
with another measurable property besides the Generalized Born’s Rule, which
is the same in the two models. In other words one would have to propose a
property that only holds in the Schrödinger model.
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1.7 How Many Time Evolutions?
A standard criticism of standard quantum theory is that it has two time
evolutions: one from Schrödinger’s equation and the other from the collapse
of the state. It is widely held that neither of these can be the consequence of
the other. After all, Schrödinger’s equation gives a continuous time evolving
state while the collapse is discontinuous.
Of course, one could try to explain collapse as a continuous change that
is so quick as to appear discontinuous. Or, on the other hand, one might try
to explain continuous time evolution as a rapid succession of discontinuous
jumps, much as a motion picture is not a picture of continuous motion but
rather many static pictures in succession giving the impression of motion.
While these remain as logical possibilities, neither is readily implementable.
So, leaving these possibilities to a side, these two time evolutions are
not only incompatible, but also neither can be the basic description of time
evolution in quantum theory. There are logically two alternatives here. The
first is to accept that nature is described by two independent time evolutions,
and that’s the end of the matter. The second is that there is one time
evolution which is somehow more basic than these two. I am advocating for
the second option in a rather specific way.
1.8 Relation to Observation
It is crucial to understand that the relation of quantum theory to physical
observations is based only on those statements in the theory that are model
independent within an isomorphism class of models. Unitary transformations
are the isomorphisms of Hilbert spaces. Physically, this means that the
formulation of a theory in the context of one specific Hilbert space can always
be translated into the context of a different isomorphic Hilbert space via
the application of a unitary transformation. Such a unitary transformation
changes the model being used to understand the physics. Only properties
that hold in all isomorphic models can possibly be relevant to understanding
physical phenomena. A property that holds in one model, but not in all
other isomorphic models, must absolutely never be considered as having any
physical significance. Such properties can be useful as intermediate steps in
the analysis of a physical system, but nothing more than that. Such model
dependent properties do not need to be ‘interpreted’ nor ‘explained’ vis a vis
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their physical significance. They simply have no physical significance.
As an example, a Schrödinger operator acting in L2(R3) could have an
eigenstate which is represented by a C∞ function. That function corresponds
to a unit vector in any isomorphic Hilbert space, whose elements need not
be represented by functions on a differential manifold. So the concept of C∞
does not apply in that isomorphic model. Nonetheless, the eigenvalue of the
corresponding self-adjoint operator for the corresponding eigenstate is the
same real number for all isomorphic models and has a physical significance,
provided that the original Schrödinger operator represents a physical system.
For example, the Segal-Bargmann space on C3 (see [2]) can be used instead
of L2(R3). (A unitary transformation effecting this change of model is the
Segal-Bargmann transform.) In the Segal-Bargmann model all pure states
are C∞ functions. So in that model the property of a pure state being C∞ is
unremarkable. As we shall see later, the failure to recognize this elementary
aspect of quantum theory leads to pointless discussions about the ‘meaning’
or ‘interpretation’ of model dependent properties.
Chapter 2
Quantum Probability
le hasard . . .
qui est en réalité
l’ordre de la nature
Anatole France
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is meant to motivate, define and study the fundamentals of
quantum probability. I start by explaining how certain classical probability
measures (in the sense of the formulation of Kolmogorov in his book [20])
arise as a consequence of various hypotheses, which are accepted generally
by physicists who work in quantum theory. The idea that probability is an
added-on ‘interpretation’ of quantum theory is a misconception, that leads
many to think that quantum probability can be replaced by using some
alternative ‘interpretation’. While this has been known since at least since
the publication of von Neumann’s book [25] in 1932, it seems not to be well
known, neither in the mathematics nor the physics communities. Actually,
just about everything in this chapter can be found in the literature, with
the possible exception of the Generalized Born’s Rule as the fundamental
time evolution equation of quantum theory. I have tried to re-organize this
known, but not well known, material which has too often been overlooked
by people who were, I am afraid, more interested in ‘interpreting’ quantum
theory than in understanding it
Before going into details it is necessary to understand what is meant by a
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probability theory in the most general terms. But this is rather clear. It is any
theory which contains formulas whose values are real numbers lying in the
closed interval [0, 1]. The application of probability theory to experimental
science is that these real numbers, called probabilities, have the significance
that they describe relative frequencies of certain observations. There are
many more details on both the theoretical and experimental sides, but this
is the basic idea. One of the more important achievements of contemporary
mathematics is the introduction of many new probability theories, such as
free probability.
I understand Quantum Probability to mean that part of Quantum Theory
which gives rise to probabilities and the rules that apply to them. As such
it is not an independent theory, since it is essentially linked to the rest of
Quantum Theory. In other words, Quantum Probability is a part of physics.
It also is an example, (the first historically, I guess), of a Non-commutative
Probability Theory, which is an ongoing research area in basic mathematics.
But I shall not deal with this more general mathematical topic, except to
note that it (typically?) does not come as part and parcel of a theory with
time evolution nor is it intended to be a physical theory. For a glimpse into
some beautiful advanced topics in quantum probability see [1], [27], [30] and
references therein.
2.2 The Physical Assumptions
A given quantum system is described by a formulation based on a specific
complex, non-zero Hilbert spaceH which is often, but not necessarily, infinite
dimensional. This is implicit in Dirac’s notation, though it is usually accepted
explicitly by those in the quantum physics community. Note that the case
when H has dimension 1 is included, even though the resulting quantum
physics is trivial. But we do exclude the case H = 0, since that leads to no
physics whatsoever, since there are no states and no events. So, H 6= 0 in
this treatise.
Within such a mathematical model quantum physics is assumed by most
in the physics community to satisfy these properties among others:
• The state of a quantum system is described by vectors ψ ∈ H with
||ψ|| = 1 with two such unit vectors ψ1, ψ2 describing the same state
provided that there exists λ ∈ C such that ψ1 = λψ2. (Necessarily
|λ| = 1.)
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• Most physical measurements (with the remarkable exception of time
measurements) are represented by self-adjoint, densely defined linear
operators acting on a linear subspace of H.
• The same physical measurement performed on an ensemble of quantum
systems, which are all described by the same state, does not in general
yield the same measured value, but rather values with some relative
frequencies of numbers in some subset of R with more than one number.
Various comments are in order. The first property only describes pure
states and not the more general mixed states, which also enter into quantum
theory. However, what we will be saying is easily generalized to the setting
with all states, including the mixed states, under consideration.
The second property may have a converse, namely that every self-adjoint,
densely defined linear operator corresponds to a physical measurement. This
converse is denied by theories with superselection rules. But this possibility
does not concern us, since we will not be using the converse statement.
The third property concerns what one observes in experiment. The only
way to deny it is to re-define the meaning of the word ‘same’. But we will not
use this property is the following argument, but rather offer a explanation of
it using classical probability theory.
2.3 The Mathematical Model
The central mathematical fact is that there is a complete description of
densely defined, self-adjoint operators which act in a Hilbert space. This
is the content of the Spectral Theorem. This description is given in terms of
projection-valued measures, which we will define momentarily. However, this
section is not a complete presentation of the appropriate functional analysis,
which I expect the reader already to know. Mainly it serves to establish
notation and as a quick review.
First, we recall some basics from Hilbert space theory. We let 〈·, ·〉 denote
the inner product inH, a complex Hilbert space, and ||·|| its associated norm.
One has ||ψ|| := 〈ψ, ψ〉1/2 for all ψ ∈ H. A function T : H → H is said to be
linear if, just as in linear algebra, we have
T (α1ψ1 + α2ψ2) = α1T (ψ1) + α2T (ψ2)
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for all ψ1, ψ2 ∈ H and all α1, α2 ∈ C. Furthermore, we say that such a
function is a (linear) operator. If such an operator T has the property that
there exists some real number M ≥ 0 such that ||Tψ|| ≤M ||ψ|| holds for all
ψ ∈ H, then we say that the operator T is bounded.
A projection E : H → H is by definition a linear operator such that E
is idempotent (meaning that E2 = E) and E is self-adjoint (meaning that
E∗ = E). Projections are bounded operators. It is important to note that
0, the zero operator (i.e., the operator which maps every ψ ∈ H to 0 ∈ H)
is a projection. Also, IH, the identity operator acting on H is a projection,
where by definition IHψ := ψ for all ψ ∈ H. Also, we define
L(H) := {T : H → H | T is linear and bounded}.
For each T ∈ L(H) we define its operator norm as
||T ||op := sup {||Tψ||
∣∣ψ ∈ H and ||ψ|| ≤ 1}.
With this norm L(H) becomes a complete, normed space, which is to say
that it is a Banach space. (Complete means that every Cauchy sequence with
respect to the metric associated to the norm is convergent to an element in
L(H). The associated metric is defined by dop(T1), T2 := ||T1 − T2||op for all
T1, T2 ∈ L(H).)
As examples we mention that for any projection E 6= 0 we have that
||E||op = 1. Also, ||IH||op = 1 since H 6= 0.
We recall from standard measure theory that the smallest σ-algebra, de-
noted as B(R), of subsets of R that contains all finite open interval (a, b)
(with a, b ∈ R and a < b) is called the Borel σ-algebra of R. Also, a set in
B(R) is called a Borel set. Notice that the empty set ∅ and the whole real
line R are Borel sets.
We now have enough to give this definition.
Definition 2.3.1 A projection-valued measure (or simply pvm) associated
to a Hilbert space H is a function P : B(R)→ L(H) satisfying these proper-
ties:
• P (B) ∈ L(H) is a projection for every Borel set B ∈ B(R).
• P (∅) = 0, the zero operator, and P (R) = IH, the identity operator
acting on H.
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• Let {Bj | j ∈ J} be a finite or countably infinite family of Borel sets in
B(R), which is disjoint (meaning that Bj ∩ Bk = ∅ whenever j 6= k).
Then we have the σ-additivity condition
P
( ∪j∈J Bj) =∑
j∈J
P (Bj),
where the possibly infinite sum on the right side has the meaning that
P
( ∪j∈J Bj)ψ =∑
j∈J
P (Bj)ψ
holds for every ψ ∈ H. Here the possibly infinite sum on the right side is
understood to mean the convergence with respect to the metric topology
on H induced by its norm. That metric, denoted as d, is defined by
d(ψ1, ψ2) := ||ψ1 − ψ2|| for all ψ1, ψ2 ∈ H. Also notice that ∪j∈JBj is
a Borel set, by definition of σ-algebra, and so the left side is also well
defined.
A curious consequence of this definition is that for every pvm we have
P (B ∩ C) = P (B)P (C) for all B,C ∈ B(R). And this in turn implies that
the family of operators {P (B) |B ∈ B(R)} is commutative.
The point of measure theory is to use measures in order to develop a well
behaved theory of integrals. In courses this is typically done with measures
with non-negative real values (such as Lebesgue measure), though also the
generalization to measures with all real values or with complex values is
sometimes presented. These generalizations are essentially the same as the
theory with non-negative valued measures. Actually, this also works out
for a measure µ : B(R) → X, where X is any Hausdorff topological vector
space. The topology gives a meaning to convergent infinite sums in X. In
particular, for any Borel measurable, function f : R → C we can consider
whether the integral
∫
R
f(λ) dµ(λ) exists as a uniquely defined element in
X. The usual technical, measure-theoretic details apply. In the case of
interest here the vector space is the complex vector space L(H), but not
with its norm topology. Instead, we use the strong operator topology on
L(H). Without going into all the technical details, let’s simply note that
a sequence of operators An ∈ L(H) converges to an operator A ∈ L(H) in
the strong operator topology if and only if for every φ ∈ H the sequence
Anφ ∈ H converges to Aφ ∈ H in the norm topology of H. The strong
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operator topology is the same as the operator norm topology on L(H) if and
only if the dimension of H is finite. Using the norm topology in the infinite
dimensional case gives an integral inadequate for spectral theory and hence
inadequate for quantum theory.
A pvm P is a measure taking values in L(H), a Hausdorff topological
vector space space when endowed with the strong operator topology. And
so we have a well defined (and well behaved in the sense of measure theory)
integral
∫
R
dP (λ) f(λ) ∈ L(H) for any essentially bounded, Borel function
f : R→ C. Also, an integral can even be defined for some unbounded Borel
functions, but that leads to ever more technical details, which the reader can
find in any good functional analysis text. Unfortunately, in the statement of
the Spectral Theorem, which we state next, the integrand is an unbounded
Borel function in the important case when the operator is not bounded.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Spectral Theorem) Suppose A that is a densely defined
self-adjoint operator acting in a Hilbert space H. Then there exists a unique
pvm P : B(R)→ L(H) such that
A =
∫
R
λ dP (λ). (2.3.1)
Many comments are in order, including why this theorem is named so. As
a start we have the annoying fact that the function that we are integrating
in (2.3.1) is the function f(λ) = λ for all λ ∈ R, and this is not a bounded
function, though it is a Borel function. Here measure theory helps, if the
pvm has bounded support. The definition of the support of a pvm P is much
the same as in regular measure theory:
SuppP := R \ ∪{U ⊂ R |P (U) = 0 and U is open}.
The only, quite minor difference is that 0 in the condition P (U) = 0 refers
to the projection operator 0. By definition, SuppP is a closed subset of R,
being the complement of an open subset. It also can not be empty, since if
it were we would have that IH = P (R) = 0, which is impossible since H 6= 0.
By measure theory we always have
A =
∫
SuppP
λ dP (λ).
So, if SuppP is a bounded subset of R, then this integral exists, since the
integrand on this subset is a bounded Borel function.
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Here is where we see spectral theory entering the theory. First, we review
some material from the functional analysis of Hilbert spaces.
Definition 2.3.2 Suppose that A : D → H is a linear operator defined on
the dense subspace D of a Hilbert space H. Then we define the resolvent set
of A to be the following subset of the complex numbers:
Res(A) := {λ ∈ C ∣∣∃Tλ ∈ L(H) s.t. (λI−A)Tλ = IH and Tλ(λI−A) = idD}.
One says λ is in the resolvent set provided that the (densely defined) operator
λI −A has a globally defined, bounded inverse. Then the spectrum is defined
as the complementary subset of C, that is
Spec(A) := C \ Res(A).
In functional analysis one proves that for self-adjoint operators A we have
that Spec(A) is a closed, non-empty subset of the real line R and, moreover,
that Spec(A) is a bounded subset if and only if A is a bounded operator. (The
diligent reader will have noticed that we have not defined what it means for
a densely defined operator to be bounded. Even worse, we have not defined
what it means for a densely defined operator to be self-adjoint. See your
favorite functional analysis text for these details.)
Now we come to a relation between the pvm and spectral theory.
Theorem 2.3.2 Let A be a densely defined self-adjoint operator, and let PA
be the unique pvm associated to A by the spectral theorem. Then
SuppPA = Spec(A).
Putting these results together we see that for bounded self-adjoint opera-
tors the integral in (2.3.1) is well-defined. Of course, it remains to prove the
equation (2.3.1). As is typical in functional analysis there are a lot of techni-
cal details to deal with in order to give meaning to the integral in (2.3.1) for
an unbounded self-adjoint operator A and, having done that, to prove the
equation (2.3.1) holds.
2.4 The Finite Dimensional Case
Leaving those technical details to the texts, let us understand in detail what
the Spectral Theorem says in the case when H is finite dimensional, since
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this is often not presented in a course of functional analysis. In that case we
have a situation in linear algebra. The self-adjoint operator is then identified
with a Hermitian n × n matrix A with n ≥ 1. Since only the whole space
H is a dense subspace (because dimH is finite), the matrix A maps all of H
to itself. In linear algebra one proves that the set of eigenvalues is a finite,
non-empty subset of R. Let {λ1, · · · , λk} where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, denote that
subset of eigenvalues, that is these are the k distinct eigenvalues of A. The
diagonalization theorem for A says that there is a basis of A with respect to
which A has diagonal form with the eigenvalues appearing along the diagonal,
each with a number of times equal to its multiplicity. Let’s put this statement
into another equivalent notation. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ k we define the spectral
subspace associated with the eigenvalue λj by
Vj := {ψ ∈ H |Aψ = λjψ}.
Since λj is an eigenvalue, there is an eigenvector (non-zero, by definition)
in Vj. In short, Vj 6= 0. One proves readily that Vi and Vj are orthogonal
subspaces, since they correspond to eigenvalues λi 6= λj. Then the diagonal-
ization of A is realized by choosing a basis Bj of Vj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k and
proving that the union B := ∪jBj is a basis of H. Since A restricted to Vj is
simply multiplication by λj, the matrix of A in the basis B is the sought for
diagonal matrix representation of A. What this means is that we have an
orthogonal decomposition
H = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vk (2.4.1)
such that A acts as multiplication by a scalar on each summand.
We now put this into the language of projections. For each spectral
subspace Vj there is a unique projection such that RanPj = Vj . The very
fact that these are projections says that P ∗j = Pj and P
2
j = Pj . Moreover,
the fact that Vi is orthogonal to Vj for all i 6= j implies that PiPj = 0 for
i 6= j. Note that this property is not shared by numbers (say, real or complex
numbers as you wish) since in that case the product ab = 0 implies either
a = 0 or b = 0. But these non-zero projections satisfy PiPj = 0 for i 6= j.
In any event we use this convenient condensed notation: PiPj = δijPi for all
1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, where δij is the Kronecker delta. And we can write (2.4.1) in
this notation as:
IH = P1 + · · ·+ Pk,
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which is called a resolution of the identity. This is not too exciting, since
there are many, many resolutions of the identity. What makes this resolution
of the identity interesting is that it comes from the diagonalization of A. In
fact, since A acts as multiplication by the eigenvalue λj on the subspace Vj,
it follows quickly that
A = λ1P1 + · · ·+ λkPk, (2.4.2)
which is called the spectral representation of the Hermitian matrix A. This
is completely equivalent to the diagonalization of A. We next re-write the
finite sum on the right side of (2.4.2) as an integral with respect to a pvm P .
We clearly want P to satisfy P ({λj}) = Pj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We also want
P (R \ SpecA) = 0, the zero operator. If we can do that, then by standard
identities of measure theory (only now applied to a pvm), we have
∫
R
λ dP (λ) =
∫
R\SpecA
λ dP (λ) +
∫
SpecA
λ dP (λ)
= 0 +
∫
∪k
j=1
{λj}
λ dP (λ)
=
k∑
j=1
∫
{λj}
λ dP (λ)
= λ1P1 + · · ·+ λkPk
as desired. So it only remains to define the pvm with the required properties.
But for every Borel subset B ⊂ R we simply define
P (B) :=
k∑
j=1
χB (λ
j)Pj,
where the characteristic function χS of any set S is defined as
χS(λ) :=
{
1 if λ ∈ S,
0 if λ /∈ S.
An alternative way to write this is as
P (B) =
∑
{j |λj∈B}
Pj,
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that is, add up all the projections associated to the eigenvalues that lie in B.
One readily checks that P so defined is a pvm and that it satisfies the
desired properties. The moral of this story is that the diagonalization of a
Hermitian matrix is exactly the finite-dimensional special case of the Spectral
Theorem. Another way to phrase this is to say that the Spectral Theorem
generalizes the diagonalization of a Hermitian matrix to the infinite dimen-
sional case. Notice that in this generalization a finite sum has been replaced
by an integral, which in certain cases will be a finite sum and in other cases
will be an infinite sum. However, the complete generalization to the infinite
dimensional case requires integrals and the corresponding measure theory
with pvm’s.
2.5 Quantum Probability: The First Steps
With all this mathematical background we are ready to see probability theory
in the context of quantum theory. This way of introducing probability into
quantum physics is what is called Quantum Probability.
The first thing to note is that a pvm is quite similar, though not identical,
to a probability measure. This is seen for example in the normalization
conditions. But even more impressive is that there is a partial order on
self-adjoint operators, which we can restrict to the special case of projection
operators (which are, as you will recall, self-adjoint). It turns out that for
any projection P we have 0 ≤ P ≤ IH, which are inequalities of self-adjoint
operators. So projections lie between the two extreme projections possible.
This is analogous to classical probability theory, where any probability p
lies between the two extreme probabilities, namely 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, which are
inequalities of numbers.
To make the relation tighter with classical probability, we note that there
is a converse of the Spectral Theorem.
Theorem 2.5.1 (Converse to Spectral Theorem) Suppose that H is a
Hilbert space and P : B(R)→ L(H) be a pvm. Then
A :=
∫
R
λ dP (λ) (2.5.1)
defines a self-adjoint operator, densely defined in H. Moreover, the pvm PA
associated to A satisfies PA = A.
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Moreover, and more importantly, this result together with the Spectral
Theorem give a bijection between the set of all self-adjoint operators acting in
H and the set of all pvm’s taking values in L(H). One way the bijection sends
the self-adjoint operator A to its pvm PA. The other way a pvm P is sent to
the self-adjoint operator given in (2.5.1). This is an amazing result, since it
sets up a dictionary between objects of analysis (self-adjoint operators) and
objects of measure theory (pvm’s).
Therefore the second basic assumption of quantum theory which says that
physical measurements are represented by self-adjoint operators translates to
saying that physical measurements are represented by pvm’s. We are getting
very close to classical probability theory using just a basic assumption of
quantum theory. To take the next step we consider a self-adjoint operator A
(or equivalently, its pvm PA) and a state ψ ∈ H. (Recall that ||ψ|| = 1.)
Here we are using the first basic assumption of quantum theory. From these
mathematical objects, given to us by quantum physics, we define for every
Borel subset B ⊂ R and unit vector ψ ∈ H the expression on the left side
here:
P (A ∈ B |ψ) := 〈ψ, PA(B)ψ〉. (2.5.2)
We read the left side in full detail as follows: The probability that the
measurement of A gives a value in B given that the quantum system is
‘described’ by the state ψ. A more colloquial reading is: The probability
that A is in B given ψ. Of course, this terminology should be justified. The
first result to prove is that the right side satisfies 0 ≤ 〈ψ, PA(B)ψ〉 ≤ 1.
The next thing to prove is that for the state ψ fixed and for the self-adjoint
operator A fixed, the function defined for every Borel subset B of R by
B 7→ 〈ψ, PA(B)ψ〉 is a classical probability measure on the real line R, that
is, it is σ-additive and satisfies the normalization of a classical probability
measure:
〈ψ, P∅(B)ψ〉 = 0 and 〈ψ, PA(R)ψ〉 = 1.
All of this follows trivially from the definitions and standard properties of
Hilbert space. I hope the reader appreciates that the tricky bit in this theory
is getting the definitions right. In functional analysis one calls the probability
measures in (2.5.2) the spectral measures. But in the physics community,
(2.5.2) is known as Born’s rule, and although Max Born stated it differently
it was worthy of his receiving the Nobel prize mainly for this achievement in
quantum physics. It is no exaggeration to say that Born’s rule is Quantum
Probability.
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Let us pause for an interlude to remark that there are some equivalent
formulas for Born’s rule (2.5.2). Continuing with the notation established
above and using standard results in Hilbert space theory we have
P (A ∈ B |ψ) = 〈ψ, PA(B)ψ〉 = ||PA(B)ψ||2
= Tr(PA(B)Eψ) = Tr(Eψ PA(B))
where Eψ := |ψ〉〈ψ| is a rank 1 quantum event (using Dirac notation) and Tr
denotes the trace of a trace class operator. The last two formulas have the
advantage of expressing the probability of Born’s rule in terms of the trace.
This is also a good time to note that there is something more general
going on here. The event PA(B) is the formulas above can be replaced by
any event E to give this definition of the probability of a quantum event,
given a pure state ψ, as
P (E |ψ) := 〈ψ,Eψ〉 = ||Eψ||2 = Tr(Eψ E). (2.5.3)
The reader should note that this is a new meaning for the word “probability”.
Quantum events do not form a σ-algebra if dimH ≥ 2, However, there are
enough properties to justify this terminology. First, 0 ≤ P (E |ψ) ≤ 1 by
basic Hilbert space theory. So we get a real number that can be compared
with a relative frequency. Next, it satisfies the normalizations
P (I |ψ) = 1 and P (0 |ψ) = 0,
where the 0 on the left side of the last equation is the zero operator. This
topic will be presented in more detail in Section 2.8.
And definition (2.5.3) in turn is a particular case of the expected value of
an observable A = A∗ with respect to ψ, which is defined as
Eψ(A) := 〈ψ,Aψ〉. (2.5.4)
And one more generalization is obtained by using the definition (2.5.4) for
all A ∈ L(H). The linear map Eψ : L(H) → C so obtained gives an exam-
ple of a non-commutative integral. The elegant theory of non-commutative
integration is found in many places in the literature.
Let’s return to the main argument. So by applying two basic properties
of quantum theory (which really are widely accepted) we have arrived at an
infinite number of classical probability measures for a given observable. As I
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like to say: This is a feature, not a bug. It only remains to understand what,
if any, role these classical probability measures play in quantum physics. It is
difficult to argue that they have no relevance or meaning in quantum physics,
since they arise from two basic properties of quantum theory plus some (well,
admittedly a lot of) mathematics. It is difficult to argue that there they are,
but who cares? The standard way of dealing with this situation is to use
these probability measures to save (‘explain’ if you wish) the phenomena of
the relative frequencies that occur in the third basic property of quantum
theory. However, do notice that our argument for arriving at these classical
probability measures did not use this third basic property as an assumption.
It might appear that I have proved Axiom 4 in Chapter 1 from other
axioms of quantum theory. That is not correct, since Axiom 4 is only a
mathematical definition within the theory. However, it is a definition with
a lot of physical significance since it is related to observations. Using the
probability measures in (2.5.2) to understand measured relative frequencies
is the physical significance of Axiom 4 as well as of the time dependent Born’s
rule (1.5.1) in Axiom 5.
However, two generally accepted first principles of quantum theory have
led us to the doorstep of Axiom 4. We just need an extra shove to cross the
threshold to arrive at Axiom 4. This is quite different from Schrödinger’s
equation, though some authors put it on an equal footing with Born’s Rule.
But mathematical considerations alone do not get one close to Schrödinger’s
equation. One could just as well arrive at the Klein-Gordon equation or the
Dirac equation. I consider Born’s rule as very nearly inevitable, but not
Schrödinger’s equation. Later I shall argue that it is reasonable to replace
Schrödinger’s equation, although I prefer to retain Born’s Rule.
But we have yet to see the generalized Born’s rule. The next section is a
step in that direction.
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2.6 Quantum Conditional Probability
The probability of an event occurring, given that another event has already
occurred, is a standard topic in classical probability. This corresponds to
the relative frequencies measured for such a pair of events. This is known
as conditional probability. So we now consider the quantum analogue of
conditional probability. Recall that if (Ω,F , P ) is a classical probability
space we define the conditional probability of an event E1 ∈ F given the
event E2 ∈ F as
P (E1|E2) :=


P (E1 ∩ E2)
P (E2)
if P (E2) 6= 0
0 otherwise.
(2.6.1)
We immediately have P (E1|E2)P (E2) = P (E1∩E2) for all E1, E2 ∈ F . From
this we get Bayes Theorem
P (E1|E2)P (E2) = P (E1 ∩ E2) = P (E2 ∩ E1) = P (E2|E1)P (E1).
We shall see that these simple formulas do not carry over to quantum
probability. So this classical probability theory serves as an analogy, nothing
more.
Now suppose that S, T are self-adjoint operators acting in H and that
B,C are Borel subsets of R. The probability that S has a value in B for a
state ψ is given, as we have seen, by Born’s rule:
P (S ∈ B |ψ) = 〈ψ, PS(B)ψ〉 = ||PS(B)ψ||2. (2.6.2)
We wish to define the conditional probability that T ∈ C given that S ∈ B
for a state ψ. This will be denoted as P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ). We assume that
this has the form P (T ∈ C |ψ1) for some state ψ1, that is to say, it will be a
quantum probability of a certain form. The choice of ψ1 depends on the first
event S ∈ B and the state ψ. The usual definition is
ψ1 :=
PS(B)ψ
||PS(B)ψ|| (2.6.3)
provided PS(B)ψ 6= 0. This definition has been given several unfortunate
names. I will comment on those names and the significance of this definition
after we have seen some of this material developed further. But first the
important definition that this leads up to.
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Definition 2.6.1 Let S, T be self-adjoint operators, B,C Borel subsets of R
and ψ a unit vector. Then the (quantum) conditional probability that T has
a value in C, given both that a state ψ is given and that S has a given value
in B, is defined by
P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) := P (T ∈ C |ψ1) = P
(
T ∈ C
∣∣∣ PS(B)ψ||PS(B)ψ||
)
if PS(B)ψ 6= 0. Also, if PS(B)ψ = 0 we define P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) := 0.
Some might prefer to leave the expression P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) undefined
in case PS(B)ψ = 0. Taking S, T, B, ψ fixed and if also PS(B)ψ 6= 0, then
the formula C 7→ P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) = P (T ∈ C |ψ1) shows that this
expression defines a probability measure on R. By using the formula in the
next proposition one can see that the expression P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) is not
even finitely additive in B.
Proposition 2.6.1 With the notation of this definition we have that
P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) = ||PT (C)PS(B)ψ||
2
P (S ∈ B |ψ) (2.6.4)
for P (S ∈ B |ψ) 6= 0.
Proof: Expanding this definition out we see that the quantum conditional
probability satisfies
P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) = P
(
T ∈ C
∣∣∣ PS(B)ψ||PS(B)ψ||
)
=
〈 PS(B)ψ
||PS(B)ψ|| , PT (C)
PS(B)ψ
||PS(B)ψ||
〉
=
1
||PS(B)ψ||2 〈PS(B)ψ, PT (C)PS(B)ψ〉
=
||PT (C)PS(B)ψ||2
P (S ∈ B |ψ) . 
For computations the expression (2.6.4) is much more useful than the
definition. Also it immediately follows for any value of PS(B)ψ that
P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ)P (S ∈ B |ψ) = ||PT (C)PS(B)ψ||2.
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This definition of conditional probability immediately allows us to define
independence. This topic is discussed in the next section in the more general
context of quantum events.
Another immediate consequence of the definition is that for any T = T ∗
and Borel subset C of R we have P (T ∈ C | T ∈ C, ψ) = 1 for all ψ satisfying
P (T ∈ C |ψ) 6= 0. This should be compared with the equally trivial identity
that holds in classical probability theory: P (E|E) = 1 for every event E,
provided that P (E) 6= 0.
After seeing all this the reader should realize that the definition (2.6.3)
plays an intermediate, minor role and could have been incorporated directly
into the definition (2.6.4) without further ado. But much ado has been spent
on this so-called collapse condition (2.6.3). It has also been dubbed the
quantum jump and the projection postulate. So much ink has been spilled to
‘explain’ or ‘justify’ this formula (often under the term ‘interpretation’) that
I am obliged to make some comments about it. The points of contact with
observational data are the relevant, essential features of this, or any, theory.
And for quantum theory those are its probability measures on R. This is
the central importance of Born’s rule (2.5.2), which on the theoretical side is
simply a definition. Similarly, the Generalized Born’s Rule (2.9.2) below is
simply a definition in the theory. Its importance comes from its relevance for
understanding experimentally measured relative frequencies. When looking
at different models of quantum theory, it is perfectly acceptable to have
discrepancies over matters that do not have anything to do with observations.
What is relevant are the probabilities, not the specific manners for calculating
them in a particular model.
For example, in the Schrödinger model the states vary in time while
the pvm’s do not. On the contrary, in the Heisenberg model the opposite
obtains: The pvm’s vary in time while the states do not. What is the same
in both are the probabilities for the same events. This is what makes these
two models isomorphic. It is important to note that Born’s rule and its
generalization are exactly the same formulas in both of these models. This
is covariance. When the time dependence is introduced into these equations
(but in different manners depending on the model chosen), the calculated
time dependent probabilities are identically equal in these two models. This
is invariance. In the Schrödinger model the collapse formula (2.6.3) does
have a mathematical sense to it, since states are allowed to change in that
model. However, it is devoid of any physical significance since it is not part
of other equivalent models, such as the Heisenberg model in which states do
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not change. Do be careful! The physical significance of the theory comes
only later in the formula for the quantum conditional probability (2.6.4) and
the application of it to quantum events.
2.7 Quantum Consecutive Probability
Classical probability is a guiding analogy in the next definition. But both
experiment and theory indicate that a time ordered sequence of two specific
observations yielding certain values should have an associated probability.
After all the relative frequencies of such sequences are often measured.
Definition 2.7.1 Let S, T be self-adjoint operators, B,C Borel subsets of R
and ψ a unit vector. Then the (quantum) consecutive probability is defined
as
P (S ∈ B, T ∈ C |ψ) := ||PT (C)PS(B)ψ||2. (2.7.1)
The left side of this should be read as follows: The probability that S takes a
value in B and subsequently T takes a value in C, given the state ψ.
Of course, one motivation of this definition is that it allows us to write (2.6.4)
in this form reminiscent of classical conditional probability:
P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) = P (S ∈ B, T ∈ C |ψ)
P (S ∈ B |ψ) (2.7.2)
provided that P (S ∈ B |ψ) 6= 0.
Some authors have the previous definition only for the case of commuting
operators. Some say it is not meaningful for non-commutating operators,
while others react adversely the fact that PT (C)PS(B) is not necessarily an
event and so should not have an associated probability. However, I have
found this definition in the general non-commutative case in the literature
though I think it has been unduly neglected. But that literature is vast, and
my reading of it is necessarily limited.
The expressions (2.6.4) and (2.7.1) are generalization of Born’s rule for
calculating quantum probabilities. They are special cases of the generalized
Born’s rule, which will be presented later.
We previously showed that Born’s rule (2.6.2) is invariant if we transform
the states by ψ 7→ Utψ =: ψ′ and the pvm’s by PS 7→ UtPSU∗t =: PS′, where
Ut is unitary for all t ∈ R. We will now show that the conditional probability
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(2.6.4) and the generalized Born’s rule (2.7.1) are also invariant under this
transformation. Of course, we also transform PT 7→ UtPTU∗t =: PT ′ . Given
this notation we now have for P (S ′ ∈ B) |ψ′) = P (S ∈ B) |ψ) 6= 0 that the
conditional probability (2.6.4) satisfies
P (T ′ ∈ C |S ′ ∈ B,ψ′) = ||PT ′(C)PS′(B)ψ
′||2
P (S ′ ∈ B) |ψ′)
=
||UtPT (C)U∗t UtPS(B)U∗t Utψ||2
P (S ∈ B) |ψ)
=
||PT (C)PS(B)ψ||2
P (S ∈ B) |ψ)
= P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ).
On the other hand, if P (S ′ ∈ B) |ψ′) = P (S ∈ B) |ψ) = 0, then
P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) = 0 = P (T ′ ∈ C |S ′ ∈ B,ψ′).
This proves that the quantum conditional probability is invariant under this
transformation. The proof that the generalized Born’s rule is also invariant
is much the same. The importance of these invariances is that these quantum
probabilities give the same results in all isomorphic quantum theories.
Note that the self-adjoint operators S and T commute (by definition!) if
and only if every projection PS(B) commutes with every projection PT (C).
So for commuting S and T we have by (2.7.1) that
P (S ∈ B, T ∈ C |ψ) = P (T ∈ C, S ∈ B |ψ). (2.7.3)
This says that in this case changing the temporal order of the two events
does not change the combined probability. For such events simultaneity of
the two events makes sense and, again, gives the same combined probability
(2.7.3).
However, it is not too difficult to find examples (thinking of spin 1/2, say)
of non-commuting self-adjoint operators S and T for which there exist Borel
sets B,C and a state ψ satisfying
P (S ∈ B, T ∈ C |ψ) 6= P (T ∈ C, S ∈ B |ψ). (2.7.4)
This implies that for such S and T the time order of the two events must
not include simultaneity. This contrasts with the case of commuting S and
T where simultaneity is allowed.
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Perhaps a word or two is in order about the notion of simultaneity. I have
not assumed Galilean invariance of this theory. Nor have I assumed Lorentz
invariance. Either one of these invariances can be incorporated into quantum
theory. Of course, these lead to non-isomorphic models of quantum theory.
But in either case there is a well defined notion of simultaneity of events with
respect to an inertial frame of reference. That is the notion of simultaneity
that should be applied here. I suppose that this is how simultaneity should
be understood in a quantum theory of gravitation, even though such a theory
does not exist at the time of writing this. This also relates to the question
of the time ordering of events in general. In a Galilean theory this order
is absolute, but in a Lorentzian theory it is only absolute for events that
are light-like or time-like with respect to each other. (I am excluding time
reversal as a symmetry, of course.) This motivates the extra hypothesis for
Lorentz invariant quantum theories that two events that are space-like should
commute.
This discussion has relevance to the well known–and false–assertion that
“the electron can be at two places at the same time”. Let Q represent the
position operator for the electron. It is clear that Q commutes with itself.
So for any state ψ
P (Q ∈ B,Q ∈ C |ψ) = P (Q ∈ C,Q ∈ B |ψ) (2.7.5)
for any pair of Borel subset B,C of R. This is important, since it includes
simultaneous events, which is the case we want to consider. It also says that
the probability of these simultaneous events makes sense in quantum theory.
It is now just a matter of computing the probability in (2.7.5). So we start
that calculation as follows:
P (Q ∈ C,Q ∈ B |ψ) = ||PQ(B)PQ(C)ψ||2 = ||PQ(B ∩ C)ψ||2.
The last equality is a property of pvm’s that is proved in functional analysis.
The expression ‘two places’ I interpret as meaning that the sets B and C are
disjoint, that is, B ∩ C = ∅, the empty set. But, by the definition of pvm
we have that PQ(∅) = 0. We conclude that the probability in (2.7.5) is 0 for
disjoint Borel sets B,C and for any state ψ. So much for the theory. What
about observations? Well, I claim that there has never been an observation of
an electron in two places at the same time. Of course, if such an observation
were ever made, this aspect of quantum theory would have to be modified.
But the principle of conservation of electric charge would also have to be
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modified. So, if there is anything ‘strange’ or ‘mysterious’ to understand
here, I do not know what that might be. I also will not discuss the relation
of this result with classical physics, because I do not wish to discuss classical
physics at all in this treatise. As a final point let me note that this argument is
quite abstract; it applies to any self-adjoint operator and any pair of disjoint
Borel subsets of R.
The inequality (2.7.4) is equivalent to
P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ)P (S ∈ B |ψ) 6= P (S ∈ B | T ∈ C, ψ)P (T ∈ C |ψ)
which says that Bayes Theorem does not generalize to quantum probability.
Notice that the inequality (2.7.4) also contrasts with the classical case where
P (E1 ∩ E2) = P (E2 ∩ E1). Moreover, (2.7.4) precludes defining a classical
probability measure pi on R2 such that S takes a value in B and T takes
a value in C in any order is equal to pi(B × C). Nonetheless, (2.6.4) has
reasonable ‘marginals’, namely
P (S ∈ R, T ∈ C |ψ) = ||PT (C)PS(R)ψ||2 = ||PT (C)ψ||2 = P (T ∈ C |ψ),
since PS(R) = I, the identity map. Similarly,
P (S ∈ B, T ∈ R |ψ) := ||PT (R)PS(B)ψ||2 = ||PS(B)ψ||2 = P (S ∈ B |ψ).
On the other hand, taking S, T , B and ψ fixed, the map that sends the
Borel subset C of R to P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B,ψ) is a classical probability measure
on R as already remarked before.
2.8 Quantum Probability of Two Events
The results of the previous section have been presented in terms of events
associated to pvm’s. So we have considered events such as S ∈ B = PS(B)
and so forth. But it is useful to express these results more abstractly in
terms of arbitrary events. Here are the definitions. The first part of the next
definition is Born’s rule for one event, given a pure state. The second part
is Born’s rule for one event, given a density matrix; it is a generalization of
the first part.
Definition 2.8.1 Let E be an event, ψ be a unit vector and ρ be a density
matrix. Then the probability of E given ψ is defined by Born’s rule
P (E |ψ) := 〈ψ,Eψ〉 = ||Eψ||2. (2.8.1)
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Moreover, the probability of E given ρ is defined by
P (E | ρ) := Tr(Eρ). (2.8.2)
In the sequel (2.8.2) will be regarded as a special case of the Generalized
Born’s Rule.
Let’s recall the standard justification of (2.8.2) in terms of (2.8.1). So we
take an orthonormal basis φk which diagonalizes the density matrix ρ, say
ρ =
∑
k λk|φk〉〈φk| where 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1 and
∑
k λk = 1. Then we compute
P (E | ρ) = Tr(Eρ)
=
∑
k
〈φk, E ρ φk〉
=
∑
k
〈φk, E λk φk〉
=
∑
k
λk 〈φk, E φk〉
=
∑
k
λk P (E | φk).
In short, P
(
E | ∑k λk|φk〉〈φk|) = ∑k λk P (E | φk). This exhibits P (E | ρ)
as an infinite combination of the component probabilities P (E | φk), each
with its corresponding weight factor λk. An immediate consequence of the
previous formula is 0 ≤ P (E | ρ) ≤ 1. Also the following normalizations are
easily shown and provide more justification for (2.8.2):
P (I | ρ) = 1 and P (0 | ρ) = 0.
Finally, there is a form of σ-additivity which says that for any countable
family {Ej | j ∈ N} of orthogonal events, meaning that Ej ∧ Ek = 0 for all
j 6= k, we have by a standard argument that
P
(
VjEj | ρ
)
=
∑
j
P (Ej | ρ). (2.8.3)
While this looks like the σ-countable condition for classical measures, it is
quite different. Notice that a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
family {Ej} to be orthogonal is that {Ej} is a commutative family, a very
restrictive condition. These facts motivate the next definition.
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Definition 2.8.2 A (quantum) probability on the set E of quantum events
is a function pi : E → [0, 1] such that
• Normalization: pi(0) = 0 and pi(I) = 1.
• σ-additivity; For any countable family {Ej | j ∈ N} of orthogonal events
in E we have
pi
(
VjEj
)
=
∑
j
pi(Ej).
It follows from the discussion above that for any density matrix ρ the function
E 7→ P (E ρ) is a probability on E . The question of the converse arises, that
is, whether all probabilities on E ⊂ L(H) have this form. The answer is yes,
if dim H ≥ 3 by Gleason’s theorem in [12].
The next definition gives two more versions of Born’s rule, but now for
two time ordered events. It is based on (2.6.4) and (2.7.1) of the previous
section.
Definition 2.8.3 Let E1, E2 be quantum events and ψ be a unit vector. Then
the (quantum) consecutive probability of the event E1 and then later the
event E2, given the state ψ, is
P (E1, E2 |ψ) := ||E2E1ψ||2.
(Notice that on the right side the earlier event E1 goes on the right.)
The (quantum) condition probability of E2, given that E1 has occurred
and given a state ψ, is defined provided that E1ψ 6= 0 by
P (E2 |E1, ψ) := P (E1, E2 |ψ)
P (E1 |ψ) =
||E2E1ψ||2
||E1ψ||2 .
If E1ψ = 0, then we define P (E2 |E1, ψ) := 0.
We say that the event E2 is (quantum) independent of the event E1 with
respect to a state ψ if E1ψ 6= 0 and
P (E2 |E1, ψ) = P (E2 |ψ). (2.8.4)
If S and T are self-adjoint operators, then the ordered pair (S, T ) is said
to be independent with respect to ψ if for all Borel subsets B,C of R the
event S ∈ B is independent of the event T ∈ C with respect to ψ, that is
P (S ∈ B, T ∈ C |ψ) = P (S ∈ B |ψ)P (T ∈ C |ψ).
(The motivation for this equation is given later.)
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Quantum independence is not necessarily a symmetric relation due to the
non-commutativity of quantum theory. Specifically, E2 is independent of E1
given ψ if and only if E1ψ 6= 0 and
||E2E1ψ||2 = ||E1ψ||2 ||E2ψ||2.
This equation trivially holds if E1ψ = 0. So the condition E1ψ 6= 0 need not
be imposed here and will be dropped when we use this formula. Therefore
the last equation is equivalent to
P (E1, E2 |ψ) = P (E1 |ψ)P (E2 |ψ),
which gives the promised motivation of the last part of the previous definition.
Using (2.8.4) we see that E1 is independent of E2 given ψ if and only if
||E1E2ψ||2 = ||E1ψ||2 ||E2ψ||2
or equivalently
P (E2, E1 |ψ) = P (E1 |ψ)P (E2 |ψ).
Clearly if E1 and E2 commute, then this is a symmetric relation, that is,
E1 is independent from E2, given ψ, if and only if E2 is independent from
E1, given ψ. Also P (E1, E1 |ψ) = P (E1 |ψ) trivially holds.
This definition is taking us ever deeper into non-commutative territory.
We assume dimH ≥ 2, since that guarantees that L(H) is non-commutative.
For each state we already have a probability (cp. Definition 2.8.2) defined on
the set of quantum events E in L(H), and E is not a σ-algebra. But now we
have, given a state, a probability defined on ordered pairs of events. (Neither
E1 nor E2 is associated to a specific time. We only require the time order
that E1 occurs first and then later E2.) This is yet another step beyond the
probability theory of Kolmogorov based on σ-algebras. The question arises
as to what are the properties of quantum consecutive probability.
Throughout the following we let ψ be any unit vector. First notice that
0 ≤ P (E1, E2 |ψ) ≤ 1, since ||E2E1|| ≤ 1. Also, we have for any event E the
intuitively transparent formulas for the marginals
P (E, I |ψ) = P (E |ψ) and P (I, E |ψ) = P (E |ψ).
So, any event E and I are independent, and in both orders, since P (I |ψ) = 1.
Moreover, at the other extreme we have the normalizations
P (E, 0 |ψ) = 0 and P (0, E |ψ) = 0.
42 Quantum Probability of Two Events
And so any event E and the ‘never-YES’ event 0 are independent (and again
in both orders), since P (0 |ψ) = 0.
Also, we have a form of σ-additivity: Let the event F = VjFj , where {Fj}
is a countable family of pairwise orthogonal events. Then for any event E
by a standard argument we have for the consecutive probability that
P (E, F |ψ) =
∑
j
P (E, Fj |ψ).
This is σ-additivity in the second event of the ordered pair of events.
However, σ-additivity fails in general in the first event for consecutive
probability. We continue with the above notation and compute
P (F,E |ψ) = ||EF ψ||2 = ||E (VjFj ψ)||2
= 〈E (VjFj ψ), E (VkFk ψ)〉
=
∑
j,k
〈EFj ψ,E Fk ψ〉
=
∑
j
〈EFj ψ,EFj ψ〉+
∑
j 6=k
〈EFj ψ,EFk ψ〉
=
∑
j
P (Fj, E |ψ) +
∑
j 6=k
〈ψ, FjEFk ψ〉.
The first summation is what one expects from σ-additivity. But the second
summation is a typical quantum term, which already in the case F = F1∨F2
is producing interference with the first term. That is, the second sum, which
is called an interference term, can either increase or decrease the first term.
However, if E commutes with all of the events Fj (which already commute
among themselves by orthogonality), then we have for each pair j 6= k that
〈ψ, FjEFk ψ〉 = 〈ψ,EFjFk ψ〉 = 0
by the orthogonality condition FjFk = 0. Therefore, in the commutative case
this characteristic quantum interference term vanishes identically.
Also it is important to remark that this interference term arises from
the rules for computing quantum probabilities and from nothing else. Of
course, those rules are based on Hilbert space properties, particularly on the
fact that the set of events is not a σ-algebra. Note, for example, that there
is no particle/wave duality being invoked here. In fact, there is no wave
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equation. There is no Superposition Principle for solutions or for states.
There is no mention of the Uncertainty Principle, of Complementarity or
of the Measurement Problem. There is no so-called ‘self-interference’ of a
particle with itself. Even Schrödinger’s equation is absent from the derivation
of this result. If this interference term is not intuitive for you, it means that
quantum probability is not intuitive for you.
The phrase ‘consecutive probability’ is never even defined in classical
probability theory for two good reasons. First, the order of events is not
important. Second, the conjunction of two events A1, A2 in a σ-algebra is
their intersection A1 ∩ A2, which is again in the σ-algebra, that is, it is also
an event. So, in classical probability the probability of two (and by induction
any finite sequence of) events is itself the probability of just one event. This
is not so in quantum probability. It is easy to construct events E1 and E2 in
L(C2) such that 0 6= E1E2 6= E2E1 6= 0 and yet E1∧E2 = 0, the ‘never-YES’
event. In this case neither E1E2 nor E2E1 is an event. Nonetheless, the
probabilities of sequences P (E1, E2 |ψ) and P (E2, E1 |ψ) make good sense
and are not equal in general.
Example 2.8.1 Here is a general example. Let H1 and H2 be Hilbert spaces.
Then define H :=H1⊗H2, the Hilbert space tensor product. Let F1 (resp., F2)
be an event acting on H1 (resp., H2). Put E1 := F1 ⊗ I and E2 := I ⊗ F2.
Then E1 and E2 commute, but that is not enough to have independence. We
also have to choose appropriately a unit vector ψ ∈ H. We choose ψ =
ψ1 ⊗ ψ2, where ψ1 (resp., ψ2) is a unit vector in H1 (resp., H2) such that
E1ψ1 6= 0 and E2ψ2 6= 0. Then it is an easy exercise to show that E1 is
independent of E2 with respect to ψ and vice versa. Of course, this example
gets very interesting if we use a unit vector that does not factorize, and it
turns out that the same two events are then not independent.
To generalize the last definition for the case of a density matrix, consider
this expression:
||E2E1ψ||2 = 〈E2E1ψ,E2E1ψ〉 = 〈ψ, (E2E1)∗E2E1ψ〉
= 〈ψ, (E2E1)∗E2E1Eψψ〉
= Tr((E2E1)
∗E2E1Eψ).
where Eψ = |ψ〉〈ψ| is a rank 1 projection operator. So, using the same
notation, the corresponding definitions for a density matrix ρ are
P (E1, E2 | ρ) := Tr((E2E1)∗E2E1ρ), (2.8.5)
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the consecutive conjunctive probability of first E1 and then later E2, given ρ.
Notice that (E2E1)∗E2E1ρ is a trace class operator, since ρ is. So its trace
in (2.8.5) is well defined. However, its trace norm need not be equal to its
trace.
Also the conditional probability of E2, given E1 and ρ, is defined by
P (E2 |E1, ρ) := P (E1, E2 | ρ)
P (E1 | ρ) =
Tr((E2E1)
∗E2E1ρ)
Tr(E1ρ)
, (2.8.6)
provided that P (E1 | ρ) 6= 0. The formula (2.8.6) is usually derived from
Lüders rule. (See [22].) Here I have by-passed Lüders rule and given (2.8.6)
directly as a definition. One can easily manipulate (2.8.6) to arrive at the
formula usually found in the literature for this conditional probability. For
example see [5], where a uniqueness result for this formula is also found.
Since I arrived at (2.8.6) without being aware of the literature (such as [5]),
my notation is not standard.
Since these formulas may be unfamiliar in the non-commutative context,
let’s see a justification of (2.8.5). As before, we let φk be an orthonormal
basis that diagonalizes ρ, that is, ρ =
∑
k λk|φk〉〈φk| where 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1 and∑
k λk = 1. Then we see that
P (E1, E2 | ρ) = Tr((E2E1)∗E2E1ρ) =
∑
k
〈φk, (E2E1)∗E2E1ρ φk〉
=
∑
k
〈E2E1φk, E2E1λk φk〉 =
∑
k
λk ||E2E1φk||2
=
∑
k
λk P (E1, E2 | φk).
So P (E1, E2 |
∑
k λk|φk〉〈φk|) =
∑
k λk P (E1, E2 | φk), showing P (E1, E2 | ρ)
as an infinite combination of the component probabilities P (E1, E2 | φk), each
with its corresponding weight factor λk. As before, these probabilities are
easily shown to be real numbers in the interval [0, 1].
As in the case of pure states, we define the event E2 to be independent of
the event E1 given a density matrix ρ, if P (E1 | ρ) 6= 0 and
P (E2 |E1, ρ) = P (E2 | ρ).
This is equivalent to
P (E1, E2 | ρ) = P (E1 | ρ)P (E2 | ρ).
In general this is not a symmetric relation, though it is if E1 and E2 commute.
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Example 2.8.2 The events E1 = F1 ⊗ I and E2 = I ⊗ F2 of Example 2.8.1
are independent in either order with respect to any density matrix ρ = ρ1⊗ρ2,
where ρ1 (resp., ρ2) is a density matrix acting on H1 (resp., H2), provided
that P (F1 | ρ1) 6= 0 and P (F2 | ρ2) 6= 0. The details are left to the reader.
2.9 Generalized Born’s Rule with a State
Rather than spell out more details of the case of two events, we continue
with the generalization to a finite sequence of time ordered events, which is
now readily at hand. This is the central definition of this treatise.
Definition 2.9.1 Generalized Born’s Rule with a State. Suppose
that E1, E2, . . . , En for an integer n ≥ 1 is an ordered sequence of events
(possibly with repetitions) and let ψ be a unit vector. Then the consecutive
(conjunctive) probability that first E1 occurs and then E2 occurs and so on
continuing until En occurs, given ψ, is defined as
P (E1, E2, . . . , En |ψ) := ||En · · ·E2E1ψ||2. (2.9.1)
Let Λ denote the empty sequence of events, not to be confused with ∅, the
empty set. Note that Λ is vacuously ordered. Then we define P (Λ |ψ) := 1.
The conditional probability that the sequence of events E1, . . . , En occurs
in that time order given that the sequence of events F1, . . . , Fk has already
occurred in that time order, given ψ, is defined as
P (E1, . . . , En |F1, . . . , Fk, ψ) := P (F1, . . . , Fk, E1, . . . , En |ψ)
P (F1, . . . , Fk |ψ)
=
||En · · ·E1Fk · · ·F1ψ||2
||Fk · · ·F1ψ||2
provided the denominator is not zero. (The definition on the first line is for
all integers k ≥ 0, while the second line only holds for k ≥ 1.) Otherwise we
define
P (E1, . . . , En |F1, . . . , Fk, ψ) := 0.
These definitions are special cases of the following corresponding definitions
given the same sequences of events and a density matrix ρ.
The consecutive probability of the ordered sequence of events E1, . . . , En
for n ≥ 1 is defined as
P (E1, . . . , En | ρ) := Tr
(
(En · · ·E1)∗En · · ·E1ρ
)
.
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Also, we define P (Λ | ρ) := 1.
We say that a family of events {Eα |α ∈ A} which has an order induced
from a linear order on A is independent with respect to ρ if for every finite
ordered subset Eα1 , Eα2 , . . . , Eαn for n ≥ 1 with α1 < α2 < · · · < αn we have
P (Eα1, Eα2 , . . . , Eαn | ρ) = P (Eα1 | ρ)P (Eα2 | ρ) · · ·P (Eαn | ρ).
The ordered sequence T1, . . . , Tn of self-adjoint operators is independent with
respect to ρ if for every sequence of Borel subsets B1, . . . , Bn of R the ordered
sequence of events T1 ∈ B1, . . . , Tn ∈ Bn is independent with respect to ρ.
(This can be defined for arbitrary families as well.)
With the same notation as above the conditional probability is defined as
P (E1, . . . , En |F1, . . . , Fk, ρ) := P (F1, . . . , Fk, E1, . . . , En | ρ)
P (F1, . . . , Fk | ρ) (2.9.2)
provided P (F1, . . . , Fk | ρ) 6= 0; otherwise it is defined to be 0.
All of the previous definitions of quantum probability are special cases of
(2.9.2), which is called the Generalized Born’s Rule.
All of these probabilities are real numbers in the interval [0, 1], and they
have other obvious properties. However, the language of σ-algebras has been
left far behind.
The ordering here of events reflects the time order of their occurrences,
but does not associate them to specific times. However, since events are self-
adjoint operators, they can have a time dependence in some models (such as
the Heisenberg model). But this dependence does not impact the time order
of these events.
Consider the union {F1, . . . , Fk, E1, . . . , En} of the ordered sequences as a
new ordered sequence of events. If this new ordered sequence is independent,
then necessarily we have that
P (E1, . . . , En |F1, . . . , Fk, ρ) = P (E1, . . . , En | ρ)P (F1, . . . , Fk | ρ).
But this is not a sufficient condition for independence of the new ordered
sequence, except in the case when n = k = 1.
Having defined independence of an ordered sequence of observables (which
are quantum random variables), it is desirable to define identically distributed
observables as well. Then we will be able to speak of an ordered sequence of
independent, identically distributed (iid) observables.
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Definition 2.9.2 Let S and T be self-adjoint operators. Then we say that
S and T are identically distributed with respect to a density matrix ρ if
P (S ∈ B | ρ) = P (T ∈ B | ρ) for all Borel subsets B of R.
Notice that this definition does not depend on the order of S and T . Clearly,
this is a symmetric relation. In fact, it is an equivalence relation on the set of
self-adjoint operators. The construction of a finite sequence of iid observables
can be done easily using tensor products.
Everything in the formulas of these definitions is well known to anyone
working in classical probability where each sequence of events becomes just
one event. What is really new is not so much generalizing to sequences of
non-commuting events, but rather identifying all of this as the Generalized
Born’s Rule (2.9.2) of quantum theory. Moreover, (2.9.2) is the fundamental
time evolution equation of quantum theory, provided that the secondary,
model dependent time evolutions are given for the set of events and for the
set of states.
The normalization conditions P (Λ |ψ) = 1 and P (Λ | ρ) := 1 could seem
non-intuitive. In their defense they make the conditional probabilities work
out when k = 0. But they seem to say that the probability that nothing
happens is 1. I suspect that this is a trap of language. Think of ever longer
sequences of events. Easily such very long sequences can have probability 0
or very near 0. But then thinking of starting with such a long sequence of
events with small probability and then considering shorter and shorter sub-
sequences of it. The intuition is that the probability increases. And when
one arrives at the empty sequence of events, one then has the most probable
situation. In more mundane terms we can say that events impose restrictions
on probability and that, by removing all such restrictions, one gets the most
probable outcome, i.e., probability 1.
Continuing with the intuition in the previous paragraph, we can define
the probability of an infinite sequence of events.
Definition 2.9.3 Let {Ej | j ∈ N} be an infinite sequence of linearly ordered
events with Ei preceding Ej if and only if i < j. Let ρ be a density matrix.
Then we define the probability of the ordered sequence, given ρ, as
P ({Ej} | ρ) := lim
n→∞
P (E1, . . . , En | ρ)
= lim
n→∞
Tr
(
(En · · ·E1)∗En · · ·E1ρ
)
= inf
n
Tr
(
(En · · ·E1)∗En · · ·E1ρ
)
.
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If this limit exists, then clearly 0 ≤ P ({Ej} | ρ) ≤ 1. It also satisfies
obvious normalization condition if all Ej = I or if any Ej = 0.
The limit in this definition exists since the sequence is both bounded
below by 0 and non-increasing. To prove the latter statement we compare
the n + 1–st term with the n–th term. Write the density matrix as ρ =∑
k λk|φk〉〈φk| where 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1,
∑
k λk = 1 and {φk} is an orthonormal
basis of H which diagonalizes ρ. The result is trivially true if En+1 = 0. So
we assume that En+1 6= 0 which implies that ||En+1|| = 1. Then we have
Tr
(
(En+1En · · ·E1)∗En+1En · · ·E1ρ
)
=
=
∑
k
〈
φk, (En+1En · · ·E1)∗En+1En · · ·E1ρφk
〉
=
∑
k
〈
En+1En · · ·E1φk, En+1En · · ·E1ρφk
〉
=
∑
k
λk
〈
En+1En · · ·E1φk, En+1En · · ·E1φk
〉
=
∑
k
λk||En+1En · · ·E1φk||2
≤
∑
k
λk||En+1||2 ||En · · ·E1φk||2
=
∑
k
λk||En · · ·E1φk||2
=
∑
k
λk
〈
En · · ·E1φk, En · · ·E1φk
〉
=
∑
k
〈
En · · ·E1φk, En · · ·E1λkφk
〉
=
∑
k
〈
φk, (En · · ·E1)∗En · · ·E1ρφk
〉
= Tr
(
(En · · ·E1)∗En · · ·E1ρ
)
.
This proves that the sequence is non-increasing. And this fact is behind the
assertion that the conditional probabilities are ≤ 1. However, this result does
not mean that more events lowers the probability. It only says that adding
more events after a given sequence of events lowers the probability. It is well
known one can find events E1 and E2 acting on C2 such that E2E1 = 0 and
so, in particular, P (E2E1 |ψ) = 0, but that there exists an event F satisfying
P (E2FE1 |ψ) > 0. (Think about light polarizing filters.)
Generalized Born’s Rule with no State 49
Since E1 is the first event and En is the last event, the expression En · · ·E1
is well-known in quantum field theory. It is called a time-ordered product.
Clearly, the actual calculation of these probabilities can be rather challenging
in practice. Such probabilities could be difficult to check in the laboratory
as well. One typically prefers experimental situations with few events in
play. However, nature does not always smile favorably on the experimental
scientist. Even if one wished to study just two consecutive events, there may
be other uncontrolled intermediate events so that one is studying a situation
with many events instead of just two. Such undesired intermediate events are
pejoratively dubbed as noise (as if they were not physical phenomena which
one could study) and the experimenter then works hard to eliminate them
or, at least, to minimize their collective impact. Neither at an experimental
level nor a theoretical level is there any ‘mystery’ about such noise that
needs special explanation. It is simply very annoying. But to their merit
some physicists do try to study this noise which they rename as decoherence.
It is important to remark, and trivial to verify, that the probabilities
in Definition 2.9.1 are invariant under isomorphisms between models. So it
makes sense to suppose these probabilities could have physical significance.
The Generalized Born’s Rule clearly applies to the special case when all of
the events have the form P (T ∈ B), where T is a self-adjoint operator and
B is a Borel subset of R.
Also, these quantum probabilities can be defined for events and states
associated to any von Neumann algebra.
2.10 Generalized Born’s Rule with no State
It makes mathematical sense to drop the state from the formulas and arrive
at a definition of probability for sequences of events with no mention of a
state. This also has some physical intuition behind it, though as we shall see
it clashes with ideas from classical probability. So we present these concepts
only as definitions without ever using them later in this treatise.
Definition 2.10.1 Suppose that E1, E2, . . . , En for an integer n ≥ 1 is an
ordered sequence of events. Then the consecutive (conjunctive) probability
that first E1 occurs and then E2 occurs and so on continuing until En occurs
is defined as
P (E1, E2, . . . , En |) := ||En · · ·E2E1||2. (2.10.1)
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Let Λ denote the empty sequence of events. Then we define P (Λ) := 1.
The conditional probability that the sequence of events E1, . . . , En occurs
in that time order given that the sequence of events F1, . . . , Fk has already
occurred in that time order is defined as
P (E1, . . . , En |F1, . . . , Fk) := P (F1, . . . , Fk, E1, . . . , En)
P (F1, . . . , Fk)
=
||En · · ·E1Fk · · ·F1||2
||Fk · · ·F1||2
provided the denominator is not zero. (The definition on the first line is for
all integers k ≥ 0, while the second line only holds for k ≥ 1.) Otherwise we
define
P (E1, . . . , En |F1, . . . , Fk) := 0.
This definition will be used in the Chapter on Entanglement. So it does
have relevance to physics. But it is non-intuitive, at least for me. Here is a
puzzling particular case. If E 6= 0 is an event, then
P (E) = ||E||2 = 1.
This contradicts the intuition that non-zero events should have non-trivial
probabilities. In particular, the map P : E → [0, 1] is not σ-additive, where
E is the set of all events in H. Therefore, P is not a pvm. Also, when
restricted to a subset of E which is a σ-algebra (the commutative classical
case), the range of P is just {0, 1}. So in Chapter 3 on Entanglement only the
conditional probability with a state will be used although a similar analysis
with the less intuitive conditional probability with no state can be made and
gives the same results.
This probability with no state contrasts sharply with the probability of
an event, given a state ψ, for which we have that
P (E |ψ) = ||Eψ||2
can be any number in the interval [0, 1] for events 0 6= E 6= I. This accords
with the classical idea that the probability of an event reflects to some degree
the state in which the system ’finds’ itself. But P (E) = 1 for all non-zero
events seems to mean something decidedly weaker. Since P (0) = 0 is the
only exceptional case and 0 is the event that has only the value NO, one is
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led to think that P (E) = 1 says that YES is a possible value of E. Again,
this is a very weak condition.
Let’s see how this works in a familiar example. Let Q denote the position
operator defined in the Hilbert space L2(R). Let a, b ∈ R satisfy a < b. Then
the quantum event
Q ∈ [a, b] = PQ
(
[a, b]
) 6= 0
and so P (Q ∈ [a, b]) = 1. On the other hand
P (Q ∈ [a, b] |ψ) = ||(Q ∈ [a, b])ψ||2
can assume any value in [0, 1], depending on the value of the unit vector ψ.
Since there exist some states such that the event Q ∈ [a, b] gives the value
YES, the probability of the event itself is 1. However, the quantum event
Q ∈ [a] = PQ
(
[a]
)
= 0
and so P (Q ∈ [a]) = 0. This is a way of saying in the language of quantum
probability that the position observable can not give sharp numerical values,
but can give values in non-trivial intervals.
2.11 Probability Amplitudes
In many formulations of quantum theory it is emphasized that the quantum
probabilities are calculated as the absolute value squared of a probability
amplitude. That is implicit in this approach in the appropriate case when
we have two unit vectors ψ, φ ∈ H, in which case we define their probability
amplitude to be A(φ, ψ) := 〈φ, ψ〉. We use the notation Eφ = |φ〉〈φ|, the
event that ‘φ occurs’. Then the probability of Eφ, given ψ, is
P (Eφ |ψ) = ||Eφ ψ||2 = ||〈φ, ψ〉φ||2 = |A(φ, ψ)|2.
For fixed φ the map ψ 7→ A(φ, ψ) is linear provided that ψ is allowed to
be any vector in H, but that ψ 7→ |A(φ, ψ)|2 is not linear. Of course, the
more relevant concept here is convexity. So, suppose that ψ =
∑
k λkφk,
where {φk} is an orthonormal basis and the complex numbers λk satisfy∑
k |λk|2 = 1. Then we have a form of σ-additivity of amplitudes:
A(φ, ψ) =
∑
k
λk〈φ, φk〉.
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But in general
|A(φ, ψ)|2 and
∑
k
|λk〈φ, φk〉|2 =
∑
k
|λk|2 |A(φ, φk)|2
are not equal due to the well known interference terms.
Probability amplitudes can also be defined for all the other examples of
quantum probability, but they are elements in the Hilbert space instead of
being complex numbers. For example, for a quantum event E and a unit
vector ψ we have P (E |ψ) = ||A(E, ψ)||2, where we define the probability
amplitude as A(E, ψ) := E ψ ∈ H.
Essentially, probability amplitudes add more notation to the theory but
without shedding much more light on it. However, that language is available
if you wish to use it.
2.12 Quantum Integrals
Having defined and studied quantum probability, it is now straightforward to
define and study the quantum theory of integration as was mentioned earlier
as E(A | ρ) = Tr(Aρ) for any A ∈ L(H) and density matrix ρ. We can
say that this is the (non-commutative) integral of A with respect to the state
ρ. Using terminology from classical probability theory we can call this the
expectation of A with respect to ρ. In quantum physics one says that this is
the expected value of A in the state ρ; this is well known since the early days
of quantum theory, although only after Born’s seminal paper appeared. So
the next definition seems to be natural, though its importance is not clear.
Definition 2.12.1 Let A1, A2, . . . , An be an ordered sequence in L(H) and
let ρ be a density matrix. We define the time-ordered integral of this sequence
of operators with respect to ρ to be
E(A1, A2, . . . , An | ρ) := Tr(An · · ·A2A1 ρ). (2.12.1)
This is also called the expectation of the ordered sequence A1, A2, . . . , An with
respect to ρ.
Of course, the time ordered integral of an ordered sequence of operators is
equal to the integral of a single operator, since
E(A1, A2, . . . , An | ρ) = E(An · · ·A2A1 | ρ).
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But the point is that non-commutativity of L(H) makes the order of the
operators important. And that is what is underlining this definition. The
corresponding definition in usual measure theory, which is a commutative
integration theory, would not have such importance.
There is a temptation to say that (2.12.1) is a state that is associated
to the probability for ordered sequences of events. However, it has some
properties that argue against being so named. For example, for an ordered
sequence E1, E2, . . . , En of events with n ≥ 2 we have in general that
E(E1, E2, . . . , En | ρ) 6= P (E1, E2, . . . , En | ρ).
So with this definition the expectation does not extend the probability. Also,
there is no apparent positivity property. One ‘nice’ property that it does
have is the normalization E(I, I, . . . , I | ρ) = Tr ρ = 1. It also has reasonable
marginals such as E(I, E2, . . . , En | ρ) = E(E2, . . . , En | ρ) and so forth.
But now we also have quantum conditional probability at our disposal,
and so we should have quantum conditional expectation as well.
Definition 2.12.2 Let E1, . . . , Ek be an ordered sequence of events in L(H)
and A1, . . . , An be an ordered sequence of operators in L(H). Also let ρ be a
density matrix. Then the (quantum) conditional expectation is defined as
E(A1, . . . , An |E1, . . . , Ek, ρ) := E(A1, . . .An, E1, . . . , Ek | ρ)E(E1, . . . , Ek | ρ) (2.12.2)
provided E(E1, . . . , Ek | ρ) 6= 0. (Note that the denominator here is not
P (E1, . . . , Ek | ρ).)
Note in the Schrödinger and Heisenberg models that the time evolution
extends naturally to L(H). Consequently, given a Hamiltonian these integrals
are also time dependent.
2.13 Born’s rule redux
Until the end of the last section, I had been rather cavalier in using the term
Born’s rule. What I mean by it is any formula in quantum theory that is a
special case of (2.9.2). Since M. Born was the first to give such a formula
in quantum theory, I have decided to credit him by calling (2.9.2) and its
immediate consequences the Generalized Born’s Rule. Actually, I have not
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yet presented Born’s rule in its original form. It might be instructive for the
reader to see this in detail. To do this I shall dive ever so shallowly into
historical waters.
The time independent version of Schrödinger’s equation Hψ = Eψ for
a self-adjoint partial differential operator H = H∗ is an eigenvalue problem
with two unknowns for which it must be solved: the eigenvalue E ∈ R
and its corresponding non-zero eigenvector ψ. Already in Schrödinger’s first
paper [29] on the subject it was realized that E represents an energy, but
the physical significance of ψ was left unresolved in that paper. However,
it seemed reasonable that the solution ψ should also have some physical
significance. And a similar concern arises with the solution ψt of the time
dependent Schrödinger equation.
In modern terminology M. Born addressed this in the specific case that
ψ ∈ L2(R3). However, to avoid a lot of sub-indices let’s consider the case
ψ ∈ L2(R), since the same same ideas apply. So, H = L2(R) is the Hilbert
space for this situation. The basic assumption is that the position of the
system is a relevant observable, that is, the values of its pvm lie in the
von Neumann algebra of the system. Here the self-adjoint position operator
Q : D(Q)→ L2(R) is defined on the dense subspace
D(Q) := {ψ ∈ L2(R) | xψ(x) ∈ L2(R)}
by the formula Qψ(x) := xψ(x). But more importantly, the pvm of Q is
PQ(B)φ = χB φ for all Borel subsets B of R and all φ ∈ L2(R). Here χB is
the characteristic function of the Borel set B, defined for all x ∈ R as
χB(x) :=
{
1 if x ∈ B,
0 if x /∈ B.
All of these results about Q come from functional analysis. We continue
by using Born’s rule as given in Axiom 4 to calculate the probability that
the position of the system is in a Borel subset B of R given a unit vector
ψ ∈ L2(R) as follows:
P (Q ∈ B |ψ) = 〈ψ, PQ(B)ψ〉 =
∫
R
dxψ(x)∗
(
PQ(B)ψ(x)
)
=
=
∫
R
dxψ(x)∗χB(x)ψ(x) =
∫
B
dxψ(x)∗ψ(x)
=
∫
B
dx |ψ(x)|2.
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The last expression on the right here is the formula given by Born for the
probability that the position of the system is in B given the unit vector ψ. Of
course, Born came to this conclusion without using all the tools of quantum
probability, which came later. Actually, Born initiated the field of quantum
probability by indicating the physical significance of this expression. This
formula for the probability is one way of viewing the physical significance of
the solution ψ ∈ L2(R) of the eigenvalue problem Hψ = Eψ. It we consider
P (T ∈ B |ψ) for some other self-adjoint operator T , we can give ψ some other
physical significance. I do not wish to elevate this last comment to the level
of a general principle of complementarity; it is merely another application of
Born’s rule as given in Axiom 4.
Concerning a solution ψt ∈ L2(R) of the time dependent Schrödinger’s
equation, Born’s rule asserts that
P (Q ∈ B |ψt) =
∫
B
dx |ψt(x)|2 (2.13.1)
is the probability at every time t ∈ R that the position of the system is in the
Borel set B. So we see time dependent probability in quantum theory in this
simple example. However, in this treatise we take equation (2.13.1) to be the
fundamental time evolution equation of the position observable Q. Moreover,
we see in this example that the time dependent Schrödinger’s equation plays
a secondary role in understanding the physical significance of ψt.
2.14 Comparison with Classical Probability
This section, just as the rest of this treatise, does not address the issues
of comparing quantum theory with classical physical theory. Rather, it is
a comparison of Kolmogorov’s formulation in [20] of classical probability in
terms of measure theory with the quantum theory of probability that has
been presented here.
A key difference is the mathematical structure of the set of events. In
classical probability the events are elements of a σ-algebra F whose elements
are subsets of a non-empty sample space Ω. In particular this is a Boolean
algebra. This means the various rules of Boolean algebra hold including the
de Morgan identities. Another way of saying this is that the events obey
the rules of classical logic that go back at least to the works of Aristotle.
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Thinking that events tell us that nature has certain properties, this means
that those properties also satisfy the rules classical logic.
In quantum theory the events are the closed subspaces (≡ projections)
of a complex Hilbert space H. (Note that the role of the complex numbers
seems to be essential.) These form a complete orthomodular lattice for which
the de Morgan identities fail if dimH ≥ 2. Consequently, if one assigns
‘properties’ to these events, then classical logic will not apply to them. So
we must think differently about quantum events. Of course, we can always
say that the event itself is a property, but this is quite distinct from how
classical probability is structured.
Quantum events when viewed as projections lie inside a larger structure,
namely the complex vector space L(H). To draw comparisons it is convenient
to embed classical events in a larger structure, namely the complex vector
space M(Ω) := {X : Ω → C |X is measurable}. Then a classical event
A ∈ F is associated with its characteristic function χA ∈ M(Ω). One has
χ2A = χA = χ
∗
A. Conversely, for every X ∈ M(Ω) satisfying X2 = X = X∗,
there exists a unique set A ∈ F such that X = χA. So, we can define
classical events equivalently as those χ ∈ M(Ω) satisfying χ2 = χ = χ∗.
This compares favorably with the definition of a quantum event as those
E ∈ L(H) satisfying E2 = E = E∗.
In classical probability the observables are called random variables and
are defined as those elements of M(Ω) that are real valued, that is, those
X ∈ M(Ω) satisfying X = X∗. The essential range of any X ∈ M(Ω) is
the spectrum of X, denoted Spec(X). (See a text on measure theory for
definitions.) If X is a random variable, then the elements of Spec(X) form a
non-empty subset of R, and its elements correspond to the values seen in the
observations associated to X. For each Borel subset B of R there is an event
in F that is denoted as X ∈ B and is called the event that X is observed
to have a value in B. It is defined as X ∈ B := X−1(B). If a probability
measure P on F is given, then the probability that X has a value in the Borel
set B is defined to be P (X ∈ B) = P (X−1(B)). For X and P given, the
map B 7→ P (X ∈ B) =: µX(B) is a probability measure on R which is called
the distribution of X (with respect to P ). The phrase in parentheses is often
omitted since P is implicit in a many contexts. The probability measure P ,
being a measure, has a theory of integration that comes with it for free. So,
integrals E(X) := ∫
Ω
dP (ω)X(ω) are defined for a wide class of X ∈ M(Ω),
including all bounded, Borel measurable functions. We say that E(X) is the
expected value of X (with respect to P ).
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An important identity for the expected value is
E(X) =
∫
Ω
dP (ω)X(ω) =
∫
R
dµX(λ) λ
in the sense that if one of these two integrals exists, then so does the other and
the equality holds. This expresses the expected value as the first moment of
a probability measure on R. More generally, for any bounded, Borel function
f : R → C and all ω ∈ Ω we define f(X)(ω) := f(X(ω)), which is itself
bounded and Borel measurable. Then we have that the probability measure
µX satisfies
E(f(X)) =
∫
Ω
dP (ω) f(X)(ω) =
∫
R
dµX(λ) f(λ).
The observables in quantum theory are self-adjoint operators T = T ∗, but
the condition T ∈ L(H) is not required though it may hold. The spectrum
of any self-adjoint operator (bounded or unbounded) is a non-empty, closed
subset of R, and its elements correspond to the values seen in the observations
associated to T . For each Borel subset B of R there is an event in L(H) that
is denoted as T ∈ B and is called the event that T is observed to have a
value in B. It is defined as T ∈ B := PT (B), where PT is the pvm associated
to T by spectral theory. If a density matrix ρ is given, then the probability
that T has a value in the Borel subset B of R is defined by Born’s rule to be
P (T ∈ B | ρ) = Tr(PT (B) ρ).
In quantum theory, only rarely would ρ be omitted from the notation on the
left side. Probability theory in quantum theory exists even prior to choosing
a state ρ, since a self-adjoint operator T has its unique associated pvm PT .
This has properties similar to those of a probability measure, except that it
takes values that are quantum events. So a pvm has a codomain consisting
of quantum events. On the other hand a classical probability measure has
classical events in its domain. The integral
∫
R
dPT (λ) f(λ) exists in L(H) for
a wide class of Borel measurable functions f : R→ C, including all bounded
functions. The ‘expected value’ of this pvm gives
T =
∫
R
dPT (λ) λ
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by the spectral theorem. Maybe you did not expect this result. Actually,
f(T ) :=
∫
R
dPT (λ) f(λ)
defines a functional calculus for all bounded, Borel functions f : R→ C.
Another curious point is that a classical probability measure P satisfies
0 ≤ P (A) ≤ 1 for every event A. This is an inequality of real numbers.
On the other hand, a pvm P on R satisfies 0 ≤ P (B) ≤ I for every Borel
subset of R. This is an inequality of self-adjoint operators. So, the linearly
ordered interval of real numbers [0, 1] for probabilities in the classical case
is replaced by the lattice of projections in the ‘interval’ [0, I] of self-adjoint
operators. An even more curious point is that the interval [0, 1] only contains
real numbers, while the ‘interval’ [0, I] contains self-adjoint operators that
are not projections. This opens the door to considering positive operator
valued measures, which will be discussed later.
Yet another way of relating quantum probability to classical probability is
by restricting a pvm to a sub-lattice E ′ of the lattice events of E such that E ′ is
a σ-algebra. Then one can put any classical probability measure whatsoever
on E ′. This probability measure need not be the restriction of a spectral
measure associated to a pvm defined E , in which case one is considering a
structure unrelated to quantum theory. However, if one starts with a spectral
measure on E , one can restrict it to many such σ-algebra sub-lattices in order
to ‘view’ the pvm in a variety of classical ways. This could be what some
would call complementarity, though such a specific description is not usually
given. Conversely, one could have a classical probability measure on E ′ and
ask whether this is the restriction of a spectral measure on E . And if it is,
then whether that spectral measure is unique. This is close to the setting of
the Kadison-Singer conjecture (see [18]), which is now a proved theorem (see
[23]). In that context one has a maximal commutative sub-∗-algebra A of a
C∗-algebra C and a state φ : A → C. Then the theorem says that there exists
a unique extension φ˜ : C → C of φ which is a state. Colloquially, under these
hypotheses one commutative ‘snapshot’ of a state suffices to characterize it.
Another notable difference is that the probability of a sequence of events
in quantum probability does not reduce in general to the probability of a
single event, as happens in classical probability theory. This entails a separate
definition of quantum probability for sequences of events. The properties
of there multi-event probabilities include new features absent in classical
Expected Value 59
probability theory, such as interference terms and dependence on the order
of events.
Also notice that classical probability measures on R arise naturally in
quantum probability, but classical probability does not involve quantum
probability. And finally in classical probability theory, there is no basic
time evolution equation, although time dependent stochastic processes are
a part of that theory. However, quantum probability is intrinsically a part
of quantum theory, which has time evolution as a major facet of the theory.
In fact, the generalized Born’s rule (2.9.2) is the fundamental time evolution
equation of quantum theory.
2.15 Expected Value
Expected value is a mostly unremarkable, quite secondary aspect of quantum
probability. However, many times I have heard colleagues speak about it
incorrectly. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding can be found in print, too.
So I think that it is necessary to give a clarification of this topic.
First, let’s repeat what quantum theory says about probability, namely
Born’s rule for ψ a unit vector, A = A∗ and B a Borel subset of R, which
with a bit of new notation is
µ(B) := P (A ∈ B |ψ) = 〈ψ, PA(B)ψ〉.
As a function of the Borel subset B of R with both A and ψ fixed, µ is a
probability measure on the real line R. We have seen this basic point already
many times. One can now apply concepts from standard probability theory
to this probability measure µ. And this is indeed done. For example, one
can consider the moments of any probability measure. So, for every integer
k ≥ 1 we define the kth moment of µ as
mk :=
∫
R
dµ(λ) λk,
provided that this integral converges absolutely. The expected value of µ is
defined to bem1, the first moment, provided again that the integral converges
absolutely. The idea is that m1 is a statistical estimator given by probability
theory of the empirically observed sample average
m :=
λ1 + · · ·+ λn
n
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of n ≥ 1 measured values (or sample) λ1, . . . , λn. The values measured are
typically not all the same and, indeed, this is what motivates one to turn to
probability theory in order to understand them. It is quite common that the
expected value is not going to be equal to any of the measured values, since
this is a common property of the sample average. For example, the sample
average of the number of children per family (in a sample of families in a
city, say) could be 2.3, which is not an integer.
As a brief aside, let me note that one can continue by defining the central
moments for every integer k ≥ 2 by
σk :=
∫
R
dµ(λ) (λ−m1)k (2.15.1)
provided that the expected value m1 exists and that the integral in (2.15.1)
also is absolutely convergent. A frequently used central moment is σ2, which
is also called the variance. And the standard deviation of µ is defined by
σ :=
√
σ2. Standard deviations (or equivalently variances) enter into the
Roberts inequality that expresses mathematically the Heisenberg Uncertainty
Principle.
It is well known that the moments (or equivalently the central moments)
do not uniquely determine µ in all cases. Even in the most favorable case
when these moments exist for all k this moment problem might not have a
solution µ and, if it does, that solution might not be unique. Colloquially,
one can say that the moments carry some information about the probability
measure µ, but not in general all the possible information.
We have enough context now for discussing a common misunderstanding.
The false assertion is often made that the only information that quantum
theory provides about a system is the expected value of observables in a
given state. Actually, Born’s rule provides the probability measure for any
observable in a given state, which is a lot more than just the first moment
of that probability measure. This aspect of quantum theory dates back at
least to 1932 in the seminal book [25] of von Neumann and so should be
well known in the physics community. My experience is that it is known by
some, but not by others. An example of this confusion is the ‘proof’ that
Schrödinger’s model is equivalent to the Heisenberg model by showing that
the expected value is the same in both models. While this is a necessary
condition, by itself it is not sufficient.
To complete this section here is the derivation of the usual formula for
calculating the expected value of A = A∗ given a pure state ψ in the dense
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domain of A.
m1 =
∫
R
〈ψ, dPA(λ)ψ〉 λ =
〈
ψ,
(∫
R
dPA(λ) λ
)
ψ
〉
= 〈ψ,Aψ〉.
2.16 Dynamics: The Generalized Born’s Rule
The Final Version
The dynamics, also known as the time evolution, of a physical system is
given in quantum theory by a further generalization of the time dependent
generalized Born’s rule (2.9.2). Contrary to the confused opinion of many
authors (including me in [31]), there is only one fundamental time evolution
equation in quantum theory. It is the same equation in all models. It is
the only equation which we subject to experimental verification. But (2.9.2)
is still not adequate for all purposes, since it assumes that there is no time
evolution of the quantum system between events. So now we suppose that
a system is given with state ψ at time t0 and that we are interested in the
events E1, . . . , En at the times t1, t2, . . . , tn, where t0 < t1 < · · · < tn. The
probability of this sequence of events at these times is
P (E1, . . . , En, t0, t1, . . . , tn|ψ)= ||EnU(tn, tn−1) · · ·E2U(t2, t1)E1U(t1, t0)ψ||2,
where U(s, t) is the time evolution operator of the system for the times
s < t. In the Schrödinger model U(s, t) = exp(−i(t−s)H/~), where H is the
Hamiltonian of the quantum system. I imagine that this formula is obvious
to those who think in the Schrödinger model. But whether this formula is
obvious or not is an independent consideration. It is an axiom. It is the final
version of the Generalized Born’s Rule.
Axiom 5 Updated: Let ρ be a density matrix. Suppose that E1, . . . , En is a
sequence of events and that t0 < t1 < · · · < tn is a sequence of times. Suppose
that we have time evolution operators U(s, t) ∈ L(H) for all s < t. We define
the consecutive probability with time evolution P (E1, . . . , En, t0, t1, . . . , tn|ρ)
to be
Tr(EnU(tn, tn−1) · · ·E2U(t2, t1)E1U(t1, t0)ρ). (2.16.1)
The conditional probability with time evolution reads much like (2.9.2) with
the time evolution operators appropriately interspersed between the event
operators. The exact, general formula becomes unwieldy to write down. 
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This axiom holds in all models if we extend the group Et to act on all
bounded operators and so, in particular, on the operators U(s, t). In the
standard models (Schrödinger, Heisenberg, interaction) the action of Et is
via conjugation by operators in a unitary group. This conjugation acts on
all of L(H) as well. As we have come to expect, the value of the probability
(2.16.1) is invariant under isomorphisms of models. It might appear strange
that the time evolution operators depend on the model, rather than being
the same in all models as in the familiar Schrödinger model. But this is
exactly one of the things that happens in the interaction model, which also
should be familiar for the reader. Recall that in the interaction model one
writes the Schrödinger Hamiltonian as H = Hfree +Hint, the sum of a ‘free’
term and of an ‘interacting’ term. Then the operators in the Schrödinger
model, including the time evolution operators, are transformed to operators
in the interaction model by conjugating them with exp(−itHfree/~). The
splitting of H into two terms is chosen to facilitate subsequent calculations,
not to change the results. And that is exactly the point of having different
isomorphic models of quantum theory.
Again, the manner for computing this time dependent probability does
depend on the model, which leads to much confusion. In the Schrödinger
model, which is the most familiar and most widely used model, all the events
are time independent and only the state could possibly change with time.
As is well known the time evolution of the state in this model is given by a
family of equations known collectively as Schrödinger’s equation, which all
have the same form i~ψ′(t) = Hψ(t), where H is a self-adjoint operator,
known as the Hamiltonian, acting in the Hilbert space. The multitude of
physical systems covered by this approach is due to the fact that physicists
are very adept at finding the appropriate Hamiltonian for many systems.
However, the time dependent state which solves Schrödinger’s equation has
no physical significance. It is an artifact of the model and nothing else. But
it is one of the ingredients that for the case ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| in (2.16.1) goes into
computing the time dependent probability, which indeed does have physical
significance. In other models one must calculate the time dependence of the
elements in (2.9.2) using other auxiliary equations. But again these auxiliary
time dependent elements do not have any physical significance.
It will surely be taken as heresy on my part to say that Schrödinger’s
equation is without physical significance. However, if that is the fate of its
solutions, then that must be the fate of Schrödinger’s equation itself. It is
a stepping stone, a useful tool. This idea flies in the face of long-standing
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traditions in physics, especially those that favor differential equations as the
most fundamental elements of a physical theory. There is an expectation that
the time evolution of a physical system should be expressed as a differential
equation involving time as one of the variables. But (2.16.1) does not have
that form. Taking the derivative of (2.16.1) in order to find a differential
equation that it must solve leads to a relation of the time derivative of the
probability with the time evolutions of the events and of the state. But both
of those time evolutions are model dependent.
This preference for differential equations manifests itself in the way the
equation of motion is written in the Heisenberg model. Typically this is
presented as an ill-defined differential equation whose so-called ‘solution’ is
then given. It is that ‘solution’ (1.6.1) which is the actual time evolution
equation, in spite of the fact that it is not a differential equation.
Another apparent problem in taking the generalized Born’s rule (2.16.1)
as the fundamental time evolution equation of quantum theory is that this
ignores the history of its discovery. The physics community is fascinated
with the story of how these ideas emerged and who gets the credit for each
of them. And I am complicit in this tradition to the extent that I do use
the names of scientists when discussing their discoveries. At one point while
writing this treatise I thought of removing ‘Lie’ from Lie group to give one
example of how one might eliminate history from this narrative. Born’s rule
in the traditional narrative is seen as a later add-on, an embellishment of
ideas that already ‘worked’ but somehow seemed incomplete. And besides
that there already was a known equation, namely Schrödinger’s equation,
that was recognized by one and all as the time evolution differential equation
of quantum theory. And this history then continues with Born’s rule being
severely criticized by some and rejected by others. This paragraph is one of
my few excursions into the history of quantum theory, and the point behind
it is that the historical sequence of discoveries is not the logical structure
of quantum theory. The generalized Born’s rule (2.16.1) is the fundamental
time evolution equation of quantum theory.
If you think that my purpose here is to remove Schrödinger’s equation
from its central position in quantum theory, then you are reading correctly.
For example, on Wikipedia the various topics on quantum theory (which
there is called quantum mechanics) are presented in a box with Schrödinger’s
equation at its head. This should be replaced with the generalized Born’s
rule according to my thesis.
It is not well understood that one is actually only using the conditional
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probability (2.9.2) when analyzing many physical phenomena. Let’s recall
how that works in the case of two events. Given an event E1 and a unit
vector ψ, the conditional probability of a subsequent event E2 is
P (E2 |E1, ψ) = ||E2E1ψ||
2
||E1ψ||2 = ||E2ψ˜||
2 = P (E2 | ψ˜),
where ψ˜ := E1ψ/||E1ψ|| is the ‘collapse’ of the original state ψ. Of course,
this is just reading backwards the motivating argument for the definition of
conditional probability. The point now is that the right side of this equation
can always be translated into the conditional probability on the left side.
Another common way of speaking of this situation is that the first event E1
‘prepares’ a state ψ˜, which the event E2 then ‘measures’. However, it all
reduces to quantum conditional probability of quantum events.
Another curious aspect of quantum theory is that the one-event Born’s
rule in Axiom 4 is rarely ever used to understand observations. A careful
analysis almost always reveals that one is actually considering a conditional
probability of two events.
2.17 Quantum Information
As with any other aspect of basic quantum theory, information must be
defined in a way that is invariant under isomorphisms of models. Since the
only structure left invariant is the Generalized Born’s Rule, information must
be defined in terms of it. In a more elaborated quantum theory with more
structures, and a correspondingly more restricted notion of isomorphism, it
could be possible to introduce other definitions of information. Following the
usual convention, I will formulate this topic in terms of entropy, which is the
negative of information.
Suppose that T = T ∗ is a self-adjoint operator and that ρ is a density
matrix. Then, as we have seen, for B a Borel subset of R the map
B 7→ P (T ∈ B | ρ) = Tr(PT (B) ρ)
is a probability measure on R. We suppose that this measure is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Let fT,ρ : R → [0,∞) be a
density function for P (T ∈ B | ρ), that is
P (T ∈ B | ρ) =
∫
B
dλ fT,ρ(λ).
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This condition uniquely determines fT,ρ except on a subset of R of Lebesgue
measure zero. One can make fT,ρ unique by requiring that it satisfy the
cadlag condition.
This is a model independent property in the sense that if T ′ and ρ′ cor-
respond respectively in an isomorphic model to T and ρ, then fT ′,ρ′ = fT,ρ
almost everywhere with respect to Lebesgue measure. Then we define the
entropy of T given ρ as
H(T | ρ) := −
∫
R
dλ fT,ρ(λ) log(fT,ρ(λ))
where the usual definition 0 log 0 := 0 is being used. The symbol log can
mean the logarithm to the base e or any other base b > 1. Once a base is
chosen, that fixes a normalization condition on the entropy. Continuing to
use the notation established above, we have H(T | ρ) = H(T ′ | ρ′).
Similarly, the conditional entropy of T given an event S ∈ B and a density
matrix ρ can be defined if P (T ∈ C |S ∈ B, ρ) is absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure on R with density function fS,B,ρ : R→ [0,∞)
by
H(T |S ∈ B, ρ) := −
∫
R
dλ fS,B,ρ(λ) log(fS,B,ρ(λ)).
Since there is no joint probability measure in general for a pair of self-
adjoint operators S and T , it seems to not be possible to define in general a
conditional probability of T , given S and ρ. Of course, if S and T commute,
then this can be done. In general the probabilities P (S ∈ B, T ∈ C) and
P (S ∈ B, T ∈ C | ρ), where B,C are Borel subsets of R and ρ is a density
matrix, give numbers that do carry information about the ordered pair S, T .
Chapter 3
Entanglement
I would not call [entanglement] one but rather the
characteristic trait of quantum mechanics . . .
(italics in original)
Erwin Schrödinger
Entanglement has been one of the most puzzling topics in quantum theory.
This is largely due to a detailed discussion about two events that presumably
‘know’ nothing of each other, but nonetheless show an uncanny deterministic
relation between them. One wonders how a probabilistic theory could ever
explain this determinism. Worse yet, these two events can be space-like
with respect to each other and so relativity theory forbids information from
passing from one to the other. Yet in some strange form this seems to be what
is happening. There are many experiments that agree with entanglement,
including some carefully constructed experiments where the two events are
indeed space-like. And no experiment, as far as I am aware, contradicts
entanglement. How can we deal with this conundrum? Must quantum theory
be modified or abandoned? Is there some spooky action at a distance that
accounts for entanglement? Is physics non-local? How can the collapse of a
state by one detector possibly affect the other detector?
The point here is that in a probabilistic theory some of the calculated
probabilities are 1. Experimental confirmation of entanglement should not
produce existential angst , much less to appeals for new scientific principles to
‘explain’ the ‘mystery’ of this agreement. So what is going on here in terms of
quantum theory? Quite simply, entanglement always involves three events,
never just two. (Or possibly more than three!) There always is an event
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that precedes in time the two other events. Of course, those two later events
‘know’ about that earlier event. The appropriate probability to be computed
is that of the conditional probability of these three (or more) events.
Here is some notation for a simple example of entanglement. We have an
event E0, which we will call the initial event, and then two events E1 and
E2, each of which occurs after E0. The time relation between E1 and E2 is
irrelevant to this analysis. This example captures the essence of the EPR
paper and is discussed further in Chapter 6. We could assume that E1 and
E2 commute, but that assumption is not used until the end of this chapter.
Notice that space-like separated events must commute according to special
relativity, while some time-like (or light-like) separated events can commute.
We start by taking H = C2 ⊗ C2. We let S1, S2 and S3 denote the
standard 2× 2 spin matrices. In the sequel we will only use
S3 =
1
2
(
1 0
0 −1
)
for convenience in doing calculations. Similar results hold for the other spin
matrices. Then we next consider these self-adjoint operators acting on H:
S2, Sr := S3 ⊗ I, Sl := I ⊗ S3,
where
S2 = (S1 ⊗ I + I ⊗ S1)2 + (S2 ⊗ I + I ⊗ S2)2 + (S3 ⊗ I + I ⊗ S3)2
is the standard total spin operator. The three events to be considered are
defined as
E0 := PS2({0}), E1 := PSr({1/2}), E2 := PSl({−1/2}).
The way one verbalizes this can be misleading, but I will venture to do it
anyway. The event E0 says that initially the system has total spin 0. The
event E1 says that a detector to the right of the place where E0 occurred
measures the z component of the spin to be 1/2. The event E2 says that a
detector to the left of the place where E0 occurred measures the z component
of the spin to be −1/2. The words ‘right’ and ‘left’ are not really important.
They merely give a visual rendition to the formalism.
Notice that in this example the self-adjoint operators Sr and Sl commute.
Consequently, the events E1 and E2 also commute.
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Given these definitions it is an exercise, which we now do, to compute
the appropriate conditional probability for these 3 events. The reader should
be aware that the intermediate steps in this calculation are without physical
significance. The only physically significant part of this calculation is the
last step where the value of the conditional probability is given.
Let ε1, ε2 be the standard orthonormal basis of C2, namely
ε1 =
(
1
0
)
and ε2 =
(
0
1
)
.
We first identify the pertinent quantum events in terms of this basis using
Dirac notation:
E1 = PSr(1/2) = |ε1〉〈ε1| ⊗ I2 and E2 = PSl(1/2) = I2 ⊗ |ε2〉〈ε2|,
where I2 is the identity operator acting on C2. Notice that these are rank 2
projections. The operator S2 is not central in L(H). It is well known that its
spectrum is {0, 2}. The eigenspace for the eigenvalue 2 has dimension 3 (a
triplet for spin 1), while the eigenspace for the eigenvalue 0 has dimension 1
(a singlet for spin 0), and this latter eigenspace has an orthonormal basis
consisting of the one vector
ψ0 :=
1√
2
(
ε1 ⊗ ε2 − ε2 ⊗ ε1
)
.
So we have the quantum event
E0 = PS2({0}) = |ψ0〉〈ψ0|,
which is a projection with rank 1. We now compute the quantum conditional
probability
P (E1 |E2, E0 |ψ) = ||E1E2E0 ψ||
2
||E2E0 ψ||2 (3.0.1)
provided that ||E2E0ψ|| 6= 0, (When not stated otherwise, ψ ∈ H is a unit
vector.) Intuitively, the expression (3.0.1) gives the conditional probability
that the detector on the right measures the z-component of spin to be 1/2
given that the detector on the left measures the z-component of spin to be
−1/2 and that (previously) the initial state has been prepared to have spin
0. These words in everyday language only serve to reassure the dubious that
this formalism has its motivation. We first have for all ψ ∈ H that
E0 ψ = |ψ0〉〈ψ0 |ψ = 〈ψ0, ψ〉ψ0.
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Continuing we have for all ψ ∈ H that
E2E0ψ = (I2 ⊗ |ε2〉〈ε2|)〈ψ0, ψ〉ψ0
= 2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉(I2 ⊗ |ε2〉〈ε2|)
(
ε1 ⊗ ε2 − ε2 ⊗ ε1
)
= 2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉
(
ε1 ⊗ |ε2〉〈ε2|ε2 − ε2 ⊗ |ε2〉〈ε2|ε1
)
= 2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉
(
ε1 ⊗ ε2
)
= 2−1/2|ε1 ⊗ ε2〉〈ψ0|ψ.
This is non-zero if 〈ψ0, ψ〉 6= 0, which we assume from now on. We conclude
E2E0 = 2
−1/2|ε1 ⊗ ε2〉〈ψ0|. (3.0.2)
Clearly, E2E0 is a non-zero operator that is not a projection. Finally, for all
ψ ∈ H we evaluate again that
E1E2E0ψ =
(|ε1〉〈ε1| ⊗ I2)2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉(ε1 ⊗ ε2)
= 2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉
(|ε1〉〈ε1| ⊗ I2)(ε1 ⊗ ε2)
= 2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉
(
ε1 ⊗ ε2
)
= 2−1/2|ε1 ⊗ ε2〉〈ψ0|ψ
= E2E0ψ.
This implies that we have two equal operators (not projections)
E1E2E0 = E2E0. (3.0.3)
This is more than we need to conclude that the conditional probability (3.0.1)
is equal to 1, namely
P (E1 |E2, E0 |ψ) = ||E1E2E0 ψ||
2
||E2E0 ψ||2 = 1.
The equality (3.0.3) of these two operators is an intermediate step which
has no physical significance. For example, the operator E2E0 is not an event
since E0 and E2 do not commute. Note that E0 and E1 also do not commute.
This lack of commutativity is good news. It means that we are dealing with
a truly quantum situation.
Similarly, one can calculate that
P (E2 |E1, E0 |ψ) = ||E2E1E0 ψ||
2
||E1E0 ψ||2 = 1
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provided that ||E1E0 ψ|| 6= 0. The details are left to the reader. Using
this straightforward method for 3 events with the same time order, one can
evaluate the conditional probability for other combinations of components
of spin. Typically those probabilities will lie strictly between 0 and 1, but
in the specific example given here a value of 1 is the result. The fact that
a certain probability is 1 does not invalidate the use of probability theory,
but is merely a special case of it. In particular, probability 1 does not imply
that this is a deterministic situation. In other specific cases probability 0 will
occur. For example, we have
P (Ec2 |E1, E0 |ψ) =
||(I −E2)E1E0 ψ||2
||E1E0 ψ||2 = 0,
where Ec2 = I−E2 is the event complementary to E2. One of the intermediate
steps used to show this (using a formula above) is (I −E2)E1E0 = 0.
In any probabilistic theory, some of the calculated probabilities will turn
out to be 1. I do not see anything ‘spooky’ about that. Nor do I see anything
‘non-local’ in this analysis. Nor do I see that an element of ‘reality’ is required
to ‘explain’ a probability one situation. If you are seeking ‘reality’ here, why
not say that all probabilities are real? See Chapter 6 for more on this.
Of course, we can discard the information about the event E2 and ask
only for the conditional probability of E1 given E0. Intuitively, this is the
point of view of the experimenter on the right. So we want to compute
P (E1 |E0, ψ) = ||E1E0 ψ||
2
||E0 ψ||2 .
We first note that we have E0 ψ = 〈ψ0, ψ〉ψ0 for all ψ ∈ H as before. Next,
we calculate for all ψ ∈ H that
E1E0ψ =
(|ε1〉〈ε1| ⊗ I2)(〈ψ0, ψ〉ψ0)
= 2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉
(|ε1〉〈ε1| ⊗ I2)(ε1 ⊗ ε2 − ε2 ⊗ ε1)
= 2−1/2〈ψ0, ψ〉
(
ε1 ⊗ ε2
)
= 2−1/2|ε1 ⊗ ε2〉〈ψ0|ψ.
Consequently, E1E0 = 2−1/2|ε1 ⊗ ε2〉〈ψ0| and therefore
P (E1 |E0, ψ) = ||E1E0 ψ||
2
||E0 ψ||2 =
||2−1/2|ε1 ⊗ ε2〉〈ψ0|ψ ||2
||〈ψ0, ψ〉ψ0||2 = 1/2,
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since || |ε1⊗ ε2〉〈ψ0|ψ || = |〈ψ0, ψ〉|. In other words, the axiom for calculating
the conditional probability gives the expected result. Similarly, one can show
that P (E2 |E0, ψ) = 1/2.
We can also compute the conditional probability that E1 and E2 occur
given E0. This makes sense if we assume that the events E1 and E2 commute.
The conditional probability for this situation is
P (E1, E2 |E0, ψ) = ||E1E2E0 ψ||
2
||E0 ψ||2
provided ||E0 ψ|| 6= 0. Recall (3.0.2) and (3.0.3): E1E2E0 = 2−1/2|ψ0〉〈ε1⊗ε2|.
This equality of operators, not of events, has no physical significance, but does
allow us to proceed to the next part of the calculation. So here it is:
P (E1, E2 |E0, ψ) = ||E1E2E0 ψ||
2
||E0 ψ||2 =
|| 2−1/2|ψ0〉〈ε1 ⊗ ε2|ψ ||2
||〈ψ0, ψ〉ψ0||2 = 1/2.
So, we have calculated a different conditional probability, and we get
a probability that is neither 0 nor 1. Notice that this result agrees with
what little intuition we can muster concerning quantum theory. In possibly
misleading ordinary language it says that after measuring the system to have
spin 0 the probability is 1/2 that the detector on the right measures the
z-component of spin to be +1/2 and the detector on the left measures the
z-component of spin to be −1/2.
What about the rest of the probability? Simple, similar calculations
which are left to the reader show that P (Ec1, E
c
2 |E0, ψ) = 1/2, where the
complementary event of an event E is defined as Ec := I − E. One also
easily verify that P (Ec1, E2 |E0, ψ) = 0 and P (E1, Ec2 |E0, ψ) = 0. All of
these probabilistic statements can be expressed in ordinary language, and
they all agree with commonly held ‘intuition’.
One mathematical fact behind this example is that both events E1 and
E2 are products of the form F1⊗F2, where each factor is an event in L(C2),
but the event E0 is not of that form. Here the factorizations are with respect
to the given definition H = C2 ⊗ C2. This fact is not invariant in general
under a unitary transformation to another isomorphic Hilbert space with its
own given factorization as a product of two Hilbert spaces of dimension 2.
Nonetheless, it does make sense to speak of entangled events. It does not
make sense to speak of entangled particles. A good rule of thumb is that when
someone speaks of two entangled particles, it is best to rephrase that as a
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clearer statement about three entangled events. Entanglement is a property
of events. Of course, you may object that I never defined entanglement.
Definition 3.0.1 A sequence of time ordered events is entangled if some
appropriate conditional probability involving them is equal to 1. The noun
describing such events is entanglement.
Notice that in this definition the Hilbert space need not be represented
as a tensor product. Typically, I expect that three entangled events are such
that in some unitarily equivalent tensor product Hilbert space two of them
are factorizable as a tensor product of events, while one of them is not.
Another mathematical fact of this example is that the first event E0
has rank 1. Some might object that this event only serves to ‘prepare’ the
‘real’ initial state ψ0 = E0ψ/||E0ψ||, where ψ ∈ H is some ‘pre-initial’ state
satisfying E0ψ 6= 0. You could think of it that way, but by doing so you are
missing the point. States do not change in this analysis. Everything follows
from only events and their conditional probabilities.
The analysis of entanglement given in this chapter does not depend in any
way on Schrödinger’s equation. Both the states and the events have been
taken to be time independent. So this example is in both the Schrödinger
model and in the Heisenberg model. Typically in other presentations, the
time dependence is imposed on the spatial structure rather than on the spin
structure in a way consistent with the presentation here. Most importantly
we learn that Schrödinger’s equation is not a basic structure in quantum
theory, while quantum probability theory is basic.
The critical reader may object that I have done nothing other than just
repeat the standard analysis for an entanglement experiment in a disguised
form. But that ignores certain key aspects of this presentation. Firstly, it
is an analysis of three events, not of two particles. And secondly, there is
no reference to collapse, which is only a way of describing some intermediate
steps in other, more common ways of dealing with entanglement.
And collapse does not require an ‘explanation’ any more than any other
mathematical algorithm that gives the right results. The terminology for
this particular step is unfortunate, since it leads one to think that some
sort of ‘understanding’ of a physical process is needed. Calculations are
meant to help us understand physical phenomena, or as it has been said
since Antiquity: to save the phenomena. (See [28] for the original meaning
of this phrase.)
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But for those who cling to the collapse language, let me note that collapse
also occurs in the context of classical physics, despite the often made claim
that entanglement is a purely quantum effect. One can easily produce two
space-like events which are highly correlated and are described classically.
As in the quantum case, one simply allows an event in the common past
of these two events to have an impact on them. As in the quantum case,
the two later events would be binary: one of two related possibilities. For
example, a dollar bill is torn half and each half is taken to a distant place
where they are examined at space-like separated events by, as is conventional,
Alice and Bob. One has the left half and the other has the right half. So
we can say that when Alice sees that she has the left half that this collapses
the event of what Bob sees. This is not very useful language, but it could
be said. The mythical determinism of classical mechanics has nothing to do
with this, since it is after all a chimera. I will come back to this controversial
point in a later chapter.
Also, I have done an analysis here in terms of the conditional probability
of events, which is never done when analyzing entanglement as far as I am
aware. Rather the standard discussion uses these words: particle, state,
measurement and collapse. It turns out that the conditional probability in
the particular case (3.0.1) just happens to be 1. Again I want to emphasize
strongly that the intermediate steps in the calculation have absolutely no
physical significance. Only the calculated probability matters. The rules of
quantum probability say that this particular combination of events occurs
in 100% of repetitions of the experiment. This deserves to be checked by
experiment. And it has been. The conclusion is that quantum theory is
verified. This seems to be widely accepted in the physics community.
Let me make clear that entanglement is a property of events and not of
anything else. It makes no sense to entangle particles because particles are
not events. It makes no sense to entangle a system with its environment,
since neither a system nor its environment is an event. It makes no sense to
entangle an observer of a quantum system with that system, and so on.
For those accustomed to thinking in terms of the Schrödinger model it
might be difficult to analyze phenomena using a sequence of quantum events
instead of a sequence of quantum states. Of course, I am claiming that all
entanglement phenomena can be analyzed as is done here using a sequence of
quantum events and their conditional probability. This is a sweeping claim,
although it depends on the rigorous definition I have given of entanglement.
More specifically, I am claiming that situations that are traditionally called
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entanglement in the literature are described by the definition 3.0.1. Clearly,
this claim will and should be challenged. Let me note that it should be
kept in mind when evaluating this claim that quantum states are themselves
rank 1 quantum events. But do note that in the example of this chapter
there are also quantum events of rank 2.
Now if you insist on using the word ‘collapse’, that could be acceptable
as long as you do not assign a physical significance to it, as long as you
do not treat it as a physical process. However, in practice that does not
happen. Many physicists go down a rabbit hole by saying that collapse is a
profound topic which requires some deeper ‘explanation’ or ‘interpretation’.
Then it becomes a source of thousands of pages of no significance at all.
Many are so used to working only with the Schrödinger model that they are
unaware that some aspects of that model, such as collapse, are not present
in other equivalent models, such as the Heisenberg model. And it is only
the model independent probabilistic aspects of quantum theory that have a
physical significance. Therefore I advocate for discarding “collapse” from the
quantum vocabulary much as “equant” has been discarded from astronomical
vocabulary. It is not needed. It is best to realize that there is no there there.
Analogies are difficult to find, since other branches of science do not rely
on two distinct ways of speaking about time evolution. However, biologists
sometimes speak of the evolution of species in teleological terms, which they
take to be incorrect, yet useful, shortcuts for describing Darwinian evolution.
They might say that a certain species of animals evolved to have a thicker
subcutaneous layer of fat and white fur in order to survive to a colder, snowy
climate. This can be easily misinterpreted by those who have not studied
biology. However, biologists realize that this is just a manner of speech. My
point is that the two ways of speaking about time evolution in quantum
theory (Schrödinger’s equation and collapse of the state) are at best a short
cut, a manner of speech, that takes the place of the Generalized Born’s Rule.
There is a sort of critique of formal rules and axioms that objects to the
lack of prior justification of the rules. In short, where do the rules come from?
That they work well for all observations is not accepted as a satisfactory
answer, especially if the rule clashes with an ‘intuition’ of some sort or other.
Of course, any proposed explanation of ‘why’ the rule is correct is itself
subject to the same criticism. And so on ad infinitum. Such criticism could be
applied to the Generalized Born’s Rule for computing quantum probabilities,
to which I respond: Hypotheses non fingo.
Chapter 4
Schrödinger’s Cat
Nothing divided people more deeply
than how they felt about cats.
Kingsley Amis
But there is another problem with entanglement. It has to do with how it is
verified. The two events E1 and E2 can occur with space-like separation. In
fact, this has been done precisely to see if quantum theory holds in that case.
But how is the comparison of results from a series of measurements made?
After all, at the time of the measurement neither experimenter can possibly
know what the other has measured. So they record their measurements and
get together at a later time (in the intersection of their respective future light
cones) and compare data. Of course, such persistent data are not exactly
events. This will lead us to consider the ‘paradox’ of Schrödinger’s cat.
Think of special relativity theory where events in space-time are described
as points in a Minkowski space. Or perhaps, since points are an idealization,
events are small regions in space-time, all of whose points are very close to
each other. One of the conceptual difficulties with relativity theory is that
one discusses objects as if they were events, but somehow persisting in time.
These are called world-lines. For example, the physics professor holds up
his piece of chalk for all the class to see. He asks how long it is. Everyone
agrees that it is about 2cm long. But no! That is only is one inertial frame
of reference. The endpoints of the chalk are actually world-lines of events
in Minkowski space and the spatial distance between these endpoints at the
same time (relative to another frame of reference) is the length of the chalk
(in that other frame of reference). The length in another appropriate inertial
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frame is 10−9m, a nanometer. Students are not so easily convinced and
rightly so. After all, the concept of event has been changed behind their
backs. And what color is the chalk? Well, the white light of the class room
reflects mostly the blue end of the spectrum. All agree that it is a piece
of blue chalk. But in another inertial frame the frequency is shifted, and
the reflected light from the chalk is red! Even classical physics can be very
non-intuitive.
Returning to quantum theory, what is persistent data? I doubt that it
is an event which lingers for an indefinitely long time. This seems to be
changing concepts, much as in the case of relativity theory. Actually, I have
not given any localization information in speaking about quantum events;
they are just (time) ordered projections in a Hilbert space. Let me remedy
that by using ideas of Haag from his version of local quantum field theory
in [15]. As usual everything is within the context of one given Hilbert space
H. One thinks of open regions in Minkowski space. For any such region Ω
one has an associated von Neumann algebra V(Ω) in L(H). It is well known
that a von Neumann algebra has ‘lots’ (in a sense that can be made precise1)
of projections, that is, of quantum events. One says that any projection in
V(Ω) is an event localized to the set Ω. Intuitively, one is thinking that it is
something that happened within that region of space-time. These quantum
events are the only ones which correspond to something happening in Ω; all
other quantum events in L(H) are not part of the quantum theory in Ω.
Suppose that Ω1 and Ω2 are space-like separated regions, meaning that
for all ω1 ∈ Ω1 and all ω2 ∈ Ω2 we have that ω1 and ω2 are space-like events.
Under these hypotheses we assume, following Haag, that for all quantum
events E1 ∈ V(Ω1) and E2 ∈ V(Ω2), we have that E1 and E2 commute. Of
course, the ‘small’ open sets are the ones that matter, especially those that
are small in the temporal direction. I do not know how to incorporate a
tubular neighborhood around a very long, especially infinitely long, world-
line, into quantum theory in an intuitive way. But events associated with
these sorts of regions are what one would use in quantum theory to describe
the data recorded from scientific experiments. Or to describe any sort of
information that is held indefinitely and can be shared. Of course, the entire
scientific enterprise is based on sharing data. And this is what happens also
with every entanglement experiment. But in that context it is not considered
1For example, the smallest von Neumann algebra in L(H) containing the events of a
given von Neumann algebra V ⊂ L(H) is V itself.
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to be a problem. It seems to be ‘natural’ that the experimenters share their
data at some future time. And everyone is in agreement that entanglement
has been experimentally verified this way. This is the way one verifies all
quantum experiments, actually all experiments in all the sciences! And this
is the basis of the often heard statement that quantum theory has been
remarkably successful.
But wait! Enter Schrödinger’s cat, and the persistence of data from a
quantum event becomes a problem. Let’s take the innocent cat out of harm’s
way by changing the set-up. As in the original version, there is a radioactive
source which has a probability of 1/2 of decaying within a certain period
of time. A diabolical machine is in place that can detect this decay always
and is screened from any possible background noise. (We will see later why
it is just as diabolical as Schrödinger’s machine.) If the decay is detected,
then the machine prints YES on a sheet of paper that is blank except for
the experiment run number. Otherwise, it does nothing during the time of
the experiment. When the time period ends, the machine ejects the sheet of
paper. To check that everything is working well, the experimenter repeats
this many times, counts the number of times that YES appears and then
divides by the total number of experimental runs. Within statistical precision
the relative frequency of YES agrees with 1/2. But are these sheets of paper
quantum events? Is there a self-adjoint operator P whose spectrum is {0, 1}
with the quantum event P = 1 corresponding to YES appearing and P = 0
otherwise? If so, then P is a quantum event. And even if this is true, how
do the results 1 and 0 persist in time? After all, the data from these events
has to be published, lest the experimenter perish. And the sheets of paper
can be preserved for future reference an indeterminable number of times for
a more or less indefinite future.
Here is my best attempt at dealing with these questions. I think it makes
sense to use the projection P , which in the cat context tells us whether the
cat is dead or alive. This operator generates a commutative von Neumann
algebra of dimension 2, namely V = {αI + βP |α, β ∈ C} in L(H), where
the dimension of H could be quite large, even infinite. Now following Haag
the only quantum events available in this quantum theory are 0, P, I − P,
and I. Notice that these are 4 distinct events, since P 6= 0 and P 6= I by the
construction of the experiment. Let me note that the event 0 corresponds
to starting the experiment with a dead cat, while the event I corresponds to
using an immortal cat.
So what happens now if we take normalized eigenvectors ψ1, ψ2 of P ,
78 Schrödinger’s Cat
one for the eigenvalue 1 and the other for the eigenvalue 0? We can form
the normalized eigenvector (pure state) φ := 2−1/2(ψ1 + ψ2) in the Hilbert
space H. But this state is not available in this quantum theory, because
the corresponding quantum event |φ〉〈φ| is not in V. In other words, the
‘superposition’ state of a live cat and a dead cat is not in this quantum theory.
It is important to note that this argument does not use a superselection rule.
Rather it is a mistake to take L(H) as the von Neumann algebra for this
situation. The error lies in thinking that the only von Neumann algebras
suitable for doing quantum theory are isomorphic to L(K) for some Hilbert
space K. The von Neumann algebra V is not of this type, since dimV = 2.
Rather we have V ∼= L∞({0, 1}). Worse yet from my point of view, every pair
of self-adjoint operators in V commutes. This does not a bone fide quantum
theory make, methinks. I require at least a speck of non-commutativity. And
any added self-adjoint operator would have to correspond to some physical
aspect of the ‘quantum cat’. But if we only observe the results ‘live cat’ or
‘dead cat’, then V suffices to save the phenomena. We do not need a theory
that includes events for results that are not observed. More importantly,
we do not–actually can not–give meaning to quantum events that do not
correspond to physical results, since it is just such a correspondence which
is the meaning of a quantum event ( ≡ projection operator).
However, it seems to be folklore that “one can not write something down
on paper in quantum theory”. This is related to the no-clone theorem of
quantum theory. (See [26].) But my diabolical machine does write something
down on paper. And this is why it is diabolical. It defies quantum theory.
What are we to make of that? Some physicists hold to the view that all
physical phenomena are described by quantum theory. So they face the
challenge of describing in the context of quantum theory how data can be
recorded and shared. It is not permitted to appeal to classical physics in
such an argument. It has to be a demonstration totally within quantum
theory itself. This is essentially what is known as the measurement problem
of quantum theory. Other physicists assert that the diabolical machine as
well as all measuring devices are classical, not quantum, systems. But it
is still not easy to see how classical mechanics with conservative forces can
explain how records can be made and preserved. A more plausible way would
be a classical system with dissipative forces that has at least two stable sinks
in phase space. (If there are exactly two stable sinks, this classical system is
called a bit. And bits do seem to exist.) That would not be a Hamiltonian
system, and so the usual methods of quantization do not apply. In other
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words. it would be difficult, though maybe possible, to describe the recording
device using quantum theory. But some how or another a classical system
has to be coupled to a quantum system in such a way that information flows
from the quantum system to the classical system, where that information is
preserved. It seems to be folklore that this is not possible, but I will not
express an opinion. I do not propose any solution.
Nonetheless, I wish to note that there do seem to be recording devices
in nature that are usually considered to be quantum systems. Let us think
of a nucleus that is unstable via beta decay. The nucleus changes from one
element in the periodic table to another when it decays. This is recorded in
many ways; for example the electric charge of the nucleus changes. So the
electric charge serves as a way of recording whether the nucleus has decayed
or not. And if the daughter nucleus is stable, then this data is recorded for
all posterity. Nuclei are certainly not classical systems. And most physicists
would agree that they are quantum systems. So this is an example of how
some data (though possibly not all data) can be recorded in a quantum
system. The wheel has come full circle. It was a radioactive decay that
initiated the events of the diabolical machine. In short, forget about the
diabolical machine, the box, and the cat inside the box. None of that needs
any more explaining than beta decay itself does. So we find the same puzzle
at the end of the story as at the beginning, but now in a quantum system.
The same problem is present in classical physics, though it seems to never
be discussed. Again, it is not simply a question of a physical system and some
observation of it. Rather, the information from that situation is recorded
and shared. The question is: “Can one write something down on paper
in classical theory”. The answer may be yes, but that is not so obvious.
Classical mechanics describes motion as a trajectory in phase space. What
does that theory have to do with preserving information? A piece of paper
with something written on it is a system with many degrees of freedom, that
is to say, its phase space has an enormously high dimension. And what does a
trajectory in that phase space have to do with the transmission of information
in the scientific community? These are not rhetorical questions. My point is
that the physics community is not agitated over the fact that these serious
questions are not addressed when discussing classical mechanics, say in a
university course or in a popular exposition for a general public. Typically,
one hears that there is no measurement problem in classical physics, but that
there is such a problem in quantum physics. What’s sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander.
Chapter 5
The Measurement Problem
Truth is truth
To the end of reckoning
William Shakespeare
The measurement problem is not a problem that one can address, let alone
solve, in the context of an axiomatic theory. Let me illustrate this with
an example which I hope is not very controversial: Euclidean geometry. In
the full axiomatization of this theory (which eluded Euclid’s efforts) certain
statements are proved about the size of angles and the areas of geometric
figures, such as squares in the Pythagorean theorem. These statements are in
contradiction with statements in non-Euclidean geometries about the ‘same
things’. It is generally accepted that a way to test if Euclidean geometry holds
is to measure the three physical angles of physical triangles and see whether
their sum is indeed pi radians (in modern units). It does not pertain to
Euclidean geometry nor to any of its competitors to explain how to measure
angles or areas. That is not understood to be part of the task of the theory
itself. This question is not considered to be one which the theory has to
answer: How does one measure an angle? In fact, one assumes that physical
triangles with three physical angles exist and, moreover, that all of these
incompatible geometries are speaking of these same physical objects. There
are no Euclidean angles, no projective geometry angles, and so on. But there
are measured angles. Similarly, there is no classical energy, no quantum
energy and so on. For an experimental scientist measurement is an activity,
not a problem.
And I see the axiomatization of quantum theory in the same way. As
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presented in this treatise quantum theory is an axiomatic theory of states,
events and probabilities. How these are measured is not addressed in the
mathematical theory. (But I do come out in favor of relative frequency as the
way to measure probability.) One should think of ‘state, event, probability’
as three basic concepts much like ‘point, line, angle’ in geometry. Of course,
the latter geometric words do get a significance in terms of observations. And
so do the former three concepts of quantum theory. But those are scientific
questions outside the scope of the axiomatic theory.
In this treatise the question is how to deal with measurement in the
context of quantum theory based on states, events and probability. Appeals
to classical physics, or any other theory, are beside the point. One is looking
for a consistent, but not circular, exposition of the topic. This will not solve
the measurement problem, but rather explain what are the issues that a
scientific approach must address.
To start off I would like to introduce the idea that measurement is done by
devices (or physical systems, if you wish) that implement sequences of two
events in such a way that the conditional probability of the second event,
given the first event (and maybe a state) is 1. It is definitely not assumed
that such a device always has the same sequence of two events. Such a device
is essentially a function that has a certain set of events as the possible first
event (input) of the sequence and then has the second event (output) in that
sequence. It should further be required that this function is one-to-one, so
that the second event in the sequence uniquely specifies the corresponding
first event. Colloquially, the second event is characterized by the first event,
and it in turn uniquely characterizes the first event. (As an aside, let me
note that the same idea also applies in classical physics. But this is a treatise
on quantum theory.)
Let me emphasize this one more time. Sometimes the claim is heard
that a measuring device must be classical since its results are ’determined’.
The assertion is made that this is a deterministic process, and hence the
device can not be a quantum system but must be classical system. But this
logic is fallacious. Probability theories include the special case of conditional
probability 1, as we have seen in Chapter 3 on Entanglement.
Whether such devices actually exist physically is another question, though
it is generally assumed that they do. Anyway there is nothing in quantum
theory which precludes such devices from existing. So, measuring devices as
defined here are consistent with quantum theory. Sequences of two events
that have conditional probability 1 are consistent with a probabilistic theory;
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they are just a special case. How to explain particular physical devices using
quantum theory is something that depends on the specific details of those
devices. Though I doubt there is a general answer for all devices, I could
be proved wrong. In short, I suspect that giving a general quantum theory
of measuring devices is an intractable problem, at least with our current
level of understanding. This seems to be born out by the overwhelming
lack of progress in addressing this issue. But for those who think otherwise
and want to research this problem, please remember the important role of
approximation. The point is that devices which implement sequences of
events with probability nearly equal to 1 can be quite accurate, though not
perfect, measuring instruments.
Quantum computing can be viewed in the same way. Though speaking
of a sequence of states being changed by quantum operations is valid, that
language does not survive in the equivalent Heisenberg model where the state
is time independent. I would rather say a hard-wired quantum computer is
a physical device that has a final (output) quantum event that is determined
with high conditional probability by a given first (input) quantum event and
any state. Only in this case, the function being implemented this way need
not be one-to-one; distinct input could result with high probability in the
same output. A programmable quantum computer would do the same, again
with high probability, but the function would depend on a program. To my
understanding this is what ‘classical’ computers do, but with a set of events
that is a Boolean algebra. A fully quantum computer would use all quantum
events.
Let’s look at Schrödinger’s cat using these ideas. A radioactive nucleus
with charge Z is under consideration. Let E1 be the (quantum) event that
has value 1 if and only if beta decay occurs in the time interval. Let E2 be
the (quantum!) event that has value 1 if and only if the cat dies in the same
time interval. The device is constructed so that for any state ψ we have that
the following conditional probabilities hold:
P (E2 |E1, ψ) = 1 decay occurs; cat dies,
P (Ec2 |E1, ψ) = 0 decay occurs; cat does not die,
P (E2 |Ec1, ψ) = 0 decay does not occur; cat dies,
P (Ec2 |Ec1, ψ) = 1 decay does not occur; cat does not die.
Here Ec = I − E is the complementary event to the event E. For example,
the event Ec1 means that the beta decay did not occur in the time interval.
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It is not to be confused with the expression ‘nothing happened’ in ordinary
language, which misses the point. No one, starting with Schrödinger himself,
ever seems to doubt the possibility of constructing a device which has these
conditional probabilities.
Seeing a live cat is a way of measuring the charge of the nucleus and
getting the result that it is Z. And seeing a dead cat is a way of measuring
the charge of the nucleus and getting the result that it is Z + 1. Of course,
there are other ways of measuring the charge of the nucleus. One might say
they are more ‘direct’ than using the poor cat as the measuring device. But
I claim that they will also be based on sequences of quantum events which
have conditional probabilities equal only to either 0 or 1. Or maybe just with
conditional probabilities only very near 0 or very near 1.
Chapter 6
The EPR paper
Face au réel, ce qu’on croire savoir
offusque ce qu’on devrait savoir.
Gaston Bachelard
Ever since its publication in 1935 the famous EPR paper [10] (named for
its authors Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen), has generated much discussion
and controversy, despite the fact that its conclusion is correct. It has even
been referred to as the EPR paradox! The authors come in the last paragraph
of [10] to the following conclusion:
While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a
complete description of the physical reality, we left open the question
whether or not such a description exists. We believe, however, that
such a theory is possible.
The argument of this paper is an example of entanglement, though that
word is not used, presented in the Schrödinger picture. To achieve their
conclusion the authors have to give some idea of their concept of ‘physical
reality’. This they do by saying the following:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
(i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then
there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical
quantity. (Italics in the original)
They then add how to regard this condition:
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Regarded not as a necessary, but merely
as a sufficient condition of reality . . .
One can quibble with their condition, but for the moment let’s accept it and
try to understand the paper a little better. At the beginning of the paper
the authors state:
In attempting to judge the success of a physical theory, we may ask
ourselves two questions: (1) “Is the theory correct?” and (2) “Is the
description given by the theory complete?” . . .
A little further on they continue:
It is the second question that we wish to consider
here, as applied to quantum mechanics.
This is also the question posed in the title of the paper. However a careful
consideration of both their argument and of their very words shows that
they did not answer this second question. Just to be clear here again is the
essential part of their conclusion:
. . . the wave function does not provide a complete description of the
physical reality . . .
So the implicit assumption is that the wave function is the only theoretical
element that is involved in the description of quantum theory. That is how
they can jump from showing the incompleteness of the wave function to the
incompleteness of quantum theory as a whole.
This is an error of logic, of course. But it is easy to see how the authors
arrived at it. Apparently, their tacit assumption is that the Schrödinger
equation is the fundamental time evolution equation of quantum theory and
that equation has a unique solution (the wave function), given an adequate
initial condition. This is second nature for those accustomed to thinking in
terms of physical theories based on differential equations; this is intuitive.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, it is wrong. The details in the course of their
argument about how the state changes due to measurement are not viewed
as contradicting this general idea of how physical theories work. Of course,
these details are nonetheless just how one calculates conditional probability
in the Schrödinger picture, though that wording is not used.
However, we can suppress this tacit assumption and see that the actual
conclusion of the paper is correct. Indeed, the wave function alone does
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not suffice to provide a complete description. As presented in this treatise,
events and probabilities (and their possible time evolution) are also part of
basic quantum theory. It might well be that the concept and importance of
quantum event were not known to the authors of the EPR paper in 1935. But
probability was a contemporaneously available concept. Indeed, probability
one is singled out for special consideration in their sufficient condition for an
element of physical reality. However, later commentators, and perhaps these
authors as well, have turned this into a necessary condition if they assert
that something with probability less that one is not an element of physical
reality. While one may wish to take their condition as both necessary as well
as sufficient, that is a giant step beyond what the authors of EPR actually
assert.
Some confusion arises since rank 1 events are also states (‘wave functions’
for these authors). But we saw that entanglement in the simplest example of
Chapter 3 involves events that are rank 2 operators and therefore not wave
functions. Similarly, the EPR thought experiment involves events which are
not wave functions. This may seem to be just a minor technical detail, but
ignoring it leads to a fatal flaw in the EPR argument. Using the notation of
Chapter 3, the occurrence of E1, a rank 2 event, does not tell us the state of
the particle on the left in the Hilbert space H = C2 ⊗ C2, a 4-dimensional
space. As shown in Chapter 3 entanglement can easily be understood by
calculating the conditional probability of events without assigning ‘meaning’
to the intermediate steps. But if one prefers the language of states, then the
correct statement is that the occurrence of the event E1 tells us that the state
is in the 2-dimensional subspace RanE1. Similarly, E2 does not tell us the
state of the particle on the right. The implicit error here is the assumption
that the measurements of the detectors are being modeled by events in two
different 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces. So one is discussing this quantum
system with three distinct Hilbert spaces, and therefore three different von
Neumann algebras, This is a clear violation of Axiom 1. In short the EPR
thought experiment does not assign, by using their sufficient condition, an
‘element of reality’ to the state of either particle.
Let’s examine this in a bit more detail. To describe the detector on the
left we only need the von Neumann algebra L(C2). A different copy of the
same von Neumann algebra suffices for the other detector. But if the space-
like separated events of the detectors are compared and found to have some
correlations among them, then a scientific puzzle has been noted that requires
further explanation. Of course, we already know what that explanation is in
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this case. And a part of that is including the two copies of the von Neumann
algebra of the individual detectors as sub-algebras of L(C2 ⊗ C2), the new
von Neumann algebra for the combined system.
Let’s take this one step further and suppose that the detector on the left
not only says that E1 occurred, but the experimenter on the left is told that
the earlier event E0 had already occurred. To accommodate the event E0
would require using a new model, the simplest one of which would be the von
Neumann algebra L(C2⊗C2). Using this model the experimenter on the left
then has sufficient information for calculating the probability of the event E4
of any spin 1/2 measurement by the detector on the right. As I will argue
in a moment, this is sufficient for asserting that the value (≡ eigenvalue) of
the event E4 has an element of physical reality.
Now I wish to suggest that their sufficient condition for element of physical
reality is unnecessarily linked to probability one events. Leaving aside the
vague restriction about not disturbing the system, I propose another more
general, sufficient condition for an element of physical reality:
If we can predict with non-zero probability the value of
a physical quantity, then there exists an element of
physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
I might even be disposed to deleting the word ‘non-zero’ from the above
condition. After all, violation of a conservation law has a physical reality of
a certain sort—the reality of never occurring (to date). This condition seems
to be more in the spirit of basic quantum theory viewed as being a new type
of probability theory. Of course, in some sense I am proposing a broader
definition of ‘element of physical reality’. However, this condition is intuitive
in the sense that people act as if it holds. For example, a house burning down
and resulting in (financial) value zero has an element of physical reality due
to its non-zero probability, even though it has never happened and most
likely never will. Yet this element of physical reality is sufficient to motivate
buying fire insurance for the house.
Anyway, with this enhanced sufficient condition physical quantities such
as position or spin component are elements of physical reality. Moreover, such
physical quantities do find a counterpart in quantum theory. Actually, their
pvm’s and probabilities are counterparts. This would make quantum theory
nearer to being complete than the authors might have thought according to
their own criterion given in the EPR paper:
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Whatever the meaning assigned to the term complete, the following
requirement for a complete theory seems to be a necessary one: every
element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in physical theory.
(Italics in original)
Clearly, quantum theory remains incomplete but for other reasons such as
its inability to predict the properties of the elementary particles, the values
of fundamental constants, the nature of gravitation and the origin of the
universe to name some examples.
Chapter 7
Determinism and Probability
The epistemological value of probability theory is based on
the fact that chance phenomena, considered collectively
and on a grand scale, create non-random regularity.
Andrei Kolmogorov
There is a probabilistic aspect in all the standard formulations of quantum
theory. There is rarely a probabilistic aspect in standard formulations of
classical physics and, when there is, it is chalked up to being due to a lack
of complete information rather than a fundamental aspect of that theory.
But it is also said that classical physics is deterministic. And this is not a
logical consequence of what I just said. Rather it is known as jumping to a
conclusion. The determinism ascribed to classical physics is a myth repeated
over and over by so many experts that it has become heresy to question it.
Note that a mathematical formulation of determinism is not found in the
standard texts on classical physics. The best one can find in the scientific
literature are various theorems in mathematics which state that some classes
of time dependent differential equations have unique solutions provided they
are accompanied by appropriate initial conditions. But it turns out that
there are other time dependent differential equations that do not have this
property and, according to theorem, such equations are non-linear. Also
there is nothing in classical Newtonian mechanics which tells us which sort
of differential equations will arise in that theory, that is, whether they have
unique solutions with appropriate initial conditions or not. But it is known
that the second law of motion of Newtonian mechanics is non-linear in almost
all examples.
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Since this is the relevant moment, let me pause from continuing this
discussion in order to call out a confusion that is rampant in the physics
community. The point is that differential equations do not automatically
imply determinism. To suppose otherwise is wrong-headed, to say the least.
Some differential equations are consistent with determinism, but others are
not. We often work with a linear approximation. Linear differential equations
with appropriate initial conditions do have unique solutions, which are also
global in time. But this property of a particular approximation does not
always hold in other non-linear contexts. So it is a non sequitur to say that
a theory based on differential equations is automatically deterministic.
Let me be clear about this difference between classical mechanics and
quantum theory. The theory of classical mechanics does not answer the
question of whether determinism or probability applies to its subject matter.
On the other hand quantum theory at its most basic level makes statements
about probability and, according to this treatise, about nothing else. One
should not say that quantum theory eliminated determinism from physics;
rather it put probability into physics. And probability is very non-intuitive.
However, we must pause, since it appears that Schrödinger’s equation is
deterministic. After all, for any self-adjoint Hamiltonian H there is a unique
solution, global in time t, given any initial state ϕ in the Hilbert space,
namely, ψ(t) = e−itH/~ ϕ in the Schrödinger model. At a purely mathematical
level, this is a sort of determinism. But this does not give us determinism
of a quantum system, since the states ψ(t) by themselves only determine
probabilities when combined with the events associated to a system. And
this role of probability is not the lockstep relation of cause and effect as
envisioned by the usual idea of determinism. The Heisenberg model also has
a mathematical determinism, but now of the events as given by Heisenberg’s
equation (1.6.1). And again this is not a physical determinism, since in
general events are not sufficient for computing quantum probabilities.
And moving on now to experiment the situation is even shakier. The idea
is that by knowing all about a physical system completely at one instant of
time, the future of that system is known or, as one says, determined. How
could one possibly know that? How could one possibly falsify that? If some
systems behave in what seems to be a deterministic manner (at least for some
experimentally finite period of time), that does not mean they will continue to
behave in that manner forever. And if they do not behave in a deterministic
manner, it is unacceptable to say that is due to lack of knowledge about the
initial situation. How could one possibly know in all cases that there is more
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to know? It is logically possibly that there is nothing more to know. There
is a lot of muddled thinking about determinism. Of course, there is a lot of
muddled thinking about probability theory, too.
Something that is truly confusing for me is that people, who can not
look at a probability 1 event without running to the refuge of deterministic
language, can accept without any qualms any number of probability 0 events
in quantum systems. Yet such events are literally duals of each other. One
says that a certain quantum transition is forbidden (i.e., has probability 0),
since it violates some conservation law. However, that same conservation
law holds with probability 1. And this all should be explained in terms of
quantum theory, not with determinism.
From this perspective it is not so strange to say that quantum theory is
probabilistic and, in fact, that is thought to be one of the basic aspects of
the theory. I have done just that in this treatise. What is strange is that a
deterministic time dependent differential equation is claimed to be another
basic aspect of quantum theory. Of course, I refer to the time dependent
Schrödinger’s equation
i~
dψ
dt
= Hψ. (7.0.1)
Let me remind the reader what the mathematical theory actually says about
this equation. We assume that H is a self-adjoint densely defined linear
operator acting in a Hilbert space H. Then a theorem says that for any φ
in the dense domain of H there exists a unique solution ψt of (7.0.1) for all
t ∈ R such that ψ0 = φ. Moreover, that theorem asserts that ψt = e−itH/~φ,
where the globally defined unitary operators e−itH/~ are defined for all t ∈ R
by the functional calculus of spectral theory applied to the operator H .
In the Schrödinger model one has Schrödinger’s equation, a deterministic
equation, and a probabilistic state collapse condition. It seems that the time
evolution chugs along on its merry way changing the state is a continuous
deterministic way, when–poof!–somehow a probabilistic event occurs that
changes the state in a discontinuous way. How can there be two distinct
types of time evolution? This perennial puzzle about quantum theory arises
as we have seen by focusing on details in the Schrödinger model which are
model dependent. Of course, in the equivalent Heisenberg model there is a
deterministic time evolution of the pvm’s while the state remains constant
in time. In both models the (identical!) probability measures are continuous
functions of time. The continuity of these probability measures follows from
the continuity of t 7→ e−itH/~ in the strong operator topology.
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For now I would like to discuss another sort of probability in one aspect
of quantum theory. But this aspect is quite different. Again, consider a
nucleus that can undergo beta decay. Before the decay occurs the electron
and anti-neutrino of the final state do not exist. They are created by the
decay process. And no matter where the nucleus is in the universe, the
electron has exactly the same characteristic properties as any other electron
in the universe. Its mass, electric charge, spin and magnetic moment are
always the same. In other words these are probability one properties of any
electron. The same holds for the anti-neutrino; it is the same as any other
anti-neutrino produced in beta decay. To make this sound more ‘paradoxical’
imagine two beta decays of the same isotope nucleus, but with a space-like
separation between these two events. How can one event possibly ‘know’
about the other? Yet they produce the same decay products, although the
momenta of the decay products are not always the same. Also, these decays
violate parity conservation, but they do that in the same way always. On
the other hand an alpha decay of a nucleus always preserves parity. These
are all rightly called particle properties, though one could also describe them
as spooky action at a distance.
Chapter 8
Interpretation
Interpretation is the revenge of intellect upon art.
Susan Sontag
The astute reader will have noticed that I have only used the expression
physical significance instead of ‘interpretation’ as was done in days of yore
for describing the relation between theory and observation. This is due to
the unfortunate situation that ‘interpretation’ has come to denote something
quite different from ‘save the phenomena’, a phrase also from days of yore.
(See [28].) Nowadays ‘interpretation’ refers to extra-scientific statements that
are intended to ‘save the theory’. They are neither verifiable nor falsifiable
and consequently have no role whatsoever in science. Some how they hang
in there as some sort of assurance that everything is ‘intuitive’ after all. The
theses of this treatise are scientific and are subject to the standard critiques
of scientific methodology. Any assertion that I make may be right or it
may be wrong. But in the contemporary sense of the word I do not give
any ‘interpretation’ of quantum theory. Still, some comments are called for
about some of the more common ‘interpretations’ of quantum theory.
The collapse of the wave function is quite often the central concern of
an interpretation. This results in tilting against windmills. There is nothing
about the collapse condition that merits much attention once one realizes that
it is a mathematical step used in the Schrödinger model of quantum theory,
but that it has no correlate in other isomorphic models. Typically, discussions
that deal exclusively with the Schrödinger model fall into the trap of treating
a characteristic specific to that model as universally applicable to quantum
theory, when they clearly are not due to the lack of that characteristic in
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another isomorphic model of quantum theory. The more-or-less standard
Copenhagen Interpretation simply asserts that collapse is something that
happens. But collapse is not a physical process, but rather a mathematical
formula. Of course, the Copenhagen Interpretation is not just one assertion.
And it morphs. So it is difficult to totally debunk it based on a detailed
analysis of what it says. But it is clearly barking up the wrong tree.
Another recurrent goal of ‘interpretations’ is to explain what probability
‘means’ or how it arises in quantum theory. This can be seen in the Many
Worlds Interpretation which deals with this issue by positing a hypothesis
that is neither verifiable nor falsifiable. (See [3] and references therein.) If
such a hypothesis makes some people content, what can I possibly say? While
in this treatise no attempt is made to explain where probability comes from,
explicit hypotheses are given as to what its properties are. I refer here to
the generalized Born’s rule together with its underlying mathematics. This
can be checked experimentally. This theory is not designed to make anyone
happy, though that may happen too. It is meant to save the phenomena
of the relative frequencies measured in experiments. Also The Many Worlds
Interpretation introduces a wave function of the Universe; this is supposed to
describe its state. This would make some sense if it were included in a Hilbert
space theory with an appropriate von Neumann algebra, whose events and
pvm’s had some physical significance at a cosmological level.
The consistent history approach (see [13]) is based on histories of quantum
events and their probabilities and therefore bears a superficial resemblance
to the thesis of this treatise. In all fairness this is not referred to as an
interpretation by Griffiths in [13]. But for better or worse, it is often taken
to be such. Leaving that point to a side, let me deal with what it says
about quantum theory. The idea is to introduce classical probability spaces
(and lots of them) in order to define probability in the context of quantum
theory. This leads to new constructs of which the most important is that of
a history of (usually finitely many, though possibly very many) time ordered
quantum events. Each history then defines a (usually finite, though possibly
very large) classical sample space on which probabilities are defined and then
related to Born’s rule. The formalism depends on forming an inner product
from the trace as Tr(A∗B) for an unspecified class of bounded operators A
and B. Of course, for infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces this is the rather
small space of Hilbert-Schmidt operators. As noted in [13] this only works
well for all operators in the finite dimensional case. This places an enormous
restriction on the scope of this approach. But then the first attempt to
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assign probabilities to the events in a history runs into an obstacle, namely,
finite additivity fails. To avoid this a sufficient orthogonality condition (See
Eq. (10.20) in [13]) is given. While this condition is not necessary, without
some other condition being imposed finite additivity does fail in general.
The author does not seem to consider σ-additivity, which becomes relevant
when histories with infinitely many events are considered. But even so, then
the restriction is imposed to consider only consistent (or weakly consistent)
histories as having a physical meaning. This is a rather strong restriction
with nothing corresponding in standard quantum mechanics. In short this
approach adds new features to standard quantum theory and produces a
theory which says less.
Another novelty in [13] is to re-define quantum logic by declaring that,
for example, E ∧ F does not have a meaning if the events E and F do not
commute. The justification is that in this case neither EF nor FE is an event,
a well known fact that does not prevent one from defining E ∧ F as their
unique infimum as in done in standard quantum logic. Of course, throwing
quantum logic to the wolves may not be a great loss, but I wonder what
exactly is gained by this. This gives a new logic that not only says less than
standard quantum logic but also diminishes the role of non-commutativity in
quantum theory. The author of [13] also seems to be unaware of the existence
of spectral measures, which are classical probability measures on R, nor of
their role in Born’s rule, something which was published in [25] in 1932.
By now the contrast of the current histories approach with the theses of
this treatise should be clear enough. I do not construct new sample spaces,
but use the spectral measures on R available in [25]. I do not require extra
special conditions to guarantee σ-additivity, since this is a consequence of
spectral theory. I use absolutely standard spectral theory (and the measure
theory behind much of it) plus a straightforward generalization of Born’s rule
to define conditional and other multi-event probabilities on R. I consider
this treatise to be a new organization of quantum theory and in no way an
interpretation of it.
I think that the entire enterprise of finding the ‘correct interpretation’ of
quantum theory as far as scientific activity is concerned is quite besides the
point, and so is not interesting for me at all. Simply put, I am interested in
scientific theories of nature rather than who-knows-what theories of theories.
I have not even mentioned other popular ‘interpretations’ of quantum theory.
Rather I include this chapter only to distance the contents of this treatise
from all that. Interpretation is the revenge of intellect upon science.
Chapter 9
The Wave Function
When we want to understand something strange,
previously unknown to anyone, we have to begin
with an entirely different set of questions.
What is it? How does it work?
Margaret Mead
I do not want to discuss classical physics at all. But the wave function
has the dubious role of being an aspect of quantum theory that is often
considered in language that is classical. Here is some of that language. In
classical physics the time evolution is described in terms of the points in
a particular space, which is called the phase space. These points are the
classical pure states. The phase space typically has high dimension. Then
the classical dynamics specifies the possible one-dimensional curves in phase
space. These curves are parameterized by time. Each point on such a curve
represents a complete description of the physical system at the corresponding
time.
All of this is temptingly analogous to the Schrödinger model of quantum
theory, where the time dependent solution of Schrödinger’s equation, which is
inappropriately 1 called a wave function, gives a curve in a space whose points
are called pure states. But analogies are not explanations. Unfortunately,
this one is completely misleading, since in the isomorphic Heisenberg model
the state is always constant in time. In the classical case the dynamical curve
wending its way through a high dimensional phase space is used to deduce
1Schrödinger’s equation is not a wave equation.
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how physical objects move in three dimensional physical space. Analogously,
the time dependent wave function is used to deduce properties that one can
visualize in terms of the geometry of three dimensional physical space.
However, the analogy fails in part because Schrödinger’s equation is not
the fundamental time evolution equation of quantum theory. It also fails
because, although it is not widely recognized, classical mechanics also has
a Heisenberg-type model in the case when the classical Hamiltonian flow
φt : P → P is a global diffeomorphism of the phase space P. Classical
observables are functions f : P → R, and the classical pure states are the
points in P. What one observes is the time dependent quantity f(φt(p0)),
where p0 is the initial state. This is usually considered in a Schrödinger-type
model as f(pt) with the observable f being constant in time and the initial
state p0 evolving to pt := φt(p0) at time t. This easily generalizes to the time
evolution of mixed states (≡ probability measures on P) in which case this is
the Liouville formulation of classical mechanics as used mostly in statistical
mechanics. But f(pt) = ft(p0) where we take the state p0 to be constant in
time and let the observable evolve from f to ft := f ◦ φt at time t. This
Heisenberg-type model is called the Hamiltonian picture in [11].
There are also interaction-like models in classical mechanics, in which
one takes any two families of bijections αt, βt : P → P for t ∈ R that satisfy
αt ◦ βt = φt. Then one lets the states flow according to p 7→ βt(p) while the
observables flow according to f 7→ f ◦ αt. Despite φt being a C∞ function,
its factors αt and βt need not even be continuous. But nonetheless, such a
non-intuitive factorization could help one do calculations. I am not aware of
such interaction-type models being used in classical mechanics. One could
also generalize classical mechanics by dropping the condition αt ◦ βt = φt.
One way classical thinking can creep into quantum theory is when the
Hilbert space for the quantum theory is L2(R3), since a normalized wave
function ψ in that space has an associated probability density |ψ|2 on R3. So,
computer displays of these densities are made and can be seen in textbooks,
in popular expositions and on the Internet. The graph of |ψ|2 : R3 → [0,∞)
is a subset of R4, making direct visualization a bit tricky for most of us.
But level sets in R3 can be encoded in computer memory and then their
2-dimensional projections can be displayed on a screen or printed on paper.
If one uses instead a curve of normalized solutions of the time dependent
Schrödinger’s equation, then one can make a computer video. Of course, it
is easy to misinterpret what the moving blob in such a video means. But
a more profound problem is that, except for toy models, L2(R3) is not the
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Hilbert space used to describe quantum systems. In the following examples
spin and statistics are omitted, since even without that the basic idea is clear.
Consider the ever popular example of the hydrogen atom. In the texts the
stationary states ψ ∈ L2(R3) are found, together with their corresponding
energy levels. Many images have been made for |ψ|2. The formulas for the
stationary states as well as the images made from them are all quite pretty.
But all of that is misleading, since the (electrically neutral) hydrogen atom is
a two body problem, whose Hilbert space in the Schrödinger model is L2(R6)
with Euclidean coordinates x1, x2, x3 for the electron and y1, y2, y3 for the
nucleus. A mathematical technique (change to center-of-mass coordinates)
shows that the Hamiltonian of this system can be transformed in such a
way as to give an equivalent problem with two Schrödinger operators, each
acting in L2(R3). But neither one of these operators is the Hamiltonian of
the hydrogen atom nor of any other physical entity. The wave functions
for each of these two Schrödinger operators can be combined and then with
an inverse change of coordinates can be written as ψ(x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3) in
L2(R6). But this last step is rarely done in the elementary texts. Rather
only one of these two Schrödinger operators acting in L2(R3) is analyzed.
For example this is what I did in [31].
Sometimes, instead of presenting the change of coordinates, a model is
used with the nucleus fixed and immovable at some point in space. Then the
electron is analyzed with a one-body Schrödinger operator. Among other
things the mass parameter in such an approach should not be the electron
mass. In fact, the mass parameter to be used depends on the isotope of the
nucleus. But justifying that is difficult, to say the least. So the electron
mass is used. Worse yet, this ‘approximation’ contradicts the supposedly
sacred Uncertainty Principle by fixing the values of both the position and
the momentum of the nucleus.
The neutral hydrogen molecule is a four body problem and so has its
wave functions in L2(R12). The water molecule is a 21 body problem and so
has its wave function in L2(R63). And so it goes. But you can find images
of the wave function of the ground state of the water molecule H2O in the
literature. This is done by changing to center-of-mass coordinates, fixing the
values all of the variables for the 3 nuclei as well as integrating out all the
variables for 17 of the 18 electrons. The modulus squared of the resulting
‘wave function’ in L2(R3) can then be published in a chemistry textbook
or on the cover of a popular science magazine. This sort of visualization
loses a lot of information that is encoded in the correct wave function of the
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molecule. Of course, it is approximately correct information that remains.
(It is only approximate since there are only approximations of the original
wave function itself.) But one is easily mislead into thinking that one has
visualized the spatial structure of the molecule.
I will certainly be criticized for downplaying the role of Schrödinger’s
equation in quantum theory. But that equation stands firm on the basis of
its many successes, which are found in the scientific literature. I emphasize
in [31] the central role of Schrödinger’s equation in the scientific activity of
quantum physics. The two-slit experiment is but one grain of sand on the vast
beach of successes of the Schrödinger model. They all speak for themselves.2
I need not repeat those details. I only wish to place things in the correct
perspective with respect to the Generalized Born’s Rule. Those who wish to
continue working with the Schrödinger model do not need permission to do
so. Their results, if obtained correctly, will have scientific value. However,
if one gives a physical significance to the model dependent aspects of the
Schrödinger model, then I claim one is overinterpreting the mathematics.
I most likely expect to be criticized for taking a viewpoint that is ‘too
mathematical’ in this treatise. But ironically it is those persons ascribing
deep meanings to mathematical structures with no physical significance who
are the ones that are ‘too mathematical’.
This topic is related to quantization, even though that is not a part of
quantum theory but rather a way of arriving at a quantum theory from
some other starting point. Typically, one starts from classical physics, but
that is not essential. Actually, second quantization starts with one quantum
theory in order to produce another. I do not wish to belittle research on
quantization. It has its importance, but only as a way to quantum theory.
In this treatise I want to describe the basics of the quantum world, and not go
into the details of the journey for getting there. I have even done research on
quantization, but this is not the place to go into that. My only goal now is to
comment on its lack of relevance to doing and understanding quantum theory
itself. Even worse, quantization is used to leak ideas of classical physics into
quantum theory. Of course, some classical ideas do transfer to quantum
theory, but others not. So that issue must be faced and understood on a case
by case basis.
2In poker the saying is that the cards speak for themselves. But if they do not speak
clearly to you, see for example [4] for an explanation of the two-slit experiment in terms
of events, states and probabilities
Chapter 10
Beyond Conventional Quantum
Theory
The most interesting ideas are heresies.
Susan Sontag
The main thesis of this treatise is that there is one basic time evolution
equation in quantum theory. That equation is the generalized Born’s rule.
But there is also a secondary equation in the Schrödinger model, namely
Schrödinger’s equation. In the isomorphic Heisenberg model there is a quite
different secondary time evolution equation. These are equations that have
a unique solution for a given initial condition. This looks suspiciously like
determinism, but it is only a mathematical property. We hear it said about
Schrödinger’s equation that if we know the state of the system at some initial
time, then we know it at all future (and even past!) times. That is a big
‘if’ and then some. In the first place, some states are not known and are
even unknowable. In the second place, collapse in the Schrödinger model
precludes knowing both future and past.
We use Schrödinger’s equation for the simple reason that it has been so
successful. But its success has not been complete as is evident from the
number of confusions, among other things, that it gives rise to. Now the
central role of the generalized Born’s rule clarifies matters, as we have seen.
Because of this I have been lead to wonder if the Schrödinger model is the only
possible quantum theory (up to isomorphism). And I have come to think not.
Still I must explain why the Schrödinger model has been so successful and
what could be an alternative to it. Before getting into that let me note that
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Accardi and his collaborators have a well developed theory which is not an
alternative to standard quantum theory, but rather approximates standard
Hamiltonian unitary flows for systems with many degrees of freedom with
singular Hamiltonian unitary flows in terms of fewer variables. See [1] and
references therein for this important achievement,
I shall use classical mechanics as an analogy. Now, classical Newtonian
mechanics is a theory of masses, forces and motion. The basic axioms1 (called
Newton’s Laws of Motion) of that theory give the relations among these. But
that theory is divided into two parts. This division is based on the type of
forces of a particular situation. These are called conservative forces and
(rather unimaginatively) non-conservative forces. (I dislike the alternative
phrase dissipative force since it suggests that heat should be introduced into
classical mechanics.) The theory for conservative forces has a lot of quite
wonderful properties. This is related to a new form of energy, the potential
energy, which then casts a new light on kinetic energy (which was originally
confused with the expression mv2) to give the principle of conservation of
mechanical energy. And the potential energy opens the door to an elegant
theory. One can then define the Hamiltonian function, Poisson brackets and
Hamilton’s equations of classical motion. Under certain hypotheses these
equations of motion have a unique local (in time) solution given appropriate
initial conditions. This seems to be determinism, but caveat emptor. In the
first place, local solutions can and often do have singularities, which preclude
extrapolating into the indefinite future. In the second place, the Hamiltonian
theory does not apply to situations with non-conservative forces. In the
context of conservative forces one arrives eventually at symplectic geometry.
I have even heard some colleagues maintain that classical mechanics is a topic
in symplectic geometry. But that is not so.
Classical mechanics includes the analysis of situations with friction and
other non-conservative forces, in which case there is no potential energy and
no conservation of mechanical energy. The motion of a boat in water is a
simple example of classical mechanics with non-conservative forces. Other
examples abound. Actually, there is such a sparsity of examples with only
conservative forces that the everyday ‘common sense’ of most people conceals
their importance. Ask any high school physics teacher how difficult it is to
teach classical mechanics with only conservative forces. (Angular momen-
1I believe their are at least four axioms. An overlooked axiom states that force is a
vector quantity.
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tum is essentially impossible.) Yet it is an error to think that conservative
forces are basic while non-conservative forces are not. Within the context of
classical mechanics neither is more basic than the other.
I suppose that something analogous occurs in quantum theory, namely
that the Schrödinger model is similar to conservative classical mechanics.
That model also has a lot of quite wonderful properties, but that does not
imply that they are necessarily properties of all quantum systems. I find it
quite plausible that a different equation for the time evolution of the states
could be posited and that (together with time independent pvm’s as just one
example) would give an acceptable quantum theory that is not isomorphic
to the Schrödinger model. Such an alternative to the Schrödinger model
might not be deducible from the Schrödinger model. Rather it could be an
independent model, also consistent with the basic axioms of quantum theory.
Let me be completely clear here. I am saying that Schrödinger’s equation is
not a necessary part of quantum theory, just as conservative forces are not a
necessary part of classical mechanics. Of course, Schrödinger’s equation is an
important, interesting part of quantum theory much as conservative classical
mechanics is an important, interesting part of classical mechanics.
Another well studied extension of quantum theory is to include positive
operator valued measures (povm), a generalization of projection (quantum
event) valued measures. These arise so naturally that many researchers con-
sider this to still be quantum theory. It is fine to think of them that way. My
only point is that they are not included in the axiomatization of Chapter 1.
If they are included in new axioms, then the definition of isomorphism of
quantum theories should also be modified. And the Generalized Born Rule
would also have to be changed. But I would expect that the new Generalized
Born Rule would continue to be the fundamental time evolution equation of
quantum theory.
One of the quite wonderful properties of the Schrödinger model is called
unitarity. It says that the time evolution of a state of a quantum system is
realized using the unitary group e−itH/~ for all t ∈ R, where H is a special
self-adjoint operator associated to the system. It is well known that this
unitarity group leads to a unique global (in time) solution of the appropriate
initial value problem. This leads to time reversal invariance of the theory, but
not necessarily of the physical quantum system. I find it perfectly plausible
to replace the unitary group with a semi-group that violates unitarity as well
as time reversal invariance. And that semi-group would describe the model
dependent time evolution of the states. As always, the only time evolution
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relevant to observations, to saving the phenomena, is that of the generalized
Born’s rule. And such a quantum theory would not be less basic than the
‘friction-less’ Schrödinger model. Nor would it nor should it be derivable
from the Schrödinger model. Again, let me note that a different approach is
taken in [1].
Of course, such semi-groups exist and have been studied extensively.
My point is that they should not be considered as approximations in any
sense of that word to a more ‘basic’ Schrödinger model. Neither should they
be considered as being derived nor even capable of being derived from the
Schrödinger model. As with Schrödinger’s equation itself, they are secondary
mathematical structures with no physical significance in themselves, except
that they provide a key ingredient for calculating the time evolution of the
generalized Born’s rule. That is, of course, a legitimate and important role,
which can be recognized as such by including an axiom on semi-groups into
quantum theory as a replacement of Schrödinger’s equation. The idea of
using semi-groups in quantum theory is found in the literature going back to
the 1970’s. See [17], [19] and [24].
My point is that semi-groups should be taken as seriously as Schrödinger’s
equation is. Any supposedly ‘deeper explanation’ of the semi-group as a
merely phenomenological and convenient approximation to a more ‘general’
formulation based on the Schrödinger model may be beside the point. Any
theory should be viewed as phenomenological if it saves the phenomena,
which is one goal of any theory. Further, any theory should be viewed as
convenient if it aids our understanding of nature, which is another goal of
any theory.
A quite nice and successful family of semi-groups is what I wish to call the
Lindbladian model, which is based on quantum dynamical semi-groups. This
choice of name honors the author of [21]. However, as noted in [21] there are
earlier articles on this topic, some of which I cited above. Also see [6], [7] and
[8]. Unfortunately, many authors including Lindblad himself say that they
are using a formulation in either the Schrödinger picture or the Heisenberg
picture. I prefer to view their work as dealing with a newmodel not previously
considered in the quantum literature. One of the motivations for introducing
this model is to facilitate the description of irreversible quantum processes.
This is achieved by allowing non-Hamiltonian systems that do not satisfy
the principle of unitarity. However, one very nice feature of this model (and
models isomorphic to it) is that it includes standard quantum theory as a
special case. So it is also compatible with reversible quantum processes and
104 Beyond Conventional Quantum Theory
unitarity. Another nice feature is that it gives a context in which decoherence
can be studied. The main difficulty with this model is that it can be less than
obvious how to introduce a specific semi-group for studying a specific system.
This difficulty makes intuition hard to come by, at least for me. In standard
quantum theory this is the problem of quantization, which is usually resolved
on a case-by-case basis by appealing to conservative classical mechanics.
To understand better the role of unitarity in this model and other models
of quantum theory we now turn to Wigner’s theorem. Wigner’s theorem is
one of those wonderful results related to standard quantum theory. It is based
on the idea that the Hilbert space expressions with physical significance for
quantum theory have the form
|〈ψ, ϕ〉|2 for unit vectors ψ, ϕ ∈ H. (10.0.1)
We have already noted that these other Hilbert space structures do not have
any physical significance: vector sum, scalar product, inner product.
First, let’s note that (10.0.1) is a probability that comes from Born’s rule.
Let E = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| be the rank 1 event associated to ϕ. Then we calculate
P (E |ψ) = 〈ψ,Eψ〉
= 〈ψ, |ϕ〉〈ϕ|ψ〉
= 〈ψ, 〈ϕ, ψ〉ϕ〉
= 〈ϕ, ψ〉〈ψ, ϕ〉
= |〈ψ, ϕ〉|2.
Consequently, the expression in (10.0.1) is the probability that the event
E associated to ϕ occurs given the state ψ. Since (10.0.1) is invariant if
we interchange of ψ and ϕ, (10.0.1) also is the probability that the event
associated to ψ occurs given the state ϕ. So our axiomatization of Born’s
rule gives the usual physical significance to the expression (10.0.1).
Moreover, as we noted before, the expression (10.0.1) is well defined for
pure states, not just for unit vectors in the Hilbert space H. Specifically, this
means that if we replace ψ with λψ, where λ ∈ C satisfies |λ| = 1 and also
ϕ with µϕ with |µ| = 1, then the expression (10.0.1) does not change.
Next, Wigner introduces the idea that a transformation of the set S of
pure states to itself is an isomorphism from the point of view of quantum
theory if it is a bijection T : S → S such that the expression (10.0.1) is
preserved; this is a special case of conservation of probability. Such a bijection
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is called a Wigner transformation. Then, Wigner proves that every Wigner
transformation is the quotient of a bijection U : H → H that is linear
and unitary or else of a bijection V : H → H that is anti-linear and anti-
unitary. This leads to the powerful corollary that every group of Wigner
transformations Tt : S → S for t ∈ R is the quotient of a group of unitary
transformations Ut : H → H. With a little continuity in the group Tt and
hence also in the group Ut, we can apply Stone’s theorem to write Ut = e−itH/~
for a unique densely defined self-adjoint operator H acting in the Hilbert
space H. We have arrived at the unitary group of the Schrödinger model
(also of the Heisenberg model) from general principles.
But if the Schrödinger model as well as models isomorphic to it are not
the only possible models of quantum theory, then one is obliged to conclude
that some hypothesis used in Wigner’s proof is not a fundamental principle
of quantum theory. I propose that the conservation of probability may not
be a fundamental principle of quantum theory. In my opinion it could be
analogous to the principle of conservation of mechanical energy in classical
mechanics. Conservation of mechanical energy holds in many interesting,
important cases but is not a universal principle of classical mechanics. Anal-
ogously, I am proposing that conservation of probability–and the consequent
unitarity–are not necessarily universal principles of quantum theory. They
are fine in the ‘fiction-less’ case of quantum theory as seen in the Schrödinger
model, but not in general. In this regard one has to view Wigner’s theorem as
a No-Go theorem. It tells us neither conservation of probability nor unitarity
go as an aspect of a more general quantum theory that is not isomorphic
to the Schrödinger model. We now see that in the Lindbladian model the
semi-group in general does not come from a Wigner transformation. And it is
precisely this that makes the Lindbladian model so interesting and meriting
further research. I realize that this idea is controversial, but experiment will
be the judge.
Finally, I conclude with a rather wild speculation. Since events and states
are all that enter the generalized Born’s rule, together with rules for their
time evolution, it seems natural to consider a theory with only these elements.
So, no Hilbert space. Maybe even no ~. There would be a set E of events
and a set S of states. There would be a function
P : E × S → [0, 1].
For E ∈ E and S ∈ S we would say that P (E, S) is the probability of the
event E, given the state S. Adding in two one-parameter groups of bijections
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of E and S, respectively, we would have a time dependent probability theory.
Models of such a theory would be in abundance. Isomorphism would be
defined in terms of preservation of probability. Some other mathematical
structures would eventually have to be imposed on these sets in order to get
a viable theory. For example, consecutive and conditional probabilities could
be introduced. My main point here is that the lattice of projections in a von
Neumann algebra might not be the best place to look for a model of physical
events.
Chapter 11
A Modest Proposal
Bidding good-bye is such sweet sorrow
that I could bid adieu til it be morrow
Romeo in Romeo and Juliette
William Shakespeare
It seems to me that the expression ‘quantum mechanics’ does not adequately
describe the physical theory. It is based on two misleading words. The first
is ‘mechanics’ which originally meant the study of machines but changed
to mean the study of motion. Unfortunately, the concept of motion (as
understood as an object moving along a curve) is not central to the physics
we wish to discuss at the atomic and smaller length scales.
The word ‘quantum’ is even more unfortunate. It was used to contrast
the new theory with classical theory where all measured values could assume
a continuum of possible values. All of a sudden there were physical quantities
whose measured values were in a discrete set. These measured values were
said to be ‘quantized’. While this is an important part of the story, it is
not the whole story. Even in this new theory there are still some physical
quantities with values in a continuum, such as the energy of a free particle.
Other quantities are always ‘quantized’, such as the energy of a harmonic
oscillator (realized as a diatomic molecule, say). But there are mixed cases,
such as the hydrogen atom which has ‘quantized’ energy levels (associated
with the bound states) as well as a continuum of energy levels (associated
with scattering states).
What is important here are the probabilities that arise from the pvm of a
self-adjoint operator and more generally its spectral theory. So it seems more
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appropriate to say Spectral Probability Physics instead of saying Quantum
Mechanics for the physical theory based on self-adjoint operators.
With this modest proposal I bid my gentle reader good-bye.
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